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台灣民主化與國安部門政策影響力之轉變

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摘 要

本文檢視我國民主鞏固背景下軍情部門如何兼顧專業自主性暨政治中立。中華民國軍情部門在飽受外界質疑政治忠誠之餘，既未如外界預期般干政、也未試圖保持過去足以否決政策之能力，並迅速達到政治中立。本文以海巡署為個案，發現國安部門遵循民主規則，藉遊說政治與公民社會，成功地影響國安政策議事日程，進而確保本身利基。但在國安部門轉換政策影響管道的同時，對我國實現民主領軍雖是進步表徵，但未來也將對民主領軍之鞏固暨落實形成挑戰。

關鍵詞：軍文關係、民主領軍、國安部門、國家化

From Veto Power to Influential Group: Defense and Security Sectors in Democratizing Taiwan*

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Abstract

This paper examines Taiwan's civil-military relations in the context of democratic consolidation, focusing on how armed forces and security apparatus face dual challenges for their professional autonomy and political neutrality in a young democracy. In contrast to expectations that lingering fear of interventions and questions about political loyalty would provide the military motives and opportunities to consolidate their veto power positions, defense and security sectors in Taiwan achieved political neutrality sooner than expected. Taking on the case of the Coast Guard Administration, this paper finds that the security sector actor carves their own political niches within the new democratic order by turning to political and civil society and lobbying their own defense and security policy agendas. The shifting avenue in policy influence by the security sector suggests both progresses and challenges for consolidating democratic governance over the defense and security establishments in Taiwan.

Key words: Civil-military relations, Democratic control, National security sector, *Guojiahua* (Nationalization)

* This paper is a revised version of the paper presented in 2006 APSA COGOTS panel.

Introduction

For many young democracies, the influence of the military and intelligence forces is a subject that receives continuing attention after the transition to democratic rule. Although the clouds of military coup and police state are still around the corner of democratization in few new democracies, undoubtedly coercive interventions stand little chance to play in the center stage of democratic governance. Yet coup-free phenomena cannot translate into the completed implementation of democratic civilian control over the armed forces. It simply indicates that instead of explaining why military coups have been relatively rare in democratic rules, the more pressing challenge for students of democratic civil-military relations is to explore alternative pathways the military and intelligence services exercise power, thereby rendering coup unnecessary.

Central to contemporary tasks for democratic consolidation is whether and how the armed forces exert influence in accordance to democratic orders. Even after transition into governmental control, it remains compelling to inquire whether the military and intelligence services manage to carve a niche and retain prerogatives in certain ways that are likely to undermine democratic governance of coercion. It is even more crucial for those nascent democracies facing external security threats to question how the armed forces in democracies interpret and shape national security agenda to balance democratic rules with national security. It follows to raise more questions: Do the military and intelligence systems exploit national security threat and institutionalize veto power that authorizes the armed forces to retain exclusive prerogatives over security and perhaps political arenas? Do armed forces take advantage from the external threat to initiate political participation in ways that pressure or blackmail civilian authorities?¹ Or do armed forces simply exert influence through non-coercive lobbying and propaganda without violating democratic norms?

This paper explores those questions with regard to Taiwan. Instead of studying civil-military transitions from civilian perspectives, this paper turns to the military and

¹ Modes of military interventions defined by Samuel E. Finer in his seminal book, *The Man on Horseback*, range from posing pressures or blackmails upon civilian authorities, displacements in cabinet members, and military supplantment, including a coup. This paper considers the first mode, i.e.; pressures and blackmails, as aggressive political participation exerted by the armed forces *under democratic rules*.

intelligence establishments in hopes to better understanding the civil-military interactions from another direction. With a focus on a specific period of democratic consolidation starting in 1996 and concluding until this point of writing as of 2007, this paper finds that the military carves their own political niches within the new democratic order by turning to lobbying both political and civil society to influence the defense and security policy agenda, which represents more of progress than challenges in consolidating democratic governance over the military in Taiwan. The rest of the paper proceeds in the following order. Next section lays out the theoretical groundwork that leads to the research framework undertaken for the study of Taiwan's civil-military transition. What follows is to take on the case of Coast Guard Administration (CGA) and put under scrutiny civil-military interactions in a variety of realms and explore the ways under which power transitions and transforms. The interpretations and implications drawn from the analysis serve to conclude the paper.

