Abstract

The foundation of peace after the Second World War had been laid partly during a number of wartime Allied summit conferences. Among them, the Cairo Conference of 1943 has a far-reaching impact on postwar East Asia. The Cairo Conference was a tripartite summit among Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States of America, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain. At Cairo, the three leaders met to discuss strategic planning and postwar security.

The Cairo Conference was a diplomatic watershed. For the first time in World War II, the Chinese were invited to an international summit, which marked the apex of Sino-American good will in the war. The Cairo Conference has been remembered for three demands: the complete return to Nationalist rule of Chinese territories lost to Japan, the restoration of the independence of Korea, and the unconditional surrender of Japan. What is not known to many, however, is the background of the summit and Nationalist Chinese diplomatic efforts at Cairo. Drawing on Chinese and Western records, this article gives a full account of the Cairo summit.

Key Words: Cairo Communiqué, Cairo Conference, Cairo Declaration, Chiang Kai-shek, World War II
The Cairo Conference: A Forgotten Summit

“I met in the Generalissimo a man of great vision, great courage, and a remarkably keen understanding of the problems of today and tomorrow. We discussed all the manifold military plans for striking at Japan with decisive force from many directions, and I believe I can say that he returned to Chungking (重慶) with the positive assurance of total victory over our common enemy. Today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose.”

US President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Christmas message to the American people, 1943
given after the Cairo Conference

1943 has been called “a year of conferences.”¹ That year witnessed many high-level Allied conferences, which included, in chronological order, the Casablanca, Quebec, Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran conferences. Among them, the Cairo Conference, held in Egypt from November 22 to 26, was the most important wartime summit on East Asia.² At Cairo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill drew up for the first time a new order for postwar East Asia by stipulating the return to the Republic of China of all Chinese territories ceded to or occupied by Japan since the First Sino-Japanese War,³ which included Manchuria (東北), Taiwan (Formosa), the Pescadores (the Penghu Islands, 澎湖群島), and the Liaotung Peninsula (遼東半島); the hand-over of Japanese possessions outside Japan proper, namely, Sakhalin (庫頁島) and the Kurile Islands (千島群島) to the Soviet Union, and some of Japan’s mandatories in the Pacific Ocean to the United States; the independence and freedom of Korea from Japanese occupation; and Japan’s unconditional surrender.

The Forgotten Summit

Of all the Allied summits held during the Second World War, the Cairo

² Historically, the Chiang-Roosevelt-Churchill summit is sometimes referred to as the first Cairo Conference, for there had been another summit in Cairo during the first week of December 1943 among Roosevelt, Churchill, and President of Turkey Ismet İnonü in the wake of the first Cairo Conference. The Anglo-American-Turkish summit is known as the second Cairo Conference.
³ Better known to the Chinese as the War of 1894 (甲午戰爭).
Conference, code-named SEXTANT, was the only one that the Chinese had taken part in. According to the British historian Keith Sainsbury, the Cairo Conference was by November 1943 “the most important and certainly the most high-powered allied meetings of the war so far.” However, in comparison with other wartime Allied summits, the importance of the Cairo Conference has been underrated. The conference has not been widely appreciated for its far-reaching impact on the postwar world, especially on East Asia.

In The History of World War II by the late Swiss historian Eddy Bauer, the Cairo Conference is said to have “a decisive influence on the course of war itself and the peace which was to follow.” Bauer was a distinguished scholar who combined a brilliant academic career as Professor of History at the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland with that of a lieutenant-colonel in the Swiss army. Brigadier-General James Collins, Chief of Military History, US Department of the Army, wrote:

The Second World War has been written about by historians, playwrights, and novelists. Yet most of these authors suffered from the myopia of being participants in these events described or have looked at the war from the sole viewpoint of one or another of the combatants. Now, a Swiss military historian, Lieutenant-Colonel Eddy Bauer, has clearly and without the bias of involvement set forth, as impartially as any one writer can, the tremendous story of millions of men and women surging in battle across the continents. Colonel Bauer, from the depth of his profound study and his understanding of humanity, has produced an extraordinary well balanced account of the conflict.

Like any popular books, Bauer’s The History of World War II has gone through several editions after it was first published in 1966. I have two editions on hand: a revised one published by Galahad Books of New York in 1979, and an updated one published by Barnes & Noble Books of New York in 2000. In the Galahad edition of The History of World War II, now out of print, the eminent British military historian Correlli Barnett has contributed a substantial chapter on the conferences at Cairo and Teheran. However, when Barnes & Noble, a major bookstore chain in the US,
reprinted the book, the sections on the Cairo Conference in Barnett’s chapter were deleted, leaving only those on the Teheran Conference.\(^7\) Bauer’s book on World War II has been praised as “a definitive and classic work: one of the most complete and objective accounts of that great struggle ever to have appeared.”\(^8\) The deletion of information on the Cairo Conference from the Barnes & Noble edition, I am afraid to say, may have compromised the historical objectivity that has made Bauer’s work a classic in the first place.

What has happened to the Barnes & Noble edition of *The History of World War II* is no isolated incident. For example, in *The War Years: A Global History of the Second World War*, the Cairo Conference receives a mention so sketchy and incomplete that one would think it was just another bilateral meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill.\(^9\) *The War Years: A Global History of the Second World War* claims to present “the broad themes of diplomatic, political and military events during the second world war [that] are skillfully woven with the human dimensions to form this major global history of the period,”\(^10\) yet it fails to give any credit to Chinese diplomatic effort at Cairo. In *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945*, the Cairo Conference is conspicuously missing altogether.\(^11\) The New York Review of Books praises *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945* for exploring “comprehensively” the theme of total war.\(^12\) Given the omission of the Cairo Conference, it is incomprehensible just how this particular book is able to explore World War II “comprehensively.”

Since the United States was actively involved in the Cairo Conference, one would think that books on American history might have included it. But for *America and Its People*, a one-thousand-plus-page-long general history of the US and a widely used college textbook, that is not the case.\(^13\) The Cairo Conference is nowhere to be found in the book, though all the other wartime Allied summits at Casablanca,

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\(^8\) Bauer, 1979, p. 7.
\(^10\) Ibid., back cover.
\(^12\) Ibid., back cover.
\(^13\) James Martin, et al., *America and Its People* (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1989).
Teheran, and Yalta have been given credit in it.

The principal reason for this probably lies in the so-called “Europe-first” policy, a strategy of concentrating personnel and materiel in the Europe theater at the expense of other theaters of war for the purpose of speedily defeating Nazi Germany first. Another contributing factor may be the condescending attitude of Churchill, who had scorned the China theater and belittled China’s effort in fighting Japan, both during the war and in his memoirs after the war.

To the best of my knowledge, so far there has been only one book on the Cairo Conference in the English language. The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943, The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences by Keith Sainsbury remains to this day the sole monographic work on the Sino-Anglo-American summit. Sainsbury has written extensively on the diplomatic aspect of the war. The Turning Point, out of print as well, is considered “a thorough, scholarly review of the Big Three meeting at Teheran in November-December 1943, and of the meetings preceding and immediately following.” The only complaint, albeit a minor one, I have for The Turning Point is that its author has consistently misspelled Chiang Kai-shek’s name in the book. The correct spelling of the Chinese Generalissimo is Chiang Kai-shek, not Chiang-Kai-Shek as Sainsbury has it. However, as a Chinese saying goes, “one flaw cannot obscure the splendor of the jade” (瑕不掩瑜). The misspelling of Chiang’s name, though preventable, by no means detracts from Sainsbury’s merit of giving credit to Chiang for participating in the Cairo Conference.

Sainsbury’s book aside, there are two primary sources that I rely a great deal on for this article. Foreign Relations of the United States, abbreviated as FRUS with various dates and published by the United States Department of State, is a collection of multiple volumes of diplomatic correspondence during the war years with special volumes for several of the Allied summits, including the one held in Cairo among Chiang, Roosevelt, and Churchill.


\[14\] Book review by Lucy Edwards Despard, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1985. For an electronic version of the review, visit the web site of Foreign Affairs at www.foreignaffairs.org.
Period of the Resistance War Against Japan: Wartime Diplomacy published by the Kuomintang Historical Commission is also a multi-volume set that sheds light on the diplomatic negotiations and maneuvers among wartime Allied leaders. Just as FRUS reflects the American point of view, Chung-hua-min-kuo chung-yao shih-liao chu-pien reflects that of the Chinese Nationalists, something that has been drowned out in most books on modern Chinese history. Chung-hua-min-kuo chung-yao shih-liao chu-pien is invaluable to a better understanding of the Cairo Conference because it contains a lot of information not found in Foreign Relations of the United States or many other English language records.

The Cairo Conference's Significance to Wartime China

When the Second World War broke out in Europe in September 1939, the Chinese had already endured more than two years of what later became known as the Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japan (八年對日抗戰). From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (蘆溝橋事變) of July 7, 1937, that triggered the Resistance War, to Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Republic of China fought along against Japan. By the spring of 1940, Hitler’s war in Europe had cost the Republic dearly. Under pressure from Japan, Vichy France, a pro-Nazi regime, shut down the railroad between Hanoi (河內), Vietnam, and Kunming (昆明) in China’s Yunnan province (雲南省) in June 1940. A month later, inasmuch as its vulnerability in the West after the debacle of Dunkirk, Great Britain acquiesced in Japanese demands to shut down the Burma Road (滇緬公路) linking Lashio (臘戌) in Burma, to Kunming—the Chinese National Government’s only overland access to the outside world. Nationalist China was thus totally isolated.

December 7, 1941, “a date which will live in infamy” as President Roosevelt put it when giving an account of the events at Pearl Harbor before Congress, turned out to be a blessing to Nationalist China. Japan’s sneak raid on the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on that fatal day assured the beleaguered National Government (國民政府) foreign aid it desperately needed. Furthermore, on December 31, 1941, Roosevelt telegraphed Chiang, proposing the establishment of the China-Burma-India theater

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15 The Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japan is also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War (第二次中日戰爭), as opposed to the First Sino-Japanese War, that is, the War of 1894.
under Chinese command. The importance of financial and military aid from the West, Anglo-American recognition of Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Allied Commander of the CBI theater, and the inclusion of the Republic of China in the “Big Four” (四强) cannot be underestimated. From the Chinese perspective, however, there was one more thing that needed to be done.

