

# 全球衝突及其管理：以網路恐怖主義為案例

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## 摘 要

本論文旨在將「社會衝突」概念類比到「全球社會衝突」論述中，並藉由全球治理相關理論來探討網路恐怖主義案例。

根據社會學家 Lewis Coser 所著《*The Functions of Social Conflict*》一書，「社會衝突」除了扮演釋放社會緊張的「安全閥」角色外，亦為區分社會中「我群」(we-group)與「他群」(others-groups)的工具。基此，群體間的衝突往往更能激化各自群體內共同意識的建立與凝聚。衝突發生的時機多屬「管理正當性缺乏」時，國際衝突亦然。英國學派中所探討的「秩序」(order)概念即附屬於「正當性」演進過程中的內容改變；管理規則的正當性越充足，秩序越容易維持。

恐怖主義的研究需要科技整合，以免陷入單一視角觀察所產生的疏漏與偏頗。21 世紀的全球化（國際）社會中，網路的連結讓恐怖主義的散播更為容易、迅速；如何瞭解網路恐怖攻擊的背後成因與事先預防成為吾人無法逃避的責任。本文嘗試以全球治理理論來探討在這個高度網路連結的全球社會中，如何有效降低全球衝突的發生率，並對抗網路恐怖主義。

**關鍵詞：**社會衝突、恐怖主義、網際網路、全球治理

# **The Global Social Conflicts and Its Governance: In the case of internet terrorism**

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## **Abstract**

This article begins with the analysis of concept from “social conflicts” to “global social conflicts” and then goes on to explore the internet terrorism based on the theory of global governance.

According to Lewis Coser’s *The Functions of Social Conflict*, the role of “social conflicts” is not only a safety-valve to release the intensive social tensions but an effective way to distinguish the “we-group” and “others-groups” in a society. Conflicts happened when the legitimacy of rules is absent or less-accepted. In this case, to strengthen the contents of legitimacy seems the best way to reduce the occurrence of conflict, and it may also applicable to international conflicts. The main idea of the English School is the revolution of the international world and its emphasis of the order. Order exists when legitimacy stands firm. In contrast, Michael Mann’s “interstitial” space toward traditional institutions resulted in the absence of internet regulation is thus worthy of our further investigation.

In the third part of this paper, the author thus argues that the concept of global governance may be the suitable remedy to cure this “interstitial” problem and to manage other international conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as well.

**Keywords: social conflicts, terrorism, internet, global governance**

## Introduction

After the end of Cold War, the period of nothing but ideological confrontation, this world has been interwoven as a concept of “global village” gradually. It is no doubt that the Internet network plays a vital role in this globalizing process. Along with political and military issues, economical disputes, and cultural identification puzzles, terrorist attacks become another global issue. All of which issues cannot be solved by single nation alone because of their trans-national characteristics. In the Cold War period, it is quite normal to hold the non-intervention principle to deal with international affairs for “showing respect” to the sovereignty of each state. Likewise, it is also evident that low-level intervention usually occurs in the post-Cold War period for fulfilling the principle of human rights.

In my view, the dichotomous division of the world into two camps (i.e. capitalism and communism) has negative impact on social character of human community. The division of world to a great extent hinders people from interacting with each other freely. It is an ARTIFICIAL and ABNORMAL expedient design action in human history. So, the end of Cold War means the rediscovery of sociality of this world. Moreover, the wide-spread of internet speeds up this socialization process of the post-Cold War world especially.

This research is aimed to analogize the concept of from “social conflicts” to “global social conflicts” and then to discuss its governance by exerting the theory of global governance in the case of internet terrorism. First, the author explores and reviews the literatures of social conflicts related theories. Second, it aimed to analogize conflicts in social level to world level and to check its possibility. Then, Rosenau’s global governance theory will be used to examine the internet terrorism. In the end, this study concludes the findings and suggests some approaches for the continual research in the future.

## Social Conflicts and Global Social Conflicts

### *A. The Concept of Social Conflict*

It is a good starting point to define “society” and ”conflict” once we want to

discuss “social conflicts.” In this part, author tries to explore the definition of “society” and to find a suitable one matching the theme of this article. Then the same process is exerted to “conflict” which weighs as important as “society”, and author begins to discuss the meaning of social conflict according to these definitions.

(a) What is a society?

People usually have a loose and flexible usage of “society” whether in ordinary life or in academics. For example, most sociologists, such as Comte, Spencer, Marx, and Durkheim, define a society as “a unitary social system.” Talcott Parson, who is famous for his idea of systematic society, goes further. In his research, a society is a “type of social system, in any universe of social systems which attains the highest level of self-sufficiency as a system in relation to its environment” (Parson, 1966: 9). Michael Mann once examined the etymology of “society” and also tried to define it. According to his research, “society” derives from the Latin “*societas*” which comes from “*socius*” (Mann, 1986: 14). The meaning of “*socius*” is non-Roman ally but willing to follow Roman in war. Mann found that another roots of society is “*sekw*”, a common usage in Indo-European language, meaning “follow.” In his book, Mann chose the latter root of society to construct his own definition of society: “a society is a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment” (Mann, 1986: 13). Relating to the definition of Parson’s, Mann developed his own one by adding so-called “a network of social interaction at the boundaries” to illustrate the evolutionary character of modern world. And the evolutionary characters of society will be discussed further when author explores the definition of conflicts.