Civil-military transition during democratic transition and consolidation

National security system of the Republic of China (ROC) had been placed under Leninist-style party control of the China Nationalist Party, the *Kuomintang* (KMT) since its inception, and, after 1949 KMT fleeing to Taiwan, remained assertive for decades in domestic and foreign affairs in the name of maintaining national security—thanks to external threats posed by China. Largely composed of mainlanders, as opposed to Taiwanese that contribute to the majority of population in Taiwan, the officer corps for a long time followed the KMT party lines and single-party state policy of 'One China,' thereby strongly opposing calls for Taiwan independence. The fact that China has proclaimed to attack Taiwan at any cost if Taiwan declares *de jure* independence further provided the ground for Taiwan's military and security apparatus to perceive pro-independence movements as threats to national security, which in turn reinforced the legitimacy of security sector's domestic role in safeguarding internal security and rooting out any pro-independence activities. Since democratization began, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as the opposition party calling for Taiwan independence in party platform, naturally fed the threat perception and became the enemy in the eyes of military and security apparatus.

Throughout democratization process, the national security establishments underwent

the multifaceted transition featured as *Guojiahua* (nationalization/ statification), an endeavor meant to remove the party rule and turn political control of the armed forces and intelligence apparatuses over to the nation-state government. However, the fact that the KMT party organs in the defense and security sector remained operative at the time the DPP won the presidential election in March 2000 – although followed in no time by a quick and complete withdrawal of KMT party networks – raised concerns of potential military interventions. Yet there have been no coup attempts and Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan's president after the peaceful transfer of power in 2000, frequently praised in public for the accomplishment of *Guojiahua* and ongoing progress in civilian control under DPP administration – although in March 2004 Chen surprisingly accused the KMT of stipulating some military officials to stage a near coup attempt against his successful re-election and later President Chen failed in court for false accusation. Such an intense phenomenon in Taiwan's civil-military transitions nonetheless highlights the intertwined nexus between internal democratization and external relations, and therefore lends further impulses to exploring particularly how defense and security sectors manage to remain relevant during Taiwan's democratization.

Civil-military relations in democratizing Taiwan

For students of democratic civil-military relations, there are four closely-knit issues of critical importance to the case of Taiwan. First and foremost, on the subject of the historic role of the national security sector, conventional wisdom has it that the defense and intelligence establishments once under Leninist party civilian rule are hardly to be flagged as praetorians even under the confrontational and selective cooperative party-military models.² Yet acting as the critical pillar underpinning the once highly-militarized Taiwan, the daunting image of the omnipresent military and security apparatus keeps lingering on and haunting the mindsets of many civilian politicians at the dawn of democratization.³ But the longstanding party control renders the starting state of

² See Dale Herspring, *Russian Civil-Military Relations*. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1996); Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," *World Politics*, 2 (2003), 167-192.

³ See Yun-han Chu, "Democratic Consolidation in the Post-KMT Era: The Challenge of Governance" in, Muthiah Alagappa ed., *Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

Taiwan's transitory path nowhere near a clear-cut military-dominant regime as her counterparts in Asia – for example, South Korea, Philippines, and Indonesia. The notorious “Assassination of Henry Liu” scandal in 1984 showcased the intimidating spawns of military intelligence agents, yet the reform of military intelligence service in the next year is exemplary that ultimate reign of power falls under the party leadership. What comes to fore is that, unlike civil-military transitions initiated by military retreats to move to civilian control in those Asian countries, the pathway for Taiwan is featured by the transition from one mode of civilian control to another. With that in mind, the equivocal nature of a strong party army thus constitutes the first paradox that at the same time casts doubts towards conventional wisdom on the legacy of party-army relations.