In May 1943, a Chinese official close to Chiang revealed to the American naval attaché in Chungking, Nationalist China’s fugitive wartime capital, that the Chinese considered the much publicized meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill an indication that the China theater was secondary and therefore insignificant. This official said that the National Government believed Roosevelt did not regard Chiang as his peer for he had not invited Chiang to a summit. However, the official stated that the Generalissimo could not take the initiative by “begging” Roosevelt for a summit because this would cost him face before his own people. In other words, the Chinese wanted the Americans to propose to Chiang such a conference.

This Chinese official’s anxious expectation for a Sino-American summit is understandable. After Pearl Harbor China became an ally of the Western Powers on no more than a nominally equal footing. Theoretically, it was one of the Big Four. But in terms of decision-making and resources allocation, it was in fact the least among equals. The Chinese perceived a Chiang-Roosevelt conference as imperative to document China’s standing in global affairs and to dispel doubts about the credibility of the Chungking Administration. Furthermore, Chinese morale had sunk to an all-time low by 1943. The Chinese considered the summit an excellent opportunity to uplift the morale of the nation, for it would mean that the Western Powers had neither forgotten nor abandoned their Chinese ally.

Last but not least, so far as Chiang himself was concerned, one of the important things for a head of state, according to Confucian teachings, is the substantiation of his name (正名). Chiang had established his leadership in China. But on the world stage, particularly in his dealings with the Western leaders, he felt the need for legitimizing his standing as head of the Chinese state by being able to “stand and sit

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16 A term referring to the four wartime powers that included the Republic of China, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

as an equal” (平起平坐) with Roosevelt, or Churchill for that matter. A meeting with Roosevelt would have enormous symbolic significance for the Chinese, giving a clear indication that Chiang had indeed been acknowledged as a true world leader.

Hardly alone were the Chinese in thinking that they deserved a more equitable treatment from the Americans. “Following the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan, the United States Government took a number of important steps which demonstrated the desire and intention of the United States to treat China as an equal among the Major Powers and to contribute to the strengthening of the Chinese nation.”18 The first step was to relinquish American extraterritoriality (治外法權,舊譯領事裁判權) and special rights in China, privileges that had been extended to the Americans under the most-favored nation clause (最惠國待遇), as stipulated in the unequal treaties (不平等條約), since the 1840s. On January 11, 1943, Wei Tao-ming (魏道明), the ROC Ambassador and Plenipotentiary to the United States, and Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, signed the Treaty for the Relinquishment of American Extraterritorial Rights at Washington, DC.19

Next came the repeal of the notorious Chinese Exclusion Act (排斥華人法案). In response to the soaring anti-Chinese sentiment in America, Congress passed the act in 1882, suspending Chinese immigration to the US. This was the first and the only time in American history that the country closed its doors to any immigrants for ethno-cultural reasons. During her visit to the United States,20 from November 1942 to May 1943, Madame Chiang Soong Mayling (蔣夫人宋美齡) addressed a crowd of 30,000 at the Hollywood Bowl, urging Congress to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Act. Quick to respond to Madame Chiang’s request, Roosevelt recommended to Congress that the act be repealed in order to “correct a historic mistake” and to give “additional proof that we regard China not only as a partner in waging war but that we shall regard her as a partner in days of peace.”21 Both Houses of Congress passed in

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19 From June 1943 until the end of the war, however, US servicemen in China were again put under American law.


21 United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, p. 37.
large majorities the legislation that rescinded the Chinese Exclusion Act. Roosevelt signed the legislation on December 17, 1943.

The Origins of the Cairo Conference

The relinquishment of American extraterritorial rights in China and the suggestion to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Act were warmly received by the Chinese. Encouraged by the development, Roosevelt was ready to take one step more by inviting his Chinese counterpart to a summit in late 1943. The timing was critical. The second half of 1943 saw great Allied victories in Europe and the Pacific. The Axis Powers were apparently not winning the war. The turn of tide meant that future summits would not only be devoted to strategic planning but also to the planning of a postwar order. Roosevelt appreciated the long-term value of maintaining close ties with Nationalist China, and had wanted it to join the United States, Britain, and Soviet Russia as the Big Four, a position that Churchill found difficult to accept. According to Sainsbury,

Churchill had stressed both publicly and to Roosevelt the importance of maintaining the Anglo-American alliance after the war. Roosevelt, however, considered that future peace and security after the war depended far more on four-power co-operation in the future—that is, between the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. The introduction of Chiang-Kai-Shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader, into the equation, as well as Russia, alarmed and annoyed Churchill. He had little faith in the capacity of the Chinese Nationalist government, either militarily or politically, and he regarded Chiang-Kai-Shek as quite as much an enemy of British imperialist interests as Stalin.22

Churchill, for his part, could not and did not subscribe to the American view, which he believed was too hopeful of a picture of China’s role in the Big Four. He later wrote that:

At Washington I had found the extraordinary significance of China in American minds, even at top, strangely out of proportion. I was conscious of a standard of values which accorded China almost an equal fighting power with the British Empire, and rated the Chinese armies as a factor to be mentioned in the same breath as the

22 Sainsbury, pp. 9-10.
armies of Russia. I told the President how much I felt American opinion overestimated the contribution which China could make to the general war. He differed strongly. There were five hundred million people in China. What would happen if this enormous population developed in the same way as Japan had done in the last century and got hold of modern weapons? I replied that I was speaking of the present war, which was quite enough to go on with for the time being. I said I would of course always be helpful and polite to the Chinese, . . . but that he must not expect me to adopt what I felt was a wholly unreal standard of values.\textsuperscript{23}

Indeed, Roosevelt “differed strongly” from Churchill on China. As Sainsbury points out, the Americans’ desire to have China as a reliable ally outweighed Churchill’s disapproval.

Roosevelt and Hull, however, were determined that China’s position as one of the four major Allies should be recognized. Looking to the future, they regarded China as a more suitable guardian of security in eastern Asia, and possibly a more manageable ally, than the British Empire. At the time this seemed unrealistic to Churchill and [the British Foreign Secretary Anthony] Eden and indeed to many other people. China was poor, economically backward, and riven by internal disorder and civil war. The Nationalist government controlled only about a third of the country, and that the remotest and most primitive part. The Japanese occupied about a half, including all the most advanced areas and the great commercial centers. The Chinese Communists controlled the rest. Yet twenty-five years later the British Empire in the Far East had ceased to exist, and China, united under one government for the first time since 1918, commanded enough muscle or at least enough self-confidence to defy first the United States and then the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{24}

For these reasons, Roosevelt deemed it necessary to cultivate a good personal relationship with Chiang, and decided to invite the Chinese leader to a quadripartite summit in which leaders of the Big Four could confer with each other.

The President did wish to meet Chiang-Kai-Shek. China was to be, in Roosevelt’s conception, the fourth main element in the post-war organization for international security. But in order to fulfill that role China had first to be


\textsuperscript{24} Sainsbury, p. 14.
strengthened militarily and politically. She had to be enabled to play a major part if possible in winning the war, and helped to regain her lost territories; and her status had to be recognized by Britain and, even more important, by Russia.  

It soon became evident, however, that a four-power conference would not be congenial to Churchill, Chiang or Joseph Stalin. Churchill had no desire to see Chiang. He was worried that China might become powerful enough to challenge British interests in the Far East.

In spite of Chinese denials, the British Foreign Office also suspected Chiang of further expansionist aims, threatening possibly British possessions in South-east Asia and even India itself. Churchill regarded it as particularly sinister that Chiang had shown a marked sympathy for the aspiration of the Indian nationalist leaders, most of whom had been jailed for the duration of the war. It was hardly likely that Churchill would welcome any proposal to elevate the Nationalist regime to a higher place in the councils of the Allies.

Churchill claimed that “it is an affectation to pretend China is a Great Power,” and had misgivings about the possibility of China joining “the United States and Russia in opposing British imperial interests” after the war. Eden “agreed that the American view of China’s potential future role was ‘unreal’ but felt Britain had to accept this unreality for the sake of the Anglo-American alliance. Churchill was not really convinced, but tended in practice to fall in with this view.” It was out of this consideration that the British grudgingly agreed to a summit with the Chinese.

Chiang welcomed the opportunity to talk with Roosevelt, but he was not all that keen on having the Russians around at the same conference. Chiang knew Stalin

25 Ibid., p. 126.
26 Speaking of Chiang’s showing “a marked sympathy for the aspiration of the Indian nationalist leaders,” it should be recalled that he visited India in February 1942. While there, Chiang met with Mohandas Gandhi and his protégé Jawaharlal Nehru, both of the Indian National Congress. India’s struggle for independence from British rule is a long story. It is suffice to say here that the Indian National Congress wanted to drive the British out of India and the country was on the verge of revolution in World War II. Six months after Chiang’s visit to India, the British authorities in Indian arrested Gandhi and Nehru on charges of inciting the masses to boycott British manufactured goods, especially British woven cotton textiles, and to replace them with Indian homespun cotton cloth.
27 Sainsbury, p. 145.
28 Ibid., p. 146.
29 Ibid., p. 146.
personally and he understood Russian history and the Communist record far too well not “to entertain grave doubt of the friendly intentions of the Soviet Government towards China.” As Chiang told Brigadier-General Patrick Hurley, sent to Chungking as Presidential Special Envoy by Roosevelt in the eve of the Cairo Conference, he was mindful of Moscow’s intentions of communizing China.30 The Generalissimo did not conceal his mistrust of the Communists. His first contact with communism came in his late thirties when he was sent to Russia for three months by Sun Yat-sen, in 1923, to observe the Soviet military system, the political indoctrination of the Red Army, and the methods of discipline of the Bolshevik Party. Chiang’s firsthand experience in dealing with the Communists since the 1920s uniquely qualified him to appreciate the threat to China of Soviet imperialism and its Chinese minions.

Since the start of the Resistance War, the Chinese Communists and many Westerners had assailed Chiang for using many of his best troops to blockade the Communist base in northwestern China rather than deploy them against the Japanese. This allegation has a basis in fact, but it reflects American or British rather than Chinese perspective. From 1937 onward, Chiang was actually engaging in a two-front war. For him, the defense of China and its traditional values requires not only resistance against the Japanese, but also against the insidious influence of the Chinese Communists who were committed to subverting virtually everything the Kuomintang stood for. Chiang expressed his priorities succinctly to General Hurley that “the Japanese are only the lice on the body of China, but Communism is a disease of the heart.”31

As much as Chiang had wanted to see Roosevelt in order to secure greater American aid, “the Chinese leader was reluctant to face his Russian counterpart, embittered as he was by the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of 1941 and the alleged Soviet support of the Chinese Communists.”32 On June 7, 1943, Chiang, in a telegram, instructed his foreign minister Soong Tse-ven (宋子文) to inform Roosevelt that a quadripartite conference might cause complications for Soviet-Japanese relations.