As for the notion of “network” in social theories, Mann pointed out that there are two existing approaches: Marxists and Weberians (Mann, 1986: 12). The former approach stressed the economic factor of a society and saw the totality as “ultimately,” meanwhile, the latter approach developed a multifactor view of a society where the totality is a complex interplay of dimensions. The one thing both shared is the unitary concept of a society. We can go further by merging these two views. There are several dimensions, such as political, economical, “social” and cultural, in a society, and those interactions of these networks produce many social phenomena. Election is one of these phenomena, distribution of wealth is a phenomenon, social movements belong to a phenomenon, and identity building is also a phenomenon, no doubt. Every phenomenon is a product, no matter intended or not intended, of the

interplay of these social dimensions, and there are several networks exist under the boundary of each dimension.

According to Mann's definition of a society, it is clear that networks in a society work as basic interactive "units" when we try to analyze the content of a society. In the Stone Age, we find out the exchange network to understand their economic, even political, life. In pre-Industrial Age, we should research the feudal-yeoman and monarch-church networks respectively to illustrate the political events. In Industrial Age, people can unveil the conqueror-colony network to explain the causes of many wars between states. What can we find through researching the network(s) in a globalized period to understand terrorism? It is what author will explore in the latter sections of this paper.

(b) What is a conflict?

After discussing the definition of society and the role of networks, we now turn to explore the definition(s) of conflict. Max Weber once described a "peaceful conflict" is a competition, and the (social) struggle will be called "selection" (Weber, 1964: 132-133). John Burton, who employed "world society" to replace "international relationship," thought that conflict like sex "is an essential creative element in human relationships" (Burton, 1972: 137), and conflict at all social levels "has a similar feature" (Burton, 1972: 139). Burton did not extend his idea of what's so-called "similar feature," but we can find a more specific meaning in Lewis Coser's classic. Being inspired and exerting Georg Simmel's related theories about social conflicts, Coser applied the definition to social conflict as followed:

*Social conflict means a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.* (Coser, 1956: 8)

If we follow this definition, and we can find that wherever there is a society, the conflicts occur from groups that possessed different, or opposite, values of their lives. According to Coser's (more specific, Simmel's) view, it is impossible to eliminate a conflict, and the only way is to manage. People should take conflict as a fundamental and constructive part of social organization. In Simmel's view of conflict, the central thesis is that "conflict is a form of socialization" (Coser, 1956: 31). Coser also argued that the concepts of conflict had being very much neglected as a field of investigation,

and conflict can provide to these sociologists “the central explanatory category for the analysis of social change and of progress” (Coser, 1956: 16).

Meanwhile, Coser stressed the functions of conflicts in a society. One of these two functions is to set boundaries among groups within a social system by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of separateness, thus “establishing the identity of groups within the system” (Coser, 1956: 34). The other function is that the “reciprocal repulsions maintain a total social system by creating a balance between its various groups.” These two functions are called as the group-binding character of conflict. Members of a group confirm their interests and identity from other groups through (or in) conflicts. By do this, the “we-group” (or in-group) can be distinguished from the “others-groups” (or out-groups), and hostility must exist between two groups but it will not necessarily become a conflict.

Further, Coser discussed the relationship between conflict and legitimacy. In his book, Coser thought that unequal distributions of privileges and rights may lead to sentiments of hostility, and whether feeling of hostility leads to conflict behavior depends on whether or not “the unequal distribution of rights is considered legitimate” (Coser, 1956: 37). In other words, to Coser, legitimacy is a crucial intervening variable when we discussed conflict.

So, Coser concluded that when a social structure is no longer considered legitimate, individuals with similar objective positions will come, through conflict, to constitute themselves into self-conscious groups with “common interests” (Coser, 1956: 38). Besides, conflict can also play the role of “safety valve” to release the tension within a society.

Above all, conflicts occur in every society and stem from the lack of legitimacy. Hostility comes from a high-tension between groups and not necessarily makes conflict happen. People should do conflict-management, but not conflict-elimination. Once the more the legitimacy exists, the opportunity of occurrence of conflicts is less. The last but not the least, conflict within a group frequently helps to revitalize existence norms, or it contributes to the emergence of new norms. Such mechanism for adjustment of norms is hardly available to rigid systems.

From the views of sociologists, conflicts occur when there is a struggle for representative legitimacy of claiming groups. Mann, a sociologist though, offered another prospect to research conflicts. He used “interstitial space” to describe the objects which existing laws and norms can not regulate (Mann, 1986: 16). It is simple

to understand. In Mann's observation, the human society evolves itself and every evolution produces an interstitial space for outlaws to "drill" their interests. Those interstices evoke conflicts and the legitimacy of order also lost its base gradually. With the enhancement and improvement of order or laws, the interstitial space can be filled and vanishes temporarily. The interstitial space jumps out again when human society evolves once again. For example, the regulation of current International Laws can not match the governance of terrorists for the non-state character of terrorism. This situation comes to the governance of Internet, too. So we can say that terrorism and Internet are two "interstitial spaces" in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### ***B. How to analogize social conflicts to global social conflicts***

Can we analogize the notions of domestic social conflicts to ones of global conflicts?

First of all, as we all know, there is no superior authority among states existing in the international realm. "Anarchy" is the most frequently usage to illustrate this situation. In domestic aspect, governments own the exclusive right(s) to exert force to pacify the conflicts, but it is the absent of "government" to deal with international conflicts. Burton claimed that, on one hand, conflicts must be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties, and for all practical purposes by the parties. On the other hand, there is a legitimate interest of representative authorities in the outcome of conflict between two parties (Burton, 1972: 138). A dilemma, poses two question at the same time, comes. One is that where is the third-party coercion to ensure the so-called "satisfaction," and the other, just the former question alike, is the lack of the "representative authority."

The author tries to remind here that my attempt to analogize domestic social conflict to global social conflict is absolutely not to have a replica, the management of domestic conflicts, of the former one. In that way, it is called application. Hidemi Suganami, One of the English School scholars, researched the role the domestic analogy played in proposals about world order in the period since 1814. According to Suganami's arguments, if things have some similar attributes, their other attributes will be similar (Suganami, 1989: 24). In his points of view, we shall include in our purview analogical arguments concerning the conditions not only of order, but also of other related social goals, such as "peace, security, welfare and justice" (1989: 28).