Equally important is the transition process. Central to Taiwan's civil-military relations under democratization is *Guojiahua*, the nationalization/statification transition path taken in an attempt to assure that the barracks and intelligence services gear their loyalty toward the nation-state instead of any specific political party. Unlike the (re-)nationalization of the party army elsewhere in post-Communist region – which came as an inevitability due to transfer of power and mostly completed in a short period of time – similar processes in Taiwan differed in being initiated by the KMT while still in power. The cost of the KMT-controlled transition may be that the nationalization/statification transition took much longer – nearly two decades – than elsewhere before it came to an end. Paradoxically, at the initial stage of democratic consolidation, a point at least one decade after the promotion of *Guojiahua*, defense and intelligence establishments suddenly find themselves caught in a extremely difficult position as an unexpected result of democratization that allegedly opens the Pandora's box of a widespread and lasting debates over the identification with the “nation-state” that they are supposed to protect. How the nationalization/statification process is to proceed and finally comes as a success story if the nation-state itself is in question is still pretty much understudied. Although in light of the possible advantages proclaimed to be derived from incremental transitions,⁴ coupled with Taiwan's non-interventionist, coup-free reality in

⁴ Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction” in Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Felipe Aguero, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and Latin America,” in Richard Gunther, , P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1995); Samuel J. Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. (Baltimore: The Johns

sight, it is still imperative to examine whether the lengthy transition has done to the democratization of civil-military relations in harm's way. If what *Guojiahua* left is an autonomous, yet apolitical and non-interventionist, military and intelligence state within the state, it is then an open question whether *Guojiahua* is part of the problem or part of the solution to the making of democratic civil-military relations. After all, what counts at the critical moments is whether democratic professionalism has successfully tapped into *Guojiahua* and ultimately tamed the loyalty of the security sector to the state and furthermore led loyalty to the democratic system.⁵

More paradoxical is the relationship between the military and the security services under *Guojiahua*. As is the case in Leninist party-military relationship, both the military and security intelligence services in Taiwan were under party leadership. Security intelligence apparatuses, including political officers in the military, act as countervailing forces in the service of coup-prevention. Whether that coup-prevention measure indeed works at the critical moment varies from country to country,⁶ but at least it was at work in Taiwan before democratic transition. The political officers indeed take pride in the history of successfully preventing two alleged coup attempts, which, as any institutionalist approach would lead, contributes to shaping the military attitudes towards military interventions and reinforcing military loyalty to the party. However, as the majority of the intelligence staff is composed of military officers, Taiwan's military and intelligence services also constitute some kind of symbiotic relations for the sake of national security/party survival. With *Guojiahua* under way during democratization, to focus merely on the military while ignoring the intelligence services is to grasp only half of the picture. Thus it is compelling to figure out whether there is differentiated pace and degree of nationalization across both the intelligence services and the military. What

Hopkins University, 1998)

⁵ Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1978); Diamond and Plattner, 1996, *ibid.*; Fitch, 1998, *ibid.*; Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2000)

⁶ For further discussion on the relationship between coup prevention and civilian control, see, for examples, Brian D. Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000.* (Cambridge, Cambridge University, 2003); Boubacar N'Diaye, "How *Not* to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997," *Armed Forces & Society*, (4), 2002, 619-640; Aurel Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea," *Armed Forces & Society*, (3), 2004, 357-381.

is more important is to explore the impact of those variations on the military-intelligence nexus and the coup-prevention mechanisms.

While students of civil-military relations mostly pay attention to what happens domestically, the influence from external security partners cannot be dismissed, particularly after witnessing the influence the regional security institution has exerted upon civil-military relations in the post-Soviet world in enabling civilian control in place sooner rather than later. The institutional- and norm- building learned from and persuaded by international/regional organizations is gradually emerging as an important subject in the study of the civil-military relations in the global/regional context.⁷ Given the absence of Taiwan's legal security alliance and her longstanding isolation from international organizations in the face of threats posed by China, coupled with the fact that Taiwan heavily relies on the U.S. defense commitments in the spheres ranging from a binding U.S. legislation, intelligence sharing, arms sales, to personnel training and military exchanges, the influence of U.S. in Taiwan's civil-military relations remains unknown. However, what is paradoxical in this aspect is that the record of U.S. military diplomacy in enhancing stabilized civil-military relations during and after the Cold War is at best a mixed one. With that paradox in mind, whether and how Taiwan's civil-military interactions come under the U.S. influence during democratization deserves deeper examination.