“I am grateful for President Roosevelt’s proposal for inviting Churchill, Stalin,

30 FRUS, 1943, China, p. 164.
and me to a conference, and for his willingness to consult with me before the
course. However, I feel that before the Soviet Union breaks off its diplomatic
relations with Japan, my presence at such a conference may cause uneasiness for
Stalin. If my concern proves to be legitimate, it may be necessary that Britain,
America, and Russia proceed with the conference for the sake of strategic planning,
which must not be delayed until a four-power conference can be arranged. It is my
intention that American, British, and Soviet leaders convene without me. As for
myself, I would like to have a heart-to-heart talk with President Roosevelt. Should an
opportunity come up, I look forward to seeing the President. If President Roosevelt
thinks that I have to attend the conference regardless, and he is not worried about the
aforementioned concern of mine, then I would not dare turn down his invitation. It is
my wish that you deliver this message to President Roosevelt in person.”

Chiang’s determination to avoid Stalin can also be seen in his July 21, 1943
telegram to T. V. Soong.

“I wonder if President Roosevelt had mentioned to you the location of [the
proposed conference] when you two met? . . . Speaking of which, I thought that if I
am to travel to Alaska for the conference, I will have to go through Siberia in Russia.
If I do not see Stalin [on my way to Alaska via Siberia], it may have a negative impact
on Sino-Russian and international relations. For this reason, it is better that the
location be chosen somewhere [other than Alaska]. It is up to President Roosevelt to
decide the appropriate location. When he does that, please ask him to inform me of his
decision.”

Obtaining Russia’s assent to a four-power summit was even more difficult.
Chiang had no desire to see Stalin, and the feeling was mutual. The Moscow
Conference of Foreign Ministers (莫斯科外長會議) of October 1943 is a good
example of this. When Roosevelt conceived the idea of a four-power conference in
mid-1943, Moscow seemed a likely location for such a gathering. The Americans had
come up with a Declaration of Four Nations (四國普遍安全宣言) on peace,
security, and disarmament, for which they wanted to obtain the endorsement of China,
Britain, and Russia at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. But getting

34 Ibid., p. 493.
China to participate in the Moscow Conference or to sign the Four-Power Declaration proved to be a tough sell.

A Four-Power Declaration implied that the US wished China to be one of the signatories. The Soviet government immediately pointed out that this was to be a tripartite conference, in which China would not take part. Hull was already aware that it would be difficult to secure British and Soviet assent to Chinese participation in the Declaration. The British regarded China as too weak, politically and militarily, to rank as one of the “Big Four,” or as Roosevelt called them “The Four Policemen.” The Russians for their part had no love for Chiang-Kai-Shek, shared the British view of China’s weakness, and in any case did not want Far Eastern issues mixed up in the conference. They were not, as Stalin pointed out, involved in the war with Japan, and China was therefore not really an ally of theirs. Stalin professed to be afraid of provoking the Japanese into an attack on the USSR, if he seemed to be associating too closely with the Chinese Nationalists.  

However, “Hull was determined that China should sign the Declaration,” and the British and Russians eventually acquiesced in the American request. On October 30, 1943, Fu Ping-chang (傅秉常), the ROC Ambassador to Russia, signed the Declaration on behalf of the Chinese National Government, which was not invited to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers after all US efforts. With the signing of the Four-Power Declaration by Hull, Fu, Eden, and Viacheslav Mikhailovitch Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, “Hull for his part had secured two of his main objects—Soviet/British participation in the US plan for post-war security, and the recognition of China as one of the Big Four.”

As its name suggests, the Moscow Conference was a meeting for foreign ministers of the Big Three; Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were not present. Roosevelt was therefore eager to talk with both Chiang and Stalin in a quadripartite summit, to be held in Cairo towards the end of 1943. At the Moscow Conference “the strength of the American drive [had elevated] China to an equal position with the Big Three,” but that was how far Stalin was willing to go along with the Americans so

36 Ibid., p. 15.  
37 Ibid., p. 91.  
38 Ibid., p. 39.
far as China was concerned. This helps to explain in part Stalin’s subsequent steadfast refusal to renew his old acquaintance with Chiang at the proposed quadripartite summit in Cairo. In a telegram to Roosevelt dated November 5, 1943, Stalin wrote that:

“I have been charged with the duties of Supreme Commander of the Soviet troops and this obliges me to carry out daily direction of military operations at our front. . . . Under such condition for myself as Supreme Commander the possibility of traveling farther than Teheran is excluded. My colleagues in the Government consider, in general, that my traveling beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. at the present time is impossible due to great complexity of the situation at the front.”

By November 1943, Soviet Russia and Japan were not at war with each other because of the five-year Russo-Japanese neutrality pact concluded in April 1941. Stalin could not afford a two-front war against Japan and Germany. Rightfully considering Hitler a much more formidable foe, Stalin had to concentrate on the Europe theater. For this reason, he did not wish to jeopardize his relations with Japan by attending a conference with Japan’s three archenemies. He did not want to risk provoking a possible Japanese declaration of war, followed by a Japanese blockade of the strategically important seaport of Vladivostok; its exposed location between the Japanese-controlled Manchuria and Japan proper made it vulnerable to Japanese attack, as the Russians had not forgotten since the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.

Although Stalin would not commit himself to a four-power summit in Cairo, he did agree in the above telegram that Molotov could act on his behalf at the conference. “An idea occurred to me about which I already talked to Mr. Hull. I could be successfully substituted at this meeting by Mr. V. M. Molotov, my first deputy in the Government, who at negotiations will enjoy, according to our Constitution, all powers of the head of the Soviet Government.”

But within a week, the Soviet dictator changed his mind about sending Molotov over to Cairo. In another telegram to Roosevelt on November 12, Stalin’s intention of having nothing to do with the

40 Lohbeck, p. 166.
41 FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 68.
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upcoming Cairo Conference was all too obvious. Furthermore, in the telegram Stalin made clear his determination to avoid seeing the Chinese at future conferences.

“Although I had already written to the President, that Mr. V. M. Molotov would be in Cairo by November 22, I have, however, to say that due to some reasons, which are of a serious character, Mr. Molotov, unfortunately, cannot come to Cairo. He will be in Teheran at the end of November and will come there together with me. And some military men will come with me. It goes without saying that in Teheran a meeting of only three heads of the Government is to take place as it was agreed upon. And the participation of the representatives of any other countries must be excluded. I wish success to Your conference with the Chinese on Far Eastern Affairs.”

Military considerations thus provided Chiang and Stalin with convenient excuses. Both men used their concern for the Soviet military situation as a legitimate means of avoiding a possible awkward reunion. The distrust, or enmity perhaps, between the two leaders meant that Roosevelt would have to meet them one at a time, with Chiang in Cairo and with Stalin later in Teheran.

The Chiangs Come to Cairo

While Stalin was hesitating about attending the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt and Chiang were making headway for the summit. In a cable dated October 30, 1943, Roosevelt advised Chiang to “make arrangements to meet with Churchill and me in general neighborhood of Cairo about November twenty-six.” In another cable to Chiang on November 8, Roosevelt stated that:

“I am leaving for North Africa in two or three days and I hope to get to Cairo on the twenty-first. Churchill will meet me there. We hope to meet Marshal Stalin in Persia about the 26th or 27th. However I would prefer that you and Churchill and I meet before that. Therefore can you try to reach Cairo by the 22nd of November? We will arrange good accommodations and guard for you and your party in or near Cairo. Please let me know as soon as you can.”

For his reply, Chiang wrote that:

\[42\] Ibid., p. 83.
\[43\] Ibid., p. 56.
\[44\] Ibid., p. 72.
“Mme Chiang came down with flu and dysentery. Funeral of late President Lin Sen (林森) scheduled for 17th. Provided Mme Chiang has recovered I intend to leave here early on the 18th. Otherwise I must delay my departure, in which case your conference with Stalin can take place before ours. I prefer seeing you before you see Stalin and sincerely hope our plans will work out in that way.”

Given her remarkable command of English, Madame Chiang’s presence at the Cairo Conference was crucial to the cause of Nationalist China. For this reason, Madame Chiang’s untimely ailment weighed on both Chiang and Roosevelt. On November 10, Roosevelt cabled Chiang, saying that: “I am terribly sorry to learn of Madame Chiang’s illness and sincerely hope that she will be fully recovered in time for our conference. I agree with you fully that we should meet together before I see Stalin. I want so much to have some good talks with you so, naturally, I am eagerly looking forward to seeing you.”

Although Madame Chiang had not yet fully recovered, she decided to go to Cairo with her husband. In the early morning of Sunday, November 21, 1943, the Chiangs arrived at Cairo, accompanied by an entourage of fifteen people. Upon arrival, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang received a warm welcome from General Claire Chennault (陳納德), Commander of the US Fourteenth Air Force, who escorted them to their villa. Churchill reached Cairo in the afternoon on the same day. Roosevelt did not come to Cairo until the morning of November 22.

The site of the Cairo Conference was the Mena House Hotel. Located on the west bank of the Nile River and fifteen kilometers southwest of Cairo, Mena House is a grand establishment with magnificent views of the pyramids of Giza and the Sphinx.

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45 Ibid., p. 73.
46 Ibid., p. 77.
47 For a list of the Chinese mission in Chinese, see Appendix I.
48 Erstwhile known as the Flying Tigers (飛虎航空隊).
50 Arguably the most luxurious and certainly the most historic hotel in Egypt, Mena House was built by Ismail, Khedive of Egypt, as a royal hunting lodge and a guesthouse. With the opening of the Suez Canal, Ismail enlarged the guesthouse to receive international royal guests including, for example, Empress Eugénie, wife of Napoleon III of France. However, Mena House was so rarely used that Ismail offered it for sale in 1869. The new owner converted it into a hotel and renamed it Mena House after the first of the 76 kings on the famous Tablet of Abydos. Today, Mena House operates under the name Mena House Oberoi.
The three leaders and other conference participants were installed in the luxurious villas surrounded by palm-shaded gardens, near the Mena House Hotel.