Likewise, author tries to explore the analogical arguments concerning the conflicts occurred in one society. The point is the process of analogical reasoning, but not to replace the existing system. The result of this analogical reasoning will work within the existing frame and produce a consensus for conflicts management. In this way, author tries to unveil the similarities both in conflicts of domestic society and in ones of global society and provides suggestions to do a better management of global conflicts, such as terrorism.

Nowadays, United Nation seems to be a suitable pronoun of representative authority but it is viewed by many leaders and policy-makers as merely a robber-stamp institution composed of states in international system. It is not a society which states interact in several networks; simply, it's just an arena of *Realpolitik*. Besides, it is clear that UN cannot deal with non-state affairs as it's doing to state affairs. If we want to say UN is a society, and non-state actors should be included. UN is, at the best, only an invited-only club at all.

Contrasting to the notion of anarchy and so-called international system, the notion of international society, the flagship idea of the English School, makes the content of society vivid. Hedley Bull, one of the prominent members of the English School, explored the notion of international system by tracing the original usage of this term. In his research, Bull found that the term "system of states" begins to appear in a book called *De systematibus civitatum*, whose author is Samuel Pufendorf, a natural law theorist, published in 1675 (Bull, 2002: 12). And the term "state-system" first appeared in English in 1834 when a Germany theorist A. H. L. Heeren's book translated into English as the translator noting that it was "not strictly English." (Heeren, 1809 vol. I: v)

In Heeren's view, a state system is the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, and "cemented together by a reciprocity of interests" (Bull, 2002: 12). It means that there are some common interests and shared-values resting upon a common civilization. Such a conception of state system much differs from what is called an international system, mainly claimed by structural realist Kenneth Waltz, as a closed billiards-like system. Based on the common and shared interests, Bull claimed that the international system should be an international society whose member conceived themselves to be bound by a set of common rules in their relations with one another, and "share in the working of common institutions" (Bull, 2002: 13).



Further, according to Bull, the international society is a *vie media* to world society and the relationship among power, law and morality is always highly stressed throughout his research. From Bull' s perspective, both classical realism and its neorealist variant pay "insufficient attention to the framework of rules, norms, and shared understanding on which international society depends" (Bull, 2002: viii). Above all, we can see that the common interests and shared values exist in both domestic society and international society. Interests and values make members in society, no matter what kind, be bound together. Meanwhile, the struggle of legitimacy of interests and of values happen, conflicts come. That is the reason why author tries to analogize the domestic social conflict to the international social conflict. The basic character of conflict in both societies is the same: the struggle of legitimacy; and the difference is only the scale of conflicts. And next step is to have an analogy of global social conflict.

As it is mentioned above, many networks, interaction of them make phenomena, exist in one society. The artificial design of Cold War stops the natural interaction of these networks in the whole human society. Someone would say that the struggle to win Cold War between US and then USSR is also a kind of social conflict; but beside the seldom but regular official contacts of two superpowers, the interactions of rest states, especially the members belongs to each group, is hindered by their group-leader; and mainly by then dichotomized world order. Let alone the networks. There are several independent blocs which owned their rules and being warring with each in the world at that time. The *détente*, came in 70' s, started to alleviate the suffocative tension of international ready-to-war atmosphere. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the improvement of communication and the invention of Internet effectively lower down the human interactions costs which were used to be expensive and time-consuming.

The intensity of interactions of networks almost doubled, even tripled, as it was in the period of Cold War, especially after the end of Cold War. It is just the natural and normal situation of interactions of networks in human history. Thanks to the highly-connected networks by newly communicational improvements, people can move and communicate much freer and quicker than they did before. These interactions of networks become rampant. People start to use the term "global" to replace "international" and everyone is a villager in this global village which going beyond borders being easy and spontaneous. People are willing to believe that they

live in a global society. Today, as Robert Cox once claimed, the state and the civil society are so interpenetrated (Cox, 1986: 205).

Everything is double-edged, and so is the frequent interaction of networks. With the world gradually becoming globalized, transnational issues, which being beyond state's individual ability to cope with, bumps out, too. Such as environmental issues, international drug-trafficking, smuggling of WMD, economic development disparity, human rights, and terrorism, all needs the cooperation of states to deal. Due to the anarchical reality, i.e. lack of powerful enforcement of the UN resolutions, those issues often are dealt, but not resolved, in power-political ways which states are accustomed to. In other words, power-political ways of dealing issues may, mostly, not based on the common shared interests and values.

After the end of Cold War, the neo-medieval international system enters the world stage. Not only political problems, but economical, social, and cultural issues all comes out simultaneously and many of them are needed be resolved by regional cooperation. In theory, just as the same as in reality, theorists found that it is not enough to observe and explain the international relationship based on the existing perspectives from politics and economics. So, scholars begin to find solutions and inspiration from sociology to strengthen and to broaden the proofs of their studies toward explaining this world. It is worthy of noting here that it is suitable to study this world through the lens of sociology for this global society, where people go beyond borders easily, is formulating and linking by the advanced technologies of communication.

Before we discuss the sociology of globalization, we should go back to understand the characters of solidarism and pluralism in world society.

Besides working hard on the conception of world society, the English School also stressed to observe the social phenomena, but not single world affair, through "agent-structure" approach (Viotti & Kaupi, 2010: 253). That approach is to unveil the actor's responses toward the outside environment which actor faced in a social phenomenon to see the relations between these agents and structures at the same time. It is quite different from power-centric approach in politics or from demand-supply-centric one in economics. This approach is a sociological method to explore cause and effect of interaction of agent-structure model in a given situation. It also explains why sociology being popular after the end of Cold War for frequently interactions happens than ever in this world stage.