Last, but certainly not the least is the role of external threats and the inexorable nexus between domestic political developments and international environments. Conventional wisdom has it that the existence of external threats lends support for the military to retain prerogatives in the name of national security needs. That, combined with a supplementary argument that external threats not only help stabilize civil-military relations but further consolidate civilian control if the mission of national security establishments is oriented towards external defense,⁸ lend at best equivocal guides regarding whether the constant threats posed by China result in part of the problem or part of the solution to Taiwan's democratization of civil-military relations. What compounds

⁷ David Mares, *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*. (Boulder: Westview, 1998); Biljana Vankovska and Haken Wiberg, *Between Past and Future: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist Balkans*. (New York: I. B., 2003); Gheciu 2005 Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the "New Europe," *International Organization* 59:2005, 973-1012.

⁸ Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1999)

an already indeterminate direction into an intractable one is the nationalistic mobilization for Taiwan independence emerging out of Taiwan's domestic democratization that likely results in the escalation of cross-Strait military tensions. Yet it remains barren as to how to factor into the equation of Taiwan's civil-military transition this paradoxical accumulation of the sense of external insecurity as a result of internal democratization.

Civil-military transition: Nationalization of the party army

Since this paper takes special interest in how civil-military transition proceeds under the circumstances of internal democratization and external pressures, the focus is placed on the nationalization process (*Guojiahua*). Taiwan's civil-military transition in and of itself posed a question accordingly: why is it that Taiwan devotes to promoting civilian control over the armed forces after nationalization transition away from the party civilian control? In other words, if the transition trajectory is to switch from one mode of civilian control (party army) to another civilian control, and if the nationalization is already a success story, why is it so important for Taiwan to address civilian control issues? To answer those questions, this paper emphasizes that simply jumping into problems emerging in implementing civilian control over the armed forces could only gather surfaced symptoms, yet there is no getting the cure unless one gets to the bottom of the nature of Taiwan's civil-military transitions and take the military and security forces seriously. With that in mind, what follows is a discussion devoted to civil-military transition in general and, in particular, Taiwan's nationalization process.

As many young democracies muddle through transition periods and into consolidation stages, recent studies of democratic civil-military relations have either focused on civilian efforts (and the lack thereof) to move towards democratic governance over the security sector, or, conversely, how the military retain their influence through avenues short of coup attempts and military interventions in any kind. Behind this big picture is the normative concept of democratic civil-military relations that makes it clear the end game be the realization of democratic civilian control over the defense and intelligence establishments in support of the democratic consolidation. In the broader context of democratization literature, after years of debates the common ground emerged is that there is no single prescription that fits all. Before reaching the end state, what makes a difference usually is the starting point of the transition and the transitory path in between.

By the same token, inherently there is an implicit dichotomy, largely corresponding

to the pre-existent regime types, in addressing the devices for civil-military transition into democratic civilian control. On the one hand, for those once under military rules or praetorian guardianship to achieve civilian control, first and foremost priority is to establish the overriding principle of military non-intervention. Should the military interventions be curbed, civilian control then stands a chance to take hold. As for the post-transition period, however tempting, it is still too early to portray a rosy picture of military non-interventions and declare coups as dusts in the history. Taking a closer look at those newly democratized countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America., the specter of military interferences still revolve around the en route to democratic consolidation after decades of civil-military transitions. There is no absence of instances in this regard—Niger in 1996, Uruguay in 2000, Venezuela in 2002, and most recently Fiji, Thailand, and Philippines in 2006 represent cases in point.

On the other hand, post-Communist regimes experience a different transition path towards democratization of the civil-military relations. Conventional wisdom has it that the legacy of Leninist party political control gives rise to the military traditions of civilian supremacy. Furthermore, as suggested by Valerie Bunce, the legacy of party army renders military non-intervention as a given virtue that is particularly salient in the aftermath of the outbreaks of the ethnic conflicts amidst the democratic transition in post-Communist eastern and central Europe.⁹ With the principles of civilian supremacy unshakable, the civil-military transitory path therefore is portrayed as a fast track moving from one mode of civilian control to another, that is to say, from party rule to democratic civilian governance. Taking on an array of the problems not just from the military but particularly engendered by the civilian politicians, it is argued that the thrust of civil-military transitions in post-Soviet world has passed beyond merely civilian control over the military and security sectors. Rather, observations of post-Communist civil-military relations suggest that the focus should go beyond traditional military politics by switching to broader dimensions of the democratic governance over the whole national security apparatus that not only cover executive control but include parliamentary oversight and the participation of the civil society.¹⁰

⁹ See Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," *ibid.*

¹⁰ For further discussion, see Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edsmund and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, 1 (2002), 31-56; Biljana Vankovska and Haken Wiberg, *Between Past and Future: Civil-Military*

The difference post-Communist cases have made on the subject of civil-military transition is the nationalization of the defense and intelligence sectors in the aftermath of rapid regime changes – by simultaneously ridding of communist party political networks and bringing back the state governance. In Russia, the nationalization took place and completed in a short period of time thanks to the regime change. In addition to the regime change, the nature of external imposition made it relatively easy to clear the Leninist party networks from the national security establishments in central and eastern Europe.