At 4 p.m., November 21, Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador to Egypt and one-time British Ambassador to China, called on Chiang, stating that the Prime Minister had arrived at Cairo a short while ago and would like to pay a visit to the Generalissimo at 5:30 p.m. But Chiang decided that he should take the initiative in visiting Churchill, and went over to Churchill’s villa at 6:30 p.m. In the presence of Wang Chung-hui (王寵惠), Secretary General of the Chinese Supreme National Defense Council, and Lord Louis Mountbatten, Commander of the Southeast Asia Command, the two leaders talked for half-hour. The atmosphere was cordial.

The next day, Churchill returned the courtesy by visiting the Chiangs at their villa, where they spoke for thirty minutes. Those who were present included Wang, Lord Mountbatten, and General Carton de Wiart, Churchill’s personal representative with Chiang.51 Chiang made quite a first impression on Churchill, who regarded him as having a “calm, reserved and efficient personality.”52 But as the conference proceeded, Churchill became increasingly bitter towards Chiang as soon as he realized that “it was not a happy conference for the British” and that he “had to sit by while the President was closeted with Chiang and his wife.”53

The Burma Campaign under Debate

“Like early purely Anglo-American summits,” writes Correlli Barnett, the Cairo Conference “witnessed the paradox of cordial personal relations between heads of state and between military staffs coupled with mistrust and maneuvering behind the smiles because of differing national attitudes and interests.”54 This was best exemplified by the debates over the Burma campaign, an operation proposed by the Chinese at Cairo to ensure that military aid would reach Chungking by recovering Burma and reopening the Burma Road.

The plan of recapturing Burma originated with General Joseph Stilwell (史迪
As commanding general of the Allied forces in Burma, Stilwell admitted that the loss of Burma to Japan in June 1942 had been a fiasco, both in terms of his reputation and China’s situation in the war. He candidly stated: “I claim we got a hell of beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell.” Stilwell, who was in command of one hundred thousand Chinese troops when he first took command in Burma, fled with only “26 Americans, 13 British, [and] 16 Chinese.”

Stilwell’s defeat cost Nationalist China its best trained and equipped troops, the Fifth Army. It also cost China its vital lifeline, the Burma Road, and completed the total land blockade of the country. The British had reopened the Burma Road in late 1940 when the Royal Air Force was winning the Battle of Britain over the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force. The loss of Burma as a result of Stilwell’s defeat ruined everything for Chungking. Save for the air route over “the Hump” of the Himalayas, no communications remained between Nationalist China and its allies. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Burma fiasco. One thing is clear, however, the disastrous first Burma campaign almost made China’s situation untenable. According to Madame Chiang, Chinese morale after the loss of Burma was “never lower,” and Chiang warned Roosevelt that this might lead to “total collapse of Chinese resistance.”

Thirsting for vengeance, Stilwell was determined to push through a second Burma campaign by which he hoped to restore his reputation by retaking Burma. Stilwell may have left Chiang with the impression that he was more concerned about his personal reputation than about the China theater. Chiang thought the campaign to recover Burma ought to be a joint Allied operation. He doubted if the Chinese forces alone were enough to accomplish the task, and had reservations about committing them to another battle against the veteran Japanese army in a remote place with little hope of success. Chiang’s caution was misinterpreted by Stilwell as “deliberately trying to avoid to fight the Japanese [thus] leaving the job to the United States.”

Eventually Chiang agreed to a second Burma campaign—on conditions that the
Americans would provide air and land support, and the British would launch a naval attack on the strategic Andaman Islands off southern Burma in the Bay of Bengal (Operation Buccaneer) when the Chinese began their land attack from northern Burma (Operation Tarzan)—and promised Stilwell that he would present the Burma campaign in Cairo for further discussion. At Cairo, Chiang spoke in the full conviction to Roosevelt and Churchill that:

I am of the opinion that simultaneous naval and land operations will give the best chance of success for the operations. I cannot emphasize enough that as long as the enemy can be supplied by sea, our operations have no certainty of success. If we had control of the sea, we could cut off enemy reinforcements and supplies by sea. This would create conditions favorable to our land operation. Burma is the key to the whole campaign in Asia. If the Japanese lose Burma, their position in southern and central China would be untenable. For this reason, it is imperative that our forces turn out in full strength. According to intelligence, the Japanese could deploy up to ten divisions to defend Burma. Bear in mind that if the enemy’s rear services were not cut off, they could build up their military forces. After Japan is cleared out of Burma, the enemy’s next stand would be in northern China and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma would be a very serious matter to the Japanese and they would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to retain their hold on the country. The importance of the Burma campaign can thus be seen.

The American military planners also favored the second Burma campaign and had been calling for military operations in the area since January 1943 for reasons as follows: “[To] conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, [long-range bomber] bases essential for eventual operations against Japan proper.” At the Quebec Conference, August 1943, the Americans had restated the necessity to use China as a base for air offensives against Japan.

China offered the best potentialities for bombing Japan, for attacking Japanese

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60 Ibid., pp. 256-257.
communications to the South Seas, and for mounting an invasion of Japan. . . . The emphasis in the plans for the defeat of Japan . . . still lay in establishing Allied power in North China. Approval of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) proposal for a drive across the Central Pacific did not minimize the importance of Chinese bases, for the part that Pacific islands could play in strategic aerial bombardment of Japan was not yet realized.63

The proposed Burma campaign met with strong British opposition. Writes the American historian Francis Loewenheim,

Churchill was very skeptical of the value of a campaign designed to reopen the Burma Road to increase the flow of supplies to China. He believed that even if this operation proved successful, the buildup of China would come too late to be of substantial assistance in ending the war with Japan. Furthermore, he considered that the resources necessary for operations in northern Burma and for an amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean would be better employed in the Mediterranean.64

According to Sainsbury,

Churchill had no desire to meet with Chiang-Kai-Shek, or to spend hours discussing potential allied operations in Burma to help the Chinese. He had no enthusiasm for such operations in jungle conditions favorable to the Japanese. . . . In any case he regarded the Burma theater and the Chinese as of minor importance compared with the great issues to be decided in Europe, or for that matter compared with the vast operations already being launched in the Pacific and New Guinea by the American commanders Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur.65

By his own admission at Cairo, Churchill said the recent surrender of the Italian fleet in September 1943 had made it possible for the British to dispatch a number of capital ships, which were to be based in Ceylon, to the Bay of Bengal.

Owning to the surrender of the Italian Fleet and other naval events of a favorable character, a formidable British Fleet would be established in due course in the Indian Ocean. This would ultimately consist of no less than 5 modernized (Renown Class)

64 Loewenheim, p. 275.
65 Sainsbury, p. 125.
capital ships, 4 heavy armored carriers, and up to 12 auxiliary carriers, together with cruisers and flotillas. This force would be more powerful than any detachment which it was thought that the Japanese could afford to make from their main fleet in the Pacific.

But sending warships to the Indian Ocean was one thing, and helping the Chinese was another. Churchill did not relish the idea of committing the Royal Navy to China’s cause. He told Roosevelt and Chiang that the assembly of a British fleet in the Indian Ocean might not be soon enough for Operation Buccaneer, which was tentatively scheduled for March 1944. Churchill stressed at the conference that:

He was unable to agree that the success of the land operations entirely hinged on a simultaneous naval concentration. The [British] fleet could not, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed, until some time later. The ships had to be tropicalized and fitted with special equipment. Some would be starting soon, but the build-up to full strength would not be achieved until the late spring or early summer of 1944.

Churchill believed that British naval operations in the Bay of Bengal had little to do with the prospect of success of Chinese land campaign in northern Burma. Churchill wrote in his memoirs that “he specifically refused the Generalissimo’s request that we should undertake an amphibious operation simultaneously with the land operations in Burma.” At Cairo, Churchill insisted that Operation Buccaneer would not only reduce the number of landing craft available to Operation Overlord, the cross-Channel attack on Hitler’s Festung Europa (Fortress of Europe), and delay the operation, but would also jeopardize the British campaign in Italy.

Ten months earlier at the Casablanca Conference Churchill had expressed his desire of not having anything to do with the China theater. General George Marshall (馬歇爾), the US Chief of Staffs, warned that if the Burma campaign was not undertaken, something unexpected might happen in the Pacific theater that would

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66 FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 314.
67 Ibid., p. 315.
68 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 333.
70 The English Channel between the British Isles and France.
72 Ibid., p. 753.
“necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater.” In spite of the stern warning from Marshall, Churchill reiterated his objection to the Burma campaign at Cairo. He had expected the Cairo Conference to be devoted to operations that he considered more urgent in Europe such as Operation Overlord; the military projects in the Aegean Sea against the Island of Rhodes by which he hoped to induce Turkey to enter the war against Germany; and the invasion of the European continent via the Balkans. He had very little interest in the China theater.

So far as the CBI theater was concerned, Churchill’s only worry was the safety of India. He wanted to use the military supplies and naval forces assigned to the second Burma campaign to defend India and to retake possibly Hong Kong and Singapore. The British Staffs claimed that the main thrust of the Japanese army was in the Pacific, not in Burma, and that it was impractical to concentrate large amounts of personnel and materiel in Burma.

The British were against the second Burma campaign for another reason. Churchill had never considered Burma an area of much strategic value. He nevertheless wanted to repel the Japanese from Burma, not to reopen the Burma Road in the interest of Nationalist China, but to rebuild British imperial prestige in East Asia that had been tarnished as a result of the capture of Hong Kong and Singapore by the Japanese in 1942. Should the second Burma campaign become a reality, it might undermine further British prestige in the region by providing the Chinese with an opportunity to claim credit for the liberation of Burma. This was unacceptable to Churchill, who therefore wanted to accomplish the mission of recovering Burma along, with no help from either the Chinese or the Americans.

Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek’s Japanese biographer, writes that Churchill’s lack of enthusiasm for the second Burma campaign can also be explained

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74 Lohbeck, pp. 258-259.
75 Loewenheim, p. 275.
in that the British were fighting in Asia primarily to preserve their own interests. Should China emerge from the war as a great power in East Asia, it might challenge British interests in the area. 78

Furuya’s view is shared by John Davies, 79 an American foreign service officer on Stilwell’s staff in 1943. In a recently declassified confidential memorandum that Davies prepared on November 15, 1943, he asserted that although the United States believed it was fighting against Japan “seeking to punish aggression,” in reality, American soldiers were being killed on the battlefield to defend British imperial interests. 80 As for the second Burma campaign, Davies maintained that the British would like to liberate Burma only by Dominion forces for they were “frankly afraid that the Chinese will retain or claim any section of Burma which they recapture.” 81

There was one major difference between the United States and Britain over strategy in the Pacific War. The British advocated retaking Hong Kong and Singapore, and turning them into naval strongholds so that the Allies could defeat Japan mainly with sea power. The Americans, on the other hand, believed that a total naval blockade of Japan would not guarantee a final victory if the Japanese army on the Asian continent could still put up a fight. 82 Furthermore, the Americans were concerned about the possible repercussions of China’s dropping out of the war as a result of not receiving adequate military and economic aid from its Western allies. For the Americans, China was “potentially an important base for long-range air attacks on Japan. The Burma campaign would be a necessary prelude to the more effective participation of China in the war.” 83 As Marshall pointed out,

If the armies of and government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been finally defeated, Japan would have been left free to exploit the tremendous resources of China without harassment. It might have made it possible, when the United States and Britain had finished the job in Europe and assaulted the Japanese home, for the

79 Davies was at the Cairo Conference.
81 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
82 Sherwood, p. 773.
83 Loewenheim, p. 275.
government to flee to China and continue the war on a great and rich land mass.84

The Americans’ willingness to discuss seriously with the Chinese the second Burma campaign caused tremendous chagrin for the British. Churchill regarded the Americans as “very touchy about the Pacific [theater]”85 and Roosevelt as having “an exaggerated view of the India-Chinese spheres.”86 Churchill fumed at the Chinese in his memoirs:

The talks of the British and American Staffs were sadly distracted by the Chinese story, which was lengthy, complicated, and minor. . . . The President . . . was soon closed in long conferences with the Generalissimo. All hopes of persuading Chiang and his wife to go and see the Pyramids and enjoy themselves until we returned from Teheran fell to the ground, with the result that Chinese business occupied first instead of last place at Cairo.87

Not to be outdone by his chief, Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, complained to Marshall that the discussion of the Burma operation with the Chinese “was a complete waste of time.”88 Brooke also mockingly described Chiang in the following words: “The Generalissimo reminded me of a cross between a pine-marten and a ferret. A shrewd, foxy sort of face. Evidently with no grasp of war in its larger aspects, but determined to get the best of all bargains.”89

Believing that the British did not share America’s profound interest in the China theater and considering the talks of the Anglo-American Combined Staffs on the Burma campaign unproductive, Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff of the US Navy and “a slightly more impartial observer of the Chinese than Brooke,”90 as Sainsbury describes, wrote in his memoirs:

The Prime Minister seemed determined to remove his landing ships from that effort. The discussion became almost acrimonious at times. Carrying out the orders of Churchill, their Commander-in-Chief, the British staffs headed by Brooke insisted

86 Ibid., p. 753.
87 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 328.
88 Sainsbury, p. 187.
89 Barnett, p. 415.
90 Sainsbury, p. 187.
that the Andaman operation could not be carried out. I informed our British colleagues that the American Chiefs could not recede from their present position on the Andaman attacks without orders from the President. At the same time, the President, Prime Minister, and Chiang were in conference all afternoon, probably discussing the same question. We knew that Chiang would persist in his demands for the Andaman Islands campaign and we thought that the President should continue to support him despite Churchill’s objections.

They (the British) obviously did not have the same deep interest in China that we had. They seemed to overlook the fact that the defeat of Japan would cost many more ships, lives, not to mention dollars, if Chiang’s ill-equipped, ill-fed armies were not kept in the field. The Chinese were not winning many battles. Except for a few American-trained divisions perhaps they didn’t fight well, but the fact could not be discounted that Chiang had several million men under arms and was forcing Japan to keep a large standing army in China and to keep it supplied. The American Chiefs of Staff were convinced that support of China was essential to our own safety and to the success of the Allied cause.⁹¹

Roosevelt shared Leahy’s view that keeping China in the war was crucial to the Allied cause in the Pacific, and was determined to support his military planners on the Burma campaign. Sainsbury elaborates that:

No international system would work if it lacked the support of the world’s most powerful states. In the event of allied victory these would be the United States, Russia, and Britain. China was a special case. For the moment she might be economically backward, politically divided, and militarily weak, as Russia had been twenty years earlier, but her potential was enormous. It was on grounds of potential rather than actual power that Roosevelt based his argument for the acceptance of China as a fourth member of the allied “Great Power Club.” The President had used this argument to Eden amongst others during the latter’s Washington visit earlier in 1943, together with the contention that a strong and united China would be a useful counterpoise to Russia in the Far East. On both counts it could be argued that Roosevelt showed considerable prescience. But this view had both military and political implications. The purpose of the projected campaign to reconquer Burma, which the Americans had been urging on the reluctant British for some time, was not

only to reopen a channel for supplies to the Chinese and so enable China to play a more effective military role against Japan; it was also to give the war-weary Chinese renewed hope and confidence in the goodwill of their allies and in their future role in the world. Roosevelt further intended to bolster Chinese morale and the position of the Chinese leader, Chiang-Kai-Shek, with assurances of generous treatment after the war. China was to regain all the territories she had lost to the Japanese, including Formosa, which had been Japanese territory for nearly fifty years.

The long-term considerations for sustaining China during the war so it could become a powerful and dependable ally of the United States after the war prompted Roosevelt to agree to carry out both Operations Buccaneer and Tarzan in early 1944. But caught between Chiang and Churchill, Roosevelt found himself in a difficult situation. So “Roosevelt went behind his British ally’s back to promise Chiang that ‘Buccaneer’ would take place,” leading the British to believe that they had succeeded in persuading the Americans to delay a final decision on the second Burma campaign at the Cairo Conference.

The Cairo Communiqué

The Cairo Communiqué (開羅公報) was the Sino-Anglo-American summit’s greatest political achievement and it survived the second Burma campaign. Roosevelt abandoned Operation Buccaneer only ten days after the Cairo Conference, to be discussed later. On the other hand, what was stipulated in the Cairo Communiqué on the recovery of lost Chinese territories and the independence of Korea had been fully implemented after the war.

The Cairo Communiqué is better known as the Cairo Declaration (開羅宣言). “Communiqué,” which means “official announcement,” and “declaration,” meaning “announcement,” are synonyms, and have been used interchangeably in this context. The use of “declaration” or “communiqué” is a personal choice. For example, the US Department of State uses “communiqué” in its Foreign Relations of the United States, while historians like Barnett and Sainsbury use “declaration” in their respective

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92 Sainsbury, pp. 138-139.
93 Barnett, p. 416.
94 For Chinese and English texts of the Cairo Communiqué, see Appendices II and III.
The Cairo Conference: A Forgotten Summit

writings.

The Cairo Communiqué is the official appellation, the proper designation, for the joint announcement made by Chiang, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Cairo. The Cairo Declaration is the popular name (俗名) of the Cairo Communiqué. An argument can be and has been made that there is really no such a thing as the Cairo Declaration per se. When making this kind of argument, however, one has to bear in mind that the Cairo Declaration is the Cairo Communiqué, and vice versa. Declaration or communiqué, the truth of the matter is that the Cairo joint announcement does exist. To claim that there has never existed a Cairo Declaration is at best juggling with terms, and at worst tempering with historical facts.

The Cairo Communiqué is an essential part of the agenda on wartime political cooperation between the United Nations that the Chinese Mission had prepared for the conference. The Chinese agenda consisted of four major parts: the establishment of the United Nations; the creation of an international peace-keeping organization under the aegis of the Republic of China, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union; China’s role in accepting Germany’s surrender; and the issues on postwar East Asia, including the Big Four’s joint commitment to Korean independence and the complete restoration of Chinese territory after the war, which was the forerunner of the Cairo Communiqué.

The lengthy, stormy discussions about the second Burma campaign at Cairo are well documented in American and British records. But there is not much information available from Western sources about how the Cairo Communiqué was to be drawn up. Instead, I have found Chung-hua-min-kuo chung-yao shih-liao chu-pien: chan-shih wai-chiao very helpful in piecing together as faithfully as possible how the communiqué was written.

The first discussion of the aforementioned Chinese agenda took place at the Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting, November 23, without the presence of the British. This made it difficult for the British to alter the text of the communiqué to their advantage at the expense of Nationalist China. Those who were dinner guests included Madame Chiang and the President’s Special Assistant Harry Hopkins.96

Chiang and Roosevelt reached an agreement that night: the complete return of all

96 Ibid., pp. 525-528. See also FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, pp. 322-325.
Chinese territories occupied by Japan after the war, namely, Taiwan, the four Northeastern provinces (東北四省), the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula with its two ports, Dairen (大連) and Port Arthur (Lushun, 烏蘇); the permanent deprivation of Japanese occupied islands in the Pacific; Korea was to become free and independent after Japan’s defeat; and the Chinese Government should take over all Japanese industries and businesses in China after the war as reparations.\(^98\) Strangely, in spite of its far-reaching impact on post-war East Asia, no US record of the Roosevelt-Chiang dinner conservation exists. For this reason, the Americans, when preparing the volume of *FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943*, asked the Chinese Nationalists for help, which is acknowledged in that volume.