Through agent-structure approach, people can learn what are the more important values existing in dealing with international affairs besides state-sovereignty. No doubt, power is still an important variable in analyzing the modern international politics. As we discuss above, there are still many “networks,” including political one, in one society, as the same as global society. If we want to see the whole picture, it is important to broaden our explanation pieces by observing other networks, which somehow exert more influence than political one did, to complete the jigsaw.

There comes a debate within the English School between pluralism and solidarism. Bull and some scholars thought that the solely subject of international law is state, and it is not allowed to violate the sovereignty to intervene the domestic affair of a state. Their views are prone to the positive international law, aka the pluralism. R.J. Vincent, Barry Buzan, and Ian Clark claimed that not only states but international organizations, NGOs, and individual should be included in the subjects of international law. Their views are prone to natural laws, aka solidarism.

Standing on this point, scholars whose views are prone to solidarism begin to find and to explore what the “more important values” are (Vincent 1986, Buzan 2004, Clark 2005). They all still stress that sovereignty cannot be compromised when states deal with foreign affairs is an overriding principle. But whenever a state which cannot provide protection for its people just be abiding that principle, the legitimacy of existing sovereignty of that state will be questioned. The picture looks more clearly if we add human rights in dealing with international affairs in this world society. That is just one of those more important values which people search for and hope to build the accepted order of legitimacy, or so-called common interests. The value of human rights also jumps out the limitations which always being built by power-politics and by Washington consensus. Paying one’s respects for human rights should be a more important overriding principle than sovereignty when people cope with transnational issues.

We shall turn to discuss the notion of legitimacy when the overriding principles of global society are claimed. Authoritative discussions tell us that *legitimus*, the term legitimacy in the Roman form which meant “lawful,” had transmuted into “what conforms to ancient custom and to customary procedure” (Sternberg, 1968: 245). The latter usage is not common until the French Revolution. In any case, only within the context of power relations that legitimacy becomes relevant at all. It is a mistaken assumption that consensus is somehow established and maintained by processes that are “completely independent of the existing relations of power within the society”

(Beetham, 1991: 104). Another scholar also claimed that “international society can be regarded as a powerful source of state socialization” (Armstrong, 1998). Further, “who has a right to have rights?” (Coicaud, 2002: 234). Follow these depictions; we shall understand that legitimacy will not be independent from power which accompanied when legitimacy built. But it is not right to predict that the more power denotes more legitimacy. After understanding the relation between power and legitimacy, people know how superpowers built their legitimacy during Cold War period. Is it still the same in the post Cold War time?

As Mann claimed above, the interstitial spaces will always appear after one society evolves. The so-called evolution of one society means “a set of historically changing principles of legitimacy” (Clark, 2005: 7). According to Ian Clark, legitimacy denotes the condition of international society, not the condition of its individual actors and actions. Therefore, a survey of the changing content of legitimacy provides one key insight into the critical stages in “the evolution of international society itself” (2005: 13). Now, the world has been changed from Cold War to a globalized village period, and can we trace the evolutionary track of this world? The entire Westphalian image of international society, predicated upon sovereignty and territoriality, is widely called into question (Zacher 1992; Hassner, 1993: 52-3; Lyon and Mastanduno 1995) for globalization changes this world and makes world society evolve. As Clark asked; can we “rediscover any meaning for legitimacy” within an increasingly global order (Clark, 2005: 158)? The answer goes to human rights. A notion is endorsed in modern international law by the view that in order to let human right to become a legal reality “an organized society must exist in the form of a *de jure* state” (Vasak, 1982: 4). It is so clear especially in this global society which lacks the representative authority to ensure the enforcement of international law. The value of protecting human rights can be the complementary for international law.

Above all, the distinguishing different between domestic social conflict and global social conflict is the lack of representative authority to ensure the satisfying management of conflicts. But due to the similar character of conflict, i.e. the struggle of legitimacy, we can analogize domestic society to world society, or global society caused by the advanced communication technologies. Society evolves itself, so there are always interstitial spaces which cannot be regulated by existing rules and norms in one society. For the transnational issues coming out, state cannot resolve those issues by itself gradually. Once we have to manage a global social conflict, we must find a

higher degree of legitimacy to reach consensus, i.e. to fill the interstitial space. As a result, the principle of human rights is better than that of power-politics to reach a consensus to build up the common ground to deal with global conflicts.

## **Internet Terrorism and Its Governance**

### ***A. Internet Terrorism***

#### **(a) The definition of terrorism?**

“Terrorism” is an extraordinary frequent-used, even abused, vocabulary nowadays, especially after the happening of 9/11 attack. It is hard to trace its origin and there is not a widely accepted or agree-upon definition still. Somehow, the so-called “terrorists” in one region may be the fighter of justice in another region. The author does not try to dichotomize terrorism into these two labels when defining it. Otherwise, it is of no use to do this dichotomy when people research terrorism. Yes, the terrorists attack is a crime. The methods of terrorism are overlapping with other crimes and there’s no reason for us to label those terrorist “fighter of justice” for their crimes making casualty.

We can exclude some misjudgments of fighters of justice when discussing terrorism. Then, how should we define terrorism? According to US State Department, the terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (US Department of State, 2004: xii) But this definition is different from the one of FBI: “the unlawful use of violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (US Department of Justice, 2002: 3)

Let’s examine the definition of terrorism of Department of Homeland Security: “any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and must also appear to be intended (i) to intimate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” (Homeland Security Act of 2002) Another meaning of terrorism comes from Department of Defense: “the calculated use

of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.” (Department of Defense)

Though each of the definitions above put their individual agential highlights on a point to illustrate terrorism, we can still draw some characters of terrorism from those statements such as: unlawful violence, to coerce, and to cause fear among people. The impasse now theorists and policy-makers face to fight terrorism is exactly that there’s no shared consensus about defining terrorism. It is right that there’s a blurring line between terrorism and other types of crime including: kidnapping, political violent, organizational crimes, and so on, but it is also right that we can know better about terrorism if we try to distinguish terrorism from other types of crime, instead of trying to define it.