Taiwan provides an interesting and special case for students of civil-military transitions on several accounts. Empirically, unlike party-controlled security forces elsewhere in central and east Europe that transited into national forces under governmental control in a pretty short period of time—primarily thanks to the sudden external shock of the collapse of Soviet regime, Taiwan went through a lengthy transition to put an array of military and intelligence services under state governmental control. That fact alone makes Taiwan a control case for the study in the party-military transition during democratization.

Conceptually, and most importantly, the nationalization of the party army is a missing link in the study of civil-military transition. Conventional wisdom has it that a variety of civil-military patterns constitutes a two-way directional spectrum ranging from military rule/predominance to military participation/praetorianism, and then moves to civilian control to democratic civilian control, with the sequence for transition also designated as part of the measurement of the advancement in military modernization. It remains unknown where within the transition spectrum to locate the nationalization of the party-controlled security forces. More often than not, scholarly attentions directed to the transitions to civilian control over the armed forces formulate a two-stage roadmap in first explaining the steps taken to cease military interventions and then exploring the strategies and problems in installing civilian control. Study in the transitions of the post-Communist party militaries is no exception in taking both stages under examination, but, in the aftermath, the differences post-Communist cases has made lies in the overall continuity of civilian supremacy – oftentimes attributed as a legacy encrypted by decades of Communist party control – and the ensuing contention to shift emphasis to democratic civilian control over the armed forces. However, the fact that nationalization of the post-Communist party armies has been completed in a rather short of time with little

Relations in the Post-Communist Balkans, ibid..

obstacles has paradoxically made the security nationalization as a given inevitability and been taken lightly by students of civil-military relations. That certainly should not be the case. Although with only lightly touch on issues of military intervention, it should be noted that study in post Communist civil-military transitions still presumes the dangers of military interventions is likely to persist during and after the nationalization transition.

To be sure, by logic nationalization of party military is nowhere close to a guaranteed success. Nor is it a logic necessity for nationalization to go in sync with democratization. If anything, nationalization as a plus in normative and epistemic terms could go wrong and always risks fallacy of military intervention if the security forces, after getting rid the party reign, refuse the governmental control under the guise of retaining professional autonomy or, to make things worse, initiate coercive interventions and dominate governing power without undertaking military rules. In other words, it is worth exploring whether nationalization contributes to part of the solution or part of the civil-military problems in the post-transition. More importantly, it is imperative to raise the fundamental question by asking why security nationalization succeeded in preserving military non-intervention— a precondition for the implementation of effective civilian control— and not otherwise.

Research Design

Military and intelligence in civil-military transition

Earlier discussions highlight the importance of the overriding concern over the evolving military and intelligence influences. Focusing on the scope, the content of those influences and the ways defense and security establishments manage to retain their power during and after nationalization process will be key to understanding why there is no coup, in what terms Taiwan's civil-military transition is a success story, and what is next for the implementation of democratic civilian control over the defense and security sectors. In doing so, this paper is likely to contribute to theories of civil-military transitions by shedding light on how the armed forces react to democratization.

While conventional wisdom holds that democratic transition and consolidation hinges on military nonintervention and the establishment of civilian control over the military and security services, both involving restricting the role of the military in the formulation and implementation of policy as well as addressing professionalization of the officer corps,

reorienting the mission, reorganizing structures, and adjusting the force size. Given the fact that relatively few take on the perspectives from the military and security forces when compared to abundant literatures that look at civilian side, branding that imbalance of scholarly attentions as the “stunning neglect of the military” is not overstated.¹¹

Calls to taking steps studying the internal dynamics of the military and intelligence services recently witness gathering momentum in shifted focus on the sociological side of the story – personnel career promotion, origin and connection background of officer corps, reform in professional education,¹² military discourses over the redefinition of national security are all cases in point.¹³ Yet the long-standing problem confronting collecting data inside the barracks is one that cannot be easily ignored. A middle way is to go back and look at the civil-military interactions, an approach most adopted but oftentimes goes incomplete by biasing towards civilian side of the story.¹⁴ Along with the line of civil-military interactions, tending to the ups and downs of military and intelligence influences, as suggested by Pion-Berlin, is a good starting point to weigh in on military and intelligence perspectives, yet the question of “how” on the reactions from military and intelligence side still goes under-rated, if not totally unaddressed.