No official American record of the substance of this conversation has been found and apparently none was prepared. In response to an inquiry from the editors [of *FRUS*] in 1956, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Dr. Hollington Tong)\(^99\) ascertained that the Chinese Government had in its files a summary of this conversation in the Chinese language. The Chinese Government kindly prepared an English translation and granted permission for its publication in this volume. In view of the paucity of authoritative information respecting the Roosevelt-Chiang discussions at Cairo, the Chinese memorandum is reprinted below.\(^100\)

A summary of the Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting is included in *Chung-hua-min-kuo chung-yao shih-liao chu-pien: chan-shih wai-chiao*.\(^101\) Writes Sainsbury:

As usual there is no US record of this meeting, but it is clear that post-war problems rather than current military questions were the main subject of conversation. According to the Chinese records, it was at this meeting that Roosevelt made those large post-war promises to Chiang which were designed to keep the Nationalist leader in the saddle, stiffen Chinese determination to continue the fight, and ensure post-war Chinese friendship towards the United States. This is not to say, however, that

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97 The four Northeastern provinces include Liaoning (遼寧), Heilungkiang (黑龍江), and Kirin (吉林) that make up Manchuria, and Jehol (熱河).
99 Hollington Tong (董顯光) attended the Cairo Conference in the capacity as Deputy Propaganda Minister of the Republic of China.
100 *FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943*, p. 322.
Roosevelt did not believe in the intrinsic merits of his proposals. China, he assured Chiang, was to be a permanent member of the “Big Four” in the projected international organization. Her lost territories—the North Chinese provinces, Manchuria, Formosa, the Pescadores islands—would be restored to her.102

At the close of the November 23 dinner meeting, the President instructed Hopkins to draw up a draft communiqué based on the agreement that he had reached with the Generalissimo. Hopkins completed the draft on November 24 and presented it to the Chinese for comments. The Chinese were satisfied with the draft, which was then revised by Hopkins the next day.103

The Deliberation over the Final Communiqué

The revised draft of the communiqué was ready for a tripartite meeting scheduled for the afternoon of November 26.104 The three leaders were joined by Madame Chiang, the US Ambassador to Russia Averell Harriman, Wang Chung-hui, Eden, and the British Deputy Foreign Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan. At the meeting, the British spared no efforts finding fault with the text, especially the part about the restoration of China’s lost territories.

As noted, the British were not invited to the Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting in the first place. Later, adding much to the increasing British frustration, Hopkins showed the text of the draft to the Chinese without showing it first to the British. Hardly surprisingly, the British thought that they had been kept in the dark. When the British had a chance to read the draft, “Cadogan soon discovered ‘flaws and omissions’ from the British point of view, and had been obliged to [argue] with Wang and Harriman on the subject.”105

Cadogan recommended that the sentence stating “the territory that Japan has so

102 Sainsbury, p. 188.
103 Chung-hua-min-kuo chung-yao shih-liao chu-pien: chan-shih wai-chiao, Vol. 3, p. 528. See also FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 402. For the text of the draft communiqué, see Appendix IV.
104 Chung-hua-min-kuo chung-yao shih-liao chu-pien: chan-shih wai-chiao, Vol. 3, p. 530. According to FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 366, “no [US] official record of the substance of this meeting has been found.” For the text of the revised draft communiqué, see Appendix V.
105 Sainsbury, p. 214.
treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China” be changed to “the territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be given up by Japan.” Cadogan suggested leaving “be returned to the Republic of China” out of the text. He explained that the British Parliament might demand an explanation from the British government why the communiqué would favor the Chinese by stating specifically that Manchuria and Taiwan be returned to China, while it made no reference to other Japanese occupied areas to which countries they would be returned. Cadogan said it was common knowledge that Manchuria and Taiwan belong to China, and it would not be necessary to reiterate that in the text.\(^\text{106}\)

By “other Japanese occupied areas,” Cadogan was referring to the British colonies in East Asia. If the communiqué was to be specific on the return of lost Chinese territories, this could be an opportunity for the British to reclaim their disintegrated colonial empire in Asia as well. However, a fundamental difference existed between the Chinese and British claims. The communiqué promised the return to the Republic of China of lost territories that had been rightfully parts of China. What the British wanted to reclaim were colonies that they had taken by force in the first place. Roosevelt had always made clear his objection to colonialism and did not support the British on the issue.\(^\text{107}\)

Wang Chung-hui told Cadogan that he had no objection to the suggestion that Manchuria and Taiwan “will of course be given up by Japan.” It had to be clear, however, that these territories were to be returned to China when Japan gave them up after the war. Wang maintained that he, or the Chinese Government for that matter, could not accept the suggestion to leave “be returned to the Republic of China” out of the communiqué. Such a suggestion, he warned, might cast doubts on the legitimacy of China’s claim to Manchuria and Taiwan. Wang pointed out that it was public knowledge that the war broke out in East Asia as a result of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. For this reason, he asserted, it was the responsibility of the Chinese Government to see to the restoration of Manchuria and other lost territories be spelled

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out in the communiqué as clearly as possible.\textsuperscript{108}

Undaunted, Cadogan argued that the phrase “the territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese” had already indicated that Manchuria and Taiwan would be returned to China once Japan gave them up. The phrase “be returned to the Republic of China” was therefore superfluous. Wang countered by saying that the communiqué would lose its significance completely if the text was to be equivocal. Stressing that China’s determination to be specific on the text regarding the return of lost territories was an effort to forestall any probable foreign designs on Manchuria and Taiwan in the future, Wang insisted that the phrase “be returned to the Republic of China” be kept in the text. Wang’s position won the support of Harriman, who agreed that the wording of the communiqué must be clear. The Chinese and Americans then decided that the statement “the territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China” be kept in the text.\textsuperscript{109}

The promise of Korean independence troubled the British as well. Korea lost its independence when Japan forced upon it an annexation treaty on August 22, 1910. Chiang maintained that there would be no permanent peace in East Asia until Korea’s independence was fully restored.\textsuperscript{110} That being said, the Chinese believed that restoring independence to Korea would require collective actions on the part of the Big Four for the following reasons.

By late 1943, Korea was still under Japan’s occupation and the last thing Stalin would do was to provoke the Japanese by advocating Korean independence. In consideration of its relations with Japan, Russia might not wish to take a stand on the issue at the present time. As for Britain, it would probably oppose a public pronouncement for Korean independence because this would make the British look hypocritical if they were to pledge another occupied country independence while keeping India in fetters. If Russia and Britain were reluctant to support Korean independence, the Chinese calculated, the United States would definitely hesitate over the matter. Under the circumstances, if China acted alone in supporting Korean

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., pp. 531-532.
independence, it might give rise to the false impression that a rift had developed within the Big Four.\textsuperscript{111}

Cadogan proposed to change the phrase that after Japan’s defeat Korea “shall become a free and independent country” to “shall be no longer under Japan’s control.” Wang again expressed his disapproval, maintaining that the expansion of Japanese influence to the Asian continent started with the annexation of Korea. Wang insisted that Korea’s independence and freedom after the war be guaranteed in the communiqué. Stating only that Korea “shall be no longer under Japan’s control,” he stressed, would sow the seeds of further problems for the country’s future.\textsuperscript{112}

Cadogan replied that the British Cabinet had not deliberated on the Korea issue prior to the Cairo Conference. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the British Government to make a decision on Korean independence without first consulting with the Cabinet. Furthermore, Cadogan claimed that it might not be a good idea to discuss Korea independence before the Russians declared where they stood on the issue, and suggested that it be removed entirely from the text. Harriman then stepped in and overruled Cadogan, stating that the President’s opinion was that Korean independence had nothing to do with the Russians and it would not be necessary to discuss the matter with them.\textsuperscript{113}

At the end of the meeting, Churchill presented his own text of the draft, which was shorter than the American one. According to Churchill, the shorter the text, the less military information would leak out. In his text, Churchill added to the US draft a statement that the Three Powers— the Republic of China, the United States, and Great Britain—“covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.” Upon reading the British draft, Wang suggested adding the Pescadores to the phrase “Manchuria and Formosa shall be restored to the Republic of China,” so that it reads “Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China.” Wang’s suggestion was at once written into the text, and the three leaders agreed to accept the British draft as the final version of the communiqué.\textsuperscript{114}

With the text of the communiqué finalized, the Cairo Conference officially came to an

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 532.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 532.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pp. 532-533.
end. The three leaders left Cairo the following day, Saturday, November 27.

The Release of the Cairo Communiqué

The Cairo Communiqué was scheduled for release at 23:30 Greenwich Mean Time, Wednesday, December 1, under Cairo dateline. News services were given the text of the communiqué before the official release time so that they had enough time to transmit via radio the text to newspapers around the world, and this created a problem. In the course of the Cairo Conference, the press was subjected to censorship for apparent security reasons. Hopkins had specifically requested that “newspapers and radio stations are directed not to make advance statements of any kind whatsoever [about the conference] until exact hour of release” of the text of the communiqué, which was “secret and confidential until the hour for publication and must not be discussed outside newspaper offices or speculated upon in any way.”\textsuperscript{115} Still, Reuters (路透社) broke the news of the conference almost one day ahead of the communiqué’s official release.

The Reuters dispatch, as printed on the front page in the New York Times of December 1, 1943, reads as follows:

“Lisbon, Portugal, Nov. 30—President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have completed a long conference in Cairo and are now en route to somewhere in Iran to meet Premier Stalin, it is known here definitely.

“Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took part in the Cairo conference and will also meet Premier Stalin.

“A communiqué agreed on after the Cairo conference will be published later this week. The three statesmen met on one occasion in a tent in the shadow of the Pyramids.

“During the conference Cairo was cut off from communications with the rest of the world. President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who was accompanied by Madame Chiang, traveled to Cairo by air, while Prime Minister Churchill traveled by sea.”\textsuperscript{116}

Based in London at 85 Fleet Street since 1939, Reuters has been a major

\textsuperscript{115} FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, pp. 450-451.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 452.
international news agency. The very fact that Reuters is located in Britain caused the Americans to react strongly to the British over the Reuters incident. In a cable wired on November 30 to Brendan Bracken, the British Minister of Information, Elmer Davis, Director of the US Office of War Information, wrote bluntly that:

“I must enter the most energetic protest against the Reuters dispatch purporting to come from Lisbon and distributed today. While I realize that Reuters is a purely private institution on which the British government has not the slightest shadow of influence, this dispatch is reported to have been passed by the British censorship for radio transmission abroad though we understand it was not published in the United Kingdom. I need hardly point out to you the very unfortunate consequences. First is a serious and perhaps perilous violation of security. Second, the political warfare value for both the American and British governments of the meetings and the decisions made thereat will be materially lessened by premature disclosure of the fact which enables the Germans and the Japanese to blanket the world with their version of the story before the actual announcement is on the record. Finally, a consideration not without importance is the universal indignation of the American press at Reuters disclosure here though not in British Isles of facts this morning imparted to American newspapers with instruction to observe extraordinary precautions to preserve secrecy. As you know this is far from the first time that such an incident has occurred though this exceeds all its predecessors in flagrancy. This practice could become one of the most serious obstacles to Anglo-American understanding. In the interest of that understanding, as well as our coordinated propaganda against the enemy, I most urgently request you to see that censorship holds Reuters in line hereafter.”