Bruce Hoffman distinguished terrorism from guerrilla warfare and from insurgency for all three applying the same tactics and claiming the same purposes (Hoffman, 2006: 35). Generally speaking, guerrilla is taken to seize and to hold territory which they claimed to control and exercising sovereignty. Insurgency is aimed to overthrow an existing regime which is labeled occupying force by insurgents (Beckett, 2001: ix). Terrorism means a group using violent activities to convey its messages by drawing mass attention. Beside guerrilla warfare, the other two have no intention to seize lands from governments. Only terrorism tries to avoid engaging with the enemy directly. Insurgents claimed a whole new sovereignty from the old one while the other two put fewer stress on this. All three types of violence can also be categorized into the same trend called irregular warfare. As Martin Van Creveld warns: “the main threat to many states comes from small groups and other organizations which are not states.” (Creveld, 1996: 58)

By telling differences from three types of violence and telling terrorism from other crimes, we can understand more about terrorists trying to avoid engaging with enemy directly, and they are almost non-state actors. Furthermore, author tries to attach the “MTV Characters” to terrorism. “M” stands for messages, while “T” stands for target audiences, and “V” stands for violence. Advanced and sophisticated plans are needed in terrorist attacks before terrorists initiate or execute those attacks. The messages which terrorists want to express by attacks must be included in those attacks. No matter releasing political prisoners, claiming ransom, or declaring some announcements, those are messages. And the target audiences whom these messages

try to be conveyed to also must exist. These “audiences” are almost governments, and the rest are NGOs or individuals. The last but not the least is violence. Due to the rare channels which those terrorists can exert to convey these messages, they have to draw attention from the mass by violent activities which make people feel fear spontaneously.

Till now, we can understand more about terrorism and know what the differences are from other crimes. We can conclude here that terrorist attacks are violent acts which convey messages to the target audiences. Because of the violent method and of caused casualty, governments are forced to respond to those attacks to alleviate the pressure which people throw to their own governments. Once governments make effective countermeasures toward terrorism, the pressure was alleviating temporarily and the terrorists try to initiate next bigger and effective violent attacks.

Besides MTV characters, the network of terrorism is playing an important role for terrorists to contact each other. According to RAND, there are three types of organizational networks: the chain network, the hub network, and the all-channel network (RAND, 1999:49). The people, goods, and information of the chain network move along a line. The hub one makes all actors be tied to a central node. And the all-channel network let all actors being collaborative connected in a dense network. The degree of complexity of the network varies in every terrorist attacks, but the higher the efficiency of communication among terrorists comes the more economic and more successful outcomes of attacks.

(b) The definition of internet terrorism

Before we discuss how to govern internet terrorism, it is meaningful to define internet terrorism. The internet (or the net) is originally designed to decentralize the DOD (Department of Defense) system by creating an interconnected web of computer networks so that every computer could “talk” to every other computer (Weimann, 2006: 16). Furthermore, an analyst warned that “never in history has there been an opportunity where propaganda is so effective.” (Hoffman, 2006: 214) According the MTV characters, terrorists need propaganda for communicating their messages to target audiences and claim for their legitimacy of existence and “to become in fact the powerful forces that claim to be.” (Meyer, 1991: 2)

After the end of Cold War, the world gets connected by the internet closer and closer. People are accustomed to get wired in their ordinary life gradually, and so are terrorists. Ironically, terrorists use internet as their tool to help dealing with terrorist

attacks for its “inexpensive exchange of information worldwide.” (Hoffman, 2006: 201) The term “internet terrorism” mentioned in this article means that terrorists exert internet as a free channel and a convenient tool for propaganda, recruiting, fund-raising, and intelligence-gathering. For the advantages of easy-accessibility, anonymous, and low-costs of using, internet is currently a new popular network for terrorists.

As for discussing the virtual space and its applications in warfare, many analysts have their different says about it. Some researchers distinguish cyberwar from netwar by governments’ military involvement. That is cyberwar referring to information-oriented military warfare, while netwar being a nonmilitary mode of conflict and crime (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993). Winn Schwartau includes both cyberwar and netwar into Information Warfare (Schwartau, 2000: 410). In Pentagon, it is called Information Operation.

In 2001, the first U.S. Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Security comes to his office. Eight years later, a general takes charge of the new U.S. Cyber Command (Clarke, 2010: x). It seems that the only existing superpower begins to turn its attention and resources to the preparation for fighting conflicts in virtual space. Before U.S.’s step, Russians even offered an Information Warfare Weapons Treaty to the United Nations (Schwartau, 2000: 412). China also proclaimed in its 1999 book called *Unrestricted War* by embracing indirect approach to be its countermeasure toward US.

In this article, author concentrates his discourse on netwar which terrorism is evolving in this direction currently. To be sure, there must be military involvement in fighting terrorism, but cyberwar, in author’s mind, is a bigger conflict among states, and netwar means a war among networks. For groups of any size, from two to millions, can reach each other and use the Net to promote an agenda. This sort of reach is one dramatic advantage that the Internet provides; speed is another. As described above, “ubiquity” and “timeliness” are two advantages which terrorists love to use (Hoffman, 2006: 201). Besides, internet can circumvent government censorship and to be used to portray terrorists and their actions in precisely the light and context they wish. Also, the information on internet arrives with the snap of a finger, the feedback is instantaneous (Hoffman, 2006: 202-4).