On December 2, Stephen Early, Roosevelt’s secretary, cabled Hopkins, stating that:

“Reuters’ treatment Cairo story provoked bitter resentment by American newspapers. Protests have been sent to Bracken and according to press reports today Reuters premature release was subject of heated debate in House of Commons. Bracken disclaimed responsibility. However, the Reuters story, circulated generally elsewhere some 33 hours ahead of official release, was not permitted by British censors to be published in England. . . . We have pleaded with British censorship and government for greater security. Reuters action seems most reprehensible to us. Their

117 Ibid., pp. 452-453.
reports gave away practically the entire Cairo story except actual text of communiqué. The text was about all they did not publish in advance of communiqué. Washington correspondents are disposed to place the responsibility for Reuters’ actions on the British, not on us. . . . They are making on their own responsibility formal protest to Halifax (the British Ambassador to the US) here.”

In spite of strong reactions to the Reuters incident, the most the Americans could do, as Early suggested, was the “reduction of time interval between distribution and publication should other official communiqués be issued” and “strict prohibition against export of contents of future communiqués prior to release date.” A fly in the ointment nonetheless, the Reuters incident in no way changed the fact that the Cairo Communiqué was received with great enthusiasm in the United States, as Early had assured Hopkins, and China.

The Discussion of Returning Hong Kong to Chinese Rule

For the Chinese Nationalists, the most rewarding part of the Cairo Communiqué has to be the solemn promises to return Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores to the Republic of China. At first, the Nationalists had wanted to reclaim more territories than those; they wanted Hong Kong back as well. China ceded the small island to Britain under duress in the 1842 Treaty of Nanking (南京條約), which ended the Opium War (鴉片戰爭) between the two countries.

The British were frankly afraid to lose Hong Kong to its rightful owner. Churchill, according to Sainsbury, “raised no objection to the promises to restore Chinese territory, always provided there were no references in the communiqué to Hong Kong.”

The [Chinese] Nationalist leaders were known to be bitterly opposed to European imperialism; it was indeed almost the only point on which Chiang agreed with the Communists. As a result of considerable pressure Chiang had already that year (1943) induced Britain to abandon the extraterritorial rights which British subjects

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118 Ibid., p. 454.
119 Ibid., p. 453.
120 Ibid., pp. 453, 455.
121 Sainsbury, p. 214.
had long enjoyed in China. The next step would probably be a demand for the return of the great port and naval base of Hong Kong.122

At Cairo, Chiang reminded Roosevelt of China’s unwavering claim to Hong Kong. “It seems that the Chinese leader asked Roosevelt to use his good offices with Churchill” for the return of Hong Kong to the Republic of China.123 Indeed, on November 23, “Roosevelt put forward his suggestion that the British should make a gesture to the Chinese by handing back Hong Kong, which China might then lease back to Britain. Thirty years afterwards it does not seem a particularly outrageous suggestion, but like most similar approaches on imperial problems it received a dusty answer from Churchill.”124

Later at the Teheran Conference, Churchill said to Roosevelt that “Britain desired no extension of territory, but would not give up what she had, and that included Hong Kong and Singapore.”125 Churchill’s stance meant that the issue of returning Hong Kong to Chinese rule would not be resolved at Cairo. As history has shown, it would have to wait until much later, fifty-four years later to be exact.

The Discussion of the Independence of Tibet

After Hong Kong, Tibet was another area that the Chinese Nationalists had hoped to reclaim at Cairo. Long before the Cairo Conference, China and Britain had been quarreling over Tibet. The Chinese Government accused the British of encroaching upon its sovereignty by promoting the independence of Tibet. Although the Tibet Issue, like that of Hong Kong, was not officially on the agenda of the conference, the Chinese and British did discuss it at Cairo. The conversation took place after a lunch banquet on November 26 among Wang Chung-hui, Eden, and Cadogan.126 During the conversation, Wang made it clear to the British that:

The Generalissimo considers the Tibet Issue a major obstacle to Sino-British relations. The fact that Tibet has been an integral part of the Chinese nation means that Tibet’s relationship to the rest of China is purely a matter of China’s internal

122 Ibid., p. 145.
123 Ibid., p. 188.
124 Ibid., p. 185.
125 Ibid., p. 248.
126 The November 26 conversation was found neither in The Turning Point nor FRUS.
affairs. It is the wish of the Chinese Government that Britain could fundamentally alter its existing policy towards Tibet. It is hoped that both China and Britain could fully understand this in order to improve the relations between the two countries.  

For his part, Eden said that he had discussed the matter with his Chinese counterpart T. V. Soong some time earlier in London, and that he realized there was a considerable difference between the Chinese Government’s position and that of the British Government. Eden refuted the allegation that his government was meddling in China’s domestic affairs by supporting Tibetan independence. He stated that because the Chinese Government had previously allowed Tibet complete self-rule, the British had freedom of action in Tibet.

Wang maintained “there is no room for doubt that Tibet has been an inseparable part of China. There is no justification for the British to undermine the sovereignty of China. The Tibet Issue has been dragged out for too long and has to be settled as quickly as possible. In order for that to happen, the British will have to abandon their unreasonable policy towards Tibet or the relations between the two countries may suffer as a result.”

According to Sainsbury, when Churchill added to the communiqué the statement that the Three Powers “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion,” he might have done it in the belief that this particular statement “might be of future use in dealing with Chinese claims on Hong Kong and Tibet.” At Cairo, Chiang told Roosevelt that “China would not give up its traditional claim to Tibet.” However, Chiang had never regarded reclaiming Hong Kong and Tibet as coveting gains for China or as having thoughts of territorial expansion on the part of China. At the conference, the Chinese had sought unsuccessfully, not for the lack of trying, for a British commitment to leave Tibet alone. The Tibet Issue remains to this day an open question.

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128 Ibid., p. 534.
129 Ibid., p. 534.
130 Sainsbury, p. 214.
131 Ibid., p. 215.
The Aftermath of the Cairo Conference

The Cairo Conference was the only occasion on which Chiang conferred with other Allied leaders during the war. The conference was invaluable to Chiang. It gave him the undisputed status of a world leader. Writes Sainsbury:

The political discussions at Cairo had profound implications for the future. China had been promised the repossession of all her lost territories in the north. . . . The boosting of China’s position in the post-world, also promised by Roosevelt, had equally important implications for the future. . . . [Roosevelt] felt, according to Hull, that he had established a satisfactory personal relationship with Chiang-Kai-Shek—in his view one of the most important objectives of the conference. In a cable to Hull he said enthusiastically that he “had had a very satisfactory conference with Chiang-Kai-Shek, and liked him. As for Chiang, he departed from the conference “with high hopes.” Politically he had been promised the earth, or a good part of it, and militarily, to quote Averell Harriman, “he believed his main demands had been met.”

Upon returning to Chungking, Chiang wrote to Roosevelt and Churchill, thanking them for the conference. Perhaps Madame Chiang better described the Chiang’s gratitude to Roosevelt for supporting China’s cause at Cairo. In a telegram to Roosevelt, November 26, she wrote:

“My Dear Mr. President: You will, I hope, forgive me for this uncertain letter, for I am still Cyclops, and the letters all run together very unneatly. But the Generalissimo wished me to tell you again how much he appreciates what you have done and are doing for China. When we said goodbye to you this afternoon, he could not find words adequately expressive to convey his emotions and feelings, nor to thank you sufficiently for your friendship. He felt too the wistfulness of saying farewell, although he feels that only a short while will elapse before his next meeting with you. Meanwhile he hopes that you will consider him as a friend whom you can trust. He on his part finds joy and comfort in the thought that as time goes on, the bonds of affection and similarity of motives between you and him will be

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132 Sainsbury, p. 216.
133 A euphemism for Madame Chiang’s eye trouble at the time of the conference.
The Cairo Conference: A Forgotten Summit

strengthened.

“Will you please overlook this very inadequate interpretation of his views, for I have a full day, and my brain simply cannot encompass what he conveyed to me on to you.

“On my own behalf, Mr. President, please remember that as I write this, my heart overflows with affection and gratitude for what you have done, and for what you are.”

On the day he left Cairo for Teheran, Roosevelt wrote to Kung Hsiang-hsi (孔祥熙), the Chinese Finance Minister, that “our visit here in Cairo with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang has been not only very delightful but it has been a true success. It is the beginning of many such conferences, I hope.”

Roosevelt’s positive views of Chiang and the conference were best summed up in the Christmas message that he delivered to the American people by radio from his home at Hyde Park, New York, December 24, 1943.

“At Cairo and Teheran we devoted ourselves not only to military matters, we devoted ourselves also to consideration of the future—to plans for the kind of world which alone can justify all the sacrifices of this war.

“The Cairo [Conference] gave me my first opportunity to meet the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and Marshal Stalin—and to sit down at the table with these unconquerable men and talk with them face to face.

“At Cairo, Prime Minister Churchill and I spent four days with the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek. It was the first time that we had an opportunity to go over the complex situation in the Far East with him personally. We were able not only to settle upon definite military strategy, but also to discuss certain long-range principles which we believe can assure peace in the Far East for many generations to come.

“I met in the Generalissimo a man of great vision, great courage, and a remarkably keen understanding of the problems of today and tomorrow. We discussed all the manifold military plans for striking at Japan with decisive force from many directions, and I believe I can say that he returned to Chungking with the positive assurance of total victory over our common enemy. Today we and the Republic of

134 FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 442.
135 Ibid., p. 441.
China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose.”

Although Roosevelt and the Chiangs enjoyed seeing each other, and were hoping for more of such occasions in the future, the Cairo summit turned out to be their last. As the war drew to a close, Roosevelt’s health deteriorated, and on April 12, 1945, while at Warm Springs, Georgia, he died of a cerebral hemorrhage at the age of sixty-three.

Despite the handsome rewards reaped by the Chinese Nationalists at Cairo, not all of the promises made to them had been kept in the end. As it turned out, the promise to carry out the second Burma campaign was just as real as mirage in the desert, where, ironically, it was given. At the ensuing Teheran Conference, November 28 to December 2, 1943, Stalin promised Roosevelt to enter the war against Japan as soon as Germany surrendered. “Now that Stalin had pledged that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after Hitler was defeated, there seemed to be less immediate need to build up China as a [long-range bomber] base for the closing phase of the war against Japan.” Sainsbury writes that:

The long-sought promise that the USSR would enter the Japanese war had given the British a further argument against “Buccaneer”—namely that the logical strategy to pursue for the defeat of Japan would be to combine attacks across the central Pacific with the threat from the Soviet Union. The latter could provide bases much closer to Japan than any the Chinese Nationalists could offer. This made China itself less important to the Allied war effort, and consequently reduced the importance of keeping China in the war—though that in any case could probably be achieved by maintaining supplies to China “over the Hump.” As for “Buccaneer,” and indeed the whole Burma campaign, these now fell back into a position of comparative unimportance.

Churchill welcomed Stalin’s decision to enter the war against Japan and seized the opportunity to persuade Roosevelt to abandon Operation Buccaneer. Admiral Leahy described the situation:

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137 Loewenheim, p. 276.
Churchill used every artifice in his large repertoire to induce Roosevelt to agree to drop the amphibious expedition in the Bay of Bengal and to use those naval, air, and ground forces to seize his pet Island of Rhodes [in the Aegean Sea]. . . . But the President didn’t bulge. Roosevelt insisted that promises made to Chiang Kai-shek be fully carried out. The Burma-versus-Mediterranean word battle continued throughout December 4, with a Combined Staff meeting at noon with the President and Prime Minister. Neither side would yield. . . . At no time in previous or later conferences had the British shown such determined opposition to an American proposal.\textsuperscript{139}

But eventually, Churchill was able to convince Roosevelt that dropping Operation Buccaneer would allow the Allies adequate landing craft for operations in Europe.\textsuperscript{140} Roosevelt, “worn down by Churchill’s nagging,” finally gave in and on December 6 informed Chiang of the decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer and ordered the landing craft assigned to the operation be transferred to Europe.\textsuperscript{141} Operation Tarzan was postponed until November 1944.\textsuperscript{142} At one point of the Teheran Conference, General Marshall even offered to postpone Operation Overlord if that were necessary to make Operation Buccaneer possible, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{143} After the war, Churchill wrote in defense of his opposition to Operation Buccaneer:

Certainly we favored keeping China in the war and operating air bases from her territory, but a sense of proportion and the study of alternatives were needed. I disliked intensely the prospect of a large-scale campaign in North Burma. One could not choose a worse place for fighting the Japanese. Making a road from Ledo to China was also an immense, laborious task, unlikely to be finished until the need for it had passed. Even if it were done in time to replenish the Chinese armies while they were still engaged it would make little difference to their fighting capacity. The need to strengthen the American air bases in China would also, in our view, diminish as Allied advances in the Pacific and from Australia gained us airfields closer to Japan. On both counts therefore we argued that the enormous expenditures of man-power and material would not be worth while.

We of course wanted to recapture Burma, but we did not want to have to do it by

\textsuperscript{139} Leahy, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{140} Matloff, pp. 370-371.
\textsuperscript{141} Lohbeck, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{142} Kimball, p. 616.
\textsuperscript{143} Barnett, p. 416.
land advances from slender communications and across the most forbidding fighting country imaginable. The south of Burma, with its port of Rangoon （仰光）, was far more valuable than the north. But all of it was remote from Japan, and for our forces to become side-tracked and entangled there would deny us our rightful share in a Far Eastern victory.144

The decision to torpedo Operation Buccaneer “was the only time during the war that Roosevelt overruled his chiefs-of-staffs,”145 and it frustrated many. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of US Naval Operations, said: “Chiang would consider that he had been double-crossed.”146 Admiral Leahy wrote in his memoirs the following:

It must have been a sad disappointment to Chiang. The Chinese leader had every right to feel that we had failed to keep a promise. . . . I felt that we were taking a grave risk. Chiang might drop out of the war. He never had indicated much faith in British intentions, but had relied on the United States. If the Chinese quit, the tasks of MacArthur and Nimitz in the Pacific, already difficult, would be much harder. Japanese man power in great numbers would be released to oppose our advance toward the mainland of Japan. Fortunately for us, the courageous Chinese stayed in the fighting.147

Leahy could not be more right in stating that Chiang “never had indicated much faith” in the British. When Roosevelt first agreed to the second Burma campaign, Chiang knew the British might talk him into going back on his word. As Chiang wrote in his diary: “When Roosevelt assured me that the British would undertake an amphibious operation across the bay of Bengal in coordination with our offensive in North Burma I was skeptical. Yet I took his words at face value.”148 Although Chiang might have seen this coming, it did not make him any less frustrated when the bad news did come. On December 9, “in ominous tones,” Chiang explained to Roosevelt his bitter disappointment:

“I have received your telegram of December Sixth. Upon my return [from Cairo] I asked Madame Chiang to inform you of the gratifying effect the communiqué of the Cairo Conference has had on the Chinese army and people in uplifting their morale to

144 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 494-495.
146 Matloff, p. 372.
147 Leahy, pp. 213-214.
148 Furuya, p. 786.
continue active resistance against Japan.

“First, prior to the Cairo Conference there had been disturbing elements voicing their discontent and uncertainty of America and Great Britain’s attitude in waging a global war and at the same time leaving China to shift as best she could against our common enemy. At one stroke the Cairo communiqué decisively swept away this suspicion in that we three had jointly and publicly pledged to launch a joint all-out offensive in the Pacific.

“Second, if it should now be known to the Chinese army and people that a radical change of policy and strategy is being contemplated, the repercussions would be so disheartening that I fear of the consequence of China’s inability to hold out much longer.

“Third, I am aware and appreciate your being influenced by the probable tremendous advantage to be reaped by China as well as by the United Nations as a whole in speedily defeating Germany first. For the victory of one theater of war necessarily affects all other theaters; on the other hand, the collapse of the China theater would have grave consequences on the global war. I have therefore come to this conclusion that in order to save this grave situation, I am inclined to accept your recommendation. You will doubtless realize that in doing so my task of rallying the nation to continue resistance is being made infinitely more difficult.”

In spite of Roosevelt’s high-sounding words that as a result of the Cairo Conference the United States and “the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose,” the greatness that the Chinese Nationalists had achieved at Cairo was partially offset by the cancellation of Operation Buccaneer. Stalin’s promise of declaring war on Japan as soon as Germany surrendered altered Allied strategy in East Asia. Emerging from the Teheran summit, the Soviet Union became America’s new ally in that part of the world at the expense of Nationalist China.

It was doubtful if Russian participation in the war against Japan was absolutely necessary in the light of atomic bombs. Writes Sainsbury: “hindsight tells us that the atomic weapon made Soviet assistance unnecessary for the west; and indeed it may have been unnecessary anyway, if Roosevelt and his military advisers had been prepared to contemplate a much larger American casualty rate in the later stages of

149 Romanus, p. 74.
the Pacific war.”

Taking up the cudgels for the Chinese Nationalists, Francis Loewenheim states that “if the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were generally most successful from a military planning point of view, they were considerably less so from a political standpoint. At the Cairo meeting, Chiang Kai-shek, whose country had borne the brunt of Japanese aggression since 1931, came away with little more than paper promises of future military assistance.” At the Cairo Conference, the Chinese Nationalists argued for the cause of China and Korea with determination, but lost out to the Soviet promise to enter the war against Japan. The cancellation of the Burma campaign, according to Furuya, marked the beginning of American withdrawal from its commitment to the Republic of China.

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150 Sainsbury, p. 306.
151 Loewenheim, p. 276.
152 Furuya, pp. 788-789.
Appendix I

中華民國政府出席開羅會議代表團名單
王寵惠（國防最高委員會秘書長）
商震（軍事委員會辦公廳主任）
林蔚（侍從室第一處主任）
周至柔（軍事委員會航空委員會主任）
董顯光（宣傳部副部長）
楊宣誠（軍令部副部長）
郭斌佳（外交部參事）
俞濟時（侍衛長）
蔡文治（駐美軍事代表團團員）
黃仁霖（軍事委員會戰地服務團總幹事）
陳希曾（侍從室組長）
陳平階（侍從武官）
俞國華（侍從秘書）
左維明（隨從醫官）
陳純廉（蔣夫人英文秘書）
Appendix II

開羅公報
(The Cairo Communiqué, Chinese Version)

羅斯福總統、蔣委員長、邱吉爾首相，偕同各該國軍事與外交顧問人員，在北非舉行會議，業已完畢。茲發表概括之聲明如下：

「三國軍事方面人員，關於今後對日作戰計劃，已獲得一致意見。我三大盟國決心以不鬆弛之壓力，從海、陸、空各方面，加諸殘暴之敵人。此項壓力已經在增長之中。

我三大盟國此次進行戰爭之目的，在於制止及懲罰日本之侵略。三國決不為自己圖利，亦無拓展領土之意思。三國之宗旨，在剝奪日本自從一九一四年开始第一次世界大戰開始後在太平洋上所奪得或佔領之一切島嶼。在使日本所竊取於中國之領土，例如東北四省、臺灣、澎湖羣島等，歸還中華民國。其他日本以武力或貪慾所攫取之土地，亦務將日本驅逐出境。我三大盟國稔知朝鮮人民所受之奴隸待遇，決定在相當時期，使朝鮮自由與獨立。

根據以上所認定之各項目標，並與其他對日作戰之聯合國目標一致，我三大盟國將堅忍進行其重大而長期之戰爭，以獲得日本之無條件投降。」
The Cairo Conference: A Forgotten Summit

Appendix III

The Cairo Communiqué

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

“The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

“The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

“It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

“Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

“With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.”
Appendix IV

American Draft of the Cairo Communiqué

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. The time, place, and scope of our joint offensives in this area cannot now be disclosed, but Japan will know of their power.

We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan’s specific and definite pledge not to so militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever, and the territory they have so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our three countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who took part with the Generalissimo in several of the conferences with our military leaders.
Appendix V

Revised American Draft of the Cairo Communiqué

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. They issued the following joint statement:

“The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for continuous and increasingly vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. Japan will know of its power.

“We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan’s specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever.

“The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches.

“We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the proper moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

“We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.

“The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madame Chiang Kai-shek.”
Appendix VI

British Draft of the Cairo Communiqué

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

“The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

“It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, including particularly Manchuria and Formosa, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

“With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with the rest of the United Nations, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.”
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