Due to these merits mentioned above, all major terrorist and insurgent groups not only use internet as their tool for propaganda, but have their own websites (Zanini & Edwards, 2001: 43). One sentence, illustrating the reality, goes that “if you are not on the web, you don’t exist.” (Hoffman, 2003: 206) Two scholars show that Hezbollah,



Basque, IRA, Moist movements, European neo-Nazi group, and al Qaeda can all, without exception, be found on the Web (Tsfati & Weimann, 2001: 328-30). The widespread availability of these sophisticated but inexpensive communication technologies have effectively “shattered the monopoly on readily accessible information” formerly wielded by conventional commercial and state-owned television and radio broadcasting outlets and the print media (Hoffman, 2006: 226). It is to say that internet provides an alternative source for news and information over which the movement itself could exert total control. In sum, the insurgents’ intent to use internet is to explain and to legitimate their use of violence. As terrorist communications continue to change and to evolve, the nature of terrorism will change itself, too.

As mentioned above, Michael Mann called a space which yet cannot be well-regulated: “interstitial.” The internet matches this definition. Even international laws cannot regulate internet well till today, and governments have no any good governance toward internet crimes, especially toward transnational internet terrorism, neither. The word “transnational” here means that terrorists come from A country and plan their attacks outside A country. Some scholars marked 1968 as the first year when transnational terrorism occur resulting from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (Enders & Sandler, 2009: 55). We usually use “domestic terrorism” to describe local terrorists launching fatal attacks in their own country. It is much easier for local government to trace and to control these domestic terrorist attacks. The domestic governance of social conflicts relies on the absolute authority to exert its force to regulate the struggle of legitimacy of order. What if in the international realm? Since the global society is forming by daily closer interconnecting, it is definitely needful to develop the global governance of (transnational) internet terrorism. Consensus can take a replacement of absolute authority to do good governance towards global social conflicts. While building consensus which composed by solid common interests among nations, the notion of “spheres of authority” (aka SOAs) applied by James Rosenau, a pioneer scholar who research the phenomenon of globalization, can be a good substitute for the role governments being playing when governing their internal and foreign affairs and, of course, global social conflicts.

## ***B. globalization and global governance***

### **(a) The social characters of globalization**

After the end of Cold War, the leap progress of communicational technology makes “globalization” become the significant characteristic in the current international relationship. According to James Rosenau, while the phenomenon of globalization comes, the deepening of localization is also happening simultaneously. Rosenau applied *frangmentation*, i.e. *fragmentation* and *integration*, to describe and to explain this bifurcated situation in his book (Rosenau, 1997: 99). We can also see “intermestic” or “glocal” to represent these two special ways which says the important trend in the wave of globalization nowadays.

Many transnational or supranational issues, such as terrorism, environment pollutions, ethnical disputes, and drug trafficking, jump to the world stage in the post-Cold War period. These issues were used to be neglected and ignored during the severe atmosphere of politics-military confrontation between capitalism camp and communism camp. Today, the capabilities of resolving those transnational issues are required badly and being beyond solely state to deal with alone. It not only lowers the legitimacy of state ability to solve transnational puzzles, but people start to question whether the existing anarchical order, being built mostly upon the Westphalian design, matches the needs of our desires in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Let alone the economic imparity in different regions due to globalization. WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999 protest activity illustrates the globalized movement of anti-globalization.

No matter positive or negative discourses about globalization, the concept of globalization is used in different ways and explanations for its origins as well as its consequences are equally varied (Risse, 2007: 126). Many scholars discuss this idea from economic perspective, but it is meaningful to have a sociological lens to explore for globalized networks applying their systematic effects more and more especially when we talk about the digitalized and border-less internet world. Saskia Sassen defines globalization as two distinct sets dynamics. One involves the formation of explicitly global institutions and processes, while the other says the processes being part of globalization in that they involve transboundary networks and entities connecting multiple local or national processes and actors (Sassen, 2007: 5-6). She notified us that national courts are now using international instruments to address issues where before they would have used national ones.

Furthermore, the existing orders will be reshaped and to contribute a novel formation when economic activity becomes globalized. It is to say that we should keep in mind when studying global phenomena located within the nation-state, there

is a need for collecting and constructing new sets of data to trace these flows (Sassen, 2007: 31). Otherwise, there are many contemporary theorists are still reluctant to recognize the globalization of capitalist production and its world market as fundamentally new situation and a significant historical shift.

Among these discourses demonstrating globalization, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri provide a few novel points. In their discussions, the process of globalization makes an Empire, being different from Imperialism, regulating global exchanges. In words, Empire is a new notion and an inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 9). The declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing inability to regulate economic and cultural exchanges is one of the primary symptoms of the coming of Empire. Imperialism is just an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Empire is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open and expanding frontier. In sum, globalized world is defined by new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

In this Empire, network plays a vital role to connect and to complete the linkages of globalization. Sociality, the interaction of networks, of international society remains the under-developed research topic in the field of the international relation. According to Max Weber, social relationship consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there will be a course of social action (Weber, 1964: 118). It implies that the interaction of networks, social actions, build up relationship of networks, i.e. social relationship among networks. No matter transportation or communication, these behaviors and actions illustrate the global social relationship in this globalized world. As it is mentioned earlier, terrorists use the internet as their networks to initiate attacks. These terrorist attacks are, too, belonging to global social actions, or we should be more specific to say “the social conflicts.” In this tightly connected global society, is it possible to govern social conflicts?

(b) How to govern global social conflicts?

It is clear that global social conflicts cannot be solved or managed by one state for the characteristic of transnational overlapping involvement. Also, due to rapid transformed trend of “porosity” of international relationship, authority is undergoing continuous relocation both outward toward supranational entities and inward toward

subnational groups. But how can we deal with those global issues, no matter transnational or supranational, in this so-called anarchical world? It means that people should learn how to govern in the absence of a world government.

Wherever people live, there should be some systems for them to provide security or to procure necessary resources and so on. There are many systems within a society and all is governed by a government which owns independent and domestic exclusive sovereignty. It is a common situation in every nation, but there's no such a thing existed to regulate in the international realm. Realists call it anarchy and say that might is right. Others do not think in the same way. Actually, what realists portray is just partly correct. Besides power, there are other factors having impacts upon international affairs. And if we follow realists' thoughts, should powerful states own the ability to govern the international affairs and to set up a tailored order which meets their needs and only secures their interests? The answer is absolutely no.

The shrinking of political distance by microelectronic technologies makes so many transnational issues being crowding the global agenda gradually. In this way, some functions of governance are now being performed by activities that do not originated with governments. Before exploring the idea of governance without government, author tries to discuss governance and government respectively. In James Rosenau's book, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, he makes clear definitions for two terms. Government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority; meanwhile governance refers to activities backed by shared goals (Rosenau, 1992: 4). Governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority, whereas governments can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their policies. So, governance is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. We can also say that ineffective governance means anarchy or chaos, but ineffective governments are viewed simply weak but governance still exists. Thus, it is reasonable to conceive of governance without government as a regulatory mechanism in a sphere of activity which functions effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority.

How to make and to ensure governance being effective? Rosenau observes that there must be a close link between governance and order. In other words, governance is order plus intentionality (Rosenau, 1992: 5). Global order consists of those routinized arrangements through which world politics gets from one moment in time to next. And there are three basic levels of activity to sustain global order: ideational

level, behavioral level, and institutional level (Rosenau, 1992: 14). Let us make it simple. One obeys the shared rules in mind, in behaviors, and in organizations. The sum of human obedience illustrates order, international order in international level, likewise.

Order also implies limits on behaviors (Holsti, 1992: 31). In a society of states, these limitations are spelled out when it is used to enforce community norms. Once we talk about order, it is inevitable to mention legitimacy again. Weber provided three types of legitimacy: legal, traditional, and charismatic. None of these three ideal types can be found in “pure form” in historical cases (Weber, 1964: 328). One famous economist also suggests that the most fundamental change that is required to make globalization work in the way that it should is a change in governance. Effective participation requires that the representatives of the developing countries be well informed (Stiglitz, 2003: 227). The current existing international order is almost the product of power politics. This order is trying to overcome the anarchy, but seems to make anarchy more vivid for the fragile ground of this design of power politics order.

Hence, Rosenau created the “sphere of authorities” (aka SOAs) to be the basic analytic units when discussing global governance (Rosenau, 1997: 61). As noted previously, the two (opposite but simultaneous) directions of globalization and of localization are lessening the capacities for governance located at the level of sovereign states and national level. The Westphalian scheme, state-centric presumption, is challenged in this globalized world followed the end of Cold war gradually. There are many global issues which cannot be managed by only states, and non-state actors can unleash more effective power to deal with those transnational puzzlements. That’s the reasons Rosenau exerted the idea of SOAs to replace states and international organizations for global governance discourses.

SOAs, focusing on common goals but not always being state-centric, are founded on traditional criteria of legitimacy derived from constitutional and legal sources. Furthermore, he also tried to list four types of SOAs to ensure the good functioning of order and to overcome the dilemma of anarchy. First one is the established SOAs (states), another is accommodative SOAs (WTO), the third one is contested SOAs (terrorist groups), and the last one is transit SOAs (anti-war movements) (Rosenau, 1997: 154-5). All these four types of SOAs may be faced with the instabilities and disorder that derive from resource shortages, budgetary constraints, ethnic rivalries, unemployment, and inflation. All of them may be also be subject to the continuous

tensions that spring from the inroads of corrupt practices, organized crime, and restless publics that have little use for politics and politicians. And many of the last three types of SOAs may have severe adaptive problems and some of them may fail to maintain their essential structures intact.

Besides the established SOAs, the other three SOAs are likely to be confused with regimes, institutions and organizations in the international domain. In fact, there are some differences from regimes, institutions, organizations, and SOAs. They are the cluster of arrangements of rules for some goals, but the former three are all state-centered (Krasner, 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997) and the last one is not. Last not least, when we say global governance, it is a more broaden idea and concept than international regimes, institutions, and organizations. These sentences can explain why SOAs are suitable analytic units during discussing global governance when transnational issues evoked by the shrinking of political distance.

After discussing about the basic unit in global governance, then we should go to the governance part in case of internet terrorism. As noted previously, it is self-evident that terrorists are not looking forward to engage with their target audience by messages-emission only. It is so hard for governments to trace and to cope with those terrorists, let alone to deal with this ticking bomb by international cooperation. We all know that it is not easy for sovereign states resigning their “exclusive” sovereignty to obey international rules, but it is highly in demand for governments to postulate a common shared value when preventing more terrorist attacks. Otherwise, governance of the world means a central authority doing governing, and it is no basis to anticipate it in present-day. It is possible to have expedient governance by exerting the concept of SOAs to deal with internet terrorism. The term “expedient” here is just to describe that there’s no need of an overriding principle, and it is also unavailable in reality, to guide governments to fight terrorism,. In this way, governments need expedient rules to cooperate with each other to fight terrorism toward global governance of conflicts.

It is a proper time to note here that there are three policy-oriented propositions about counterterrorism offered by the specialists of RAND. They are: a) hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks; b) it takes networks to fight networks; and c) whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages (RAND, 1999: 55). Besides, it is vital to form new mechanisms for inter-agency and multi-jurisdictional cooperation to counterattack terrorism. The international efforts to fight terrorism are especially seen in some clauses of the international laws, but it is

hard for governments to be abided by these rules for their domestic considerations respectively. In this situation, it is proper to think about common shared values to substitute the ornamental international laws.

Before discussing the fields which those shared values can be practiced and protected, we should take a look at those fields, i.e. SOAs. There some related international institutions which deal with internet affairs, such as International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), World Summit of Information Society (WSIS), Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Among them, ITU is the oldest international regime to process communicational, recently, and internet events, and IGF is the youngest one. According to Rosenau's categorized definitions, those four regimes all belong to accommodative SOAs.

ITU was founded in 1865 making it the oldest international organization in the UN family. ITU is the leading United Nations agency for information and communication technology issues, and the global focal point for governments and the private sector in developing networks and services. ICANN was formed in 1998. It is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. It promotes competition and develops policy on the Internet's unique identifiers. These two SOAs can play a pivotal role in fight internet terrorism for their characteristic of global governance. ITU, for example, initiates Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) in 2007 to enhance and to ensure the security of internet volume and activities worldwide.<sup>1</sup> It is predictable that these two SOAs are inclined to western cultural and pro-large corporations, no matter ITU is affiliated under UN and ICANN is a private sector. Many begin to see ICANN as a deeply undemocratic regulatory apparatus largely dominated by U.S. interests, notably large corporations (Sassen, 2007: 87).

Compared to ITU and ICANN, WSIS and IGF both are affiliated to ITU functioning in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and they represents broaden points of view worldwide for holding regular meetings and conference.<sup>2</sup> Though the evolutions of ideas followed every conference, WSIS and IGF still function under ITU. Put differently, only ITU and ICANN can represent the working SOAs though both needed to

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<sup>1</sup> <http://groups.itu.int/cybersecurity-gateway/HOME.aspx> (accessed on Mar. 31, 2012)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.itu.int/wsisis/index.html>; <http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/> (accessed on Mar. 31, 2012)

broaden their legitimacy in dealing with international internet issues.

(c) Proposal on the global governance of internet terrorism

Since we have discussed about how to analogize social conflicts to global social conflicts, the definitions of terrorism and the characteristics of internet terrorism, and the SOAs in global governance, it is time to initiate a feasible proposal to govern global social conflict, i.e. internet terrorism case in this article. First of all, we need a related majority consensus composed by solid common agreements about regularizing the internet crimes including internet terrorism. Then, the concept of SOAs is a good substitute for international authority which is empowered and endorsed to exert power to govern internet crimes. Last not least, ITU and ICANN can play roles as SOAs facing and coping internet terrorism once they both get modified on broaden shared rules.

The internet terrorism can be viewed as a challenge against the legitimacy of the existing order. Without communication, there can be no terrorism (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982: 9). It is to say that no networks of communication, no terrorism. If we have taken it serious to fight terrorism, it is a good beginning to use networks to fight terrorism networks as noted previously. Just as the delay-lived programs in any media, when audiences watch contents on internet, the messages of it can be previewed in advance by the check mechanism of SOAs for keeping from terrorist' messages conveyed to their target audiences (Weimann, 2006: 193). This function can be unleashed by ITU and ICANN and the standard operating procedures (SOPs) should be discussed and be built upon a common shared ground of values.

It is absolutely not my wishful thinking here. It is also not a critical censorship to violate civil rights of free communication for the sake of counterterrorism. No one should be sacrificed his rights to use the internet to achieve the goal which global governance of internet terrorism should be realized. Otherwise, the function of preview about terrorism-like messages on the internet is a good way to secure people from attacking by another terrorist strikes. Once terrorists find out there's of no use to send messages vie internet, it will lower terrorists' interest to use it as an effective (and free) medium to convey their appeals. Searching for other useful media takes terrorists' time and makes them easy to expose their hiding positions, that is, to add the costs (money and time) for them to initiate attacks. Right now, the only thing for governments to do is to consider whether this preview setting is worthy of SOAs institutional changes for the sake of human rights and a coming more stable and



accepted world order.

## Conclusion

Due to Michael Mann's "interstitial" space toward traditional institutions, the absent of internet regulation makes sense. But it does not mean that this absence cannot be remediable. In this article, author first discussed about if domestic society can be analogize to global society by the interaction of networks. He found out that the only difference is the lack of the enforcement of representative authority, and it can be mended by SOAs. Then, conflict means the struggle of legitimacy. Global social conflict management should be abiding by the value of human rights to build consensus. SOAs again can strengthen legitimacy by their transnational overlapping involvement. Avoiding to be limited by exclusive sovereignty of states, global governance (SOAs) is a good replacement for UN and other international regimes to manage transnational issues, especially terrorism (harmful for human rights).

With the rapid progress of communicational technologies, internet becomes a popular tool for a new type of terrorism: internet terrorism. No matter old or new terrorism, it needs networks to convey messages. Terrorists need a vehicle sending their appeal for propaganda or fight for their identities. The characteristic of ubiquity and timeliness makes internet be an effective medium for terrorists for fund-raising, recruits, and initiating attacks. Once we have to fight internet terrorism, we should focus on their networks which make their dreams come true.

The two representative SOAs which govern internet-related affairs are ITU and ICANN. These two SOAs can be effective interfaces to govern internet terrorism like previewing newspaper or TV in advanced. It is just a technical problem, but it is still worth noting here that this preview mechanism just deals with the conflict issues, and does not mean to violate civil liberty. In this way, states also have no need to resign their sovereignty to SOAs to govern internet terrorism. SOAs can do good to govern global conflicts, such as internet terrorism, and to help states to build up consensus which fits to resolve transnational problems.

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