Analytic framework and case selection

Taking notice on the lacuna in the literature, this paper intends to square in the military and intelligence side of the civil-military transition. Of particular importance for this paper is to address how the armed forces adapt to the emerging nexus between

¹¹ Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1988)

¹² Please see, for instances, Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Military on the Democratic Stage*, (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2005); Siddharth Chandra And Douglas Kammen, “Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics In Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation,” *World Politics* 55 (October 2002), 96–136; Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces*, *ibid.*.

¹³ See, for examples, Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*, (Routledge Curzon, 2003); Felipe Aguero, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and Latin America,” *ibid.*; Samuel J. Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, *ibid.*.

¹⁴ See, for examples, Wendy Hunter, “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthorization Brazil,” *Comparative Politics*, July 1995, 425-442; Tanel Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, (1), 2004, 127-150;

domestic democratization and external pressure, one that has received growing, yet sporadic attentions without systemic stock-taking.

Table 1 Spheres of Influence, Institutional Autonomy, and Professional-Political Continuum

		Professional	Professional-Political	Political
Levels of Autonomy	High	Junior-Level Personnel Decisions Doctrines Education/Training		Human Rights
	Medium		Arms Procurement Budget Reorganization	Internal Security Intelligence Gathering
	Low	Force Level	Senior-Level Personnel Decisions	

*Adapted from Table 2 Defense Issues, Military Autonomy, and the Professional-Political Continuum in David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” *Comparative Politics* (1), 1992:p93

At this point, a representative case study that demonstrates the most of the variations should be proximate to illuminating the trends and dynamics. Building on Pion-Berlin’s professional-political model,(See Table 1)¹⁵this paper intends to study the personnel policy, mission reorientation, and re-organization of ROC’s Coast Guard Administration(CGA), one organization whose functions come across the civilian-military, military-intelligence, internal security-external defense dichotomy, covering professional, professional-political grey zone and political continuum. Employing process-tracing method, this paper focuses on how coast guards has adapted to changing environments, domestic and external alike, since 1986. The data collected is primarily based on materials from governmental documents, Taiwan’s media news reports, memoirs of retired officials, and interviews.

It is well-known that the CGA, previously as Garrison Command under Martial Laws, used to possess veto power over national security affairs before democratization. For that matter, on the part of mission reorientation, particular attention is devoted to how

¹⁵ See David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” *Comparative Politics* (1), 1992, 83-102.

coast guards dealt with its transition from a repressive intelligence service with intimidating, widespread spawns over both external and internal security. On personnel policy, special interest is pointed to the changes in personnel component and senior personnel promotion, in an effort to observe the extent to which the institution fashions in the reorientation of missions and the corresponding reorganization. Central to the inquiry of this paper is a twofold examination: first is to assess how coast guards manage to adapt to change in their professional terrains and whether the steps they take include a creeping preservation of re-expansion of their territory; second is to observe not only whether coast guards still engage in political spheres of influences— such as human rights abuse, internal security, and intelligence gathering—but more importantly, whether their performances conform to democratic orders, and, most importantly, how they manage to carve their niches and remain relevant, or even influential, in accordance to democratic norms.

Findings and interpretations

On account of Taiwan's governmental disclosure, current CGA is affiliated to Executive Yuan after integrating the Coast Guard Command Department of the Ministry of National Defense, the aquatic police department of the National Police Administration of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Smuggling Surveillance Fleet of the Directorate General of Customs of the Ministry of Finance in 2000 under the auspice of the Coast Guard Law.¹⁶ Among those integrated organizations, Coast Guard Command Department of the Ministry of National Defense is the major body inherited most assets left by the Garrison Command before the establishment of the CGA. By that account currently the CGA staff is a combination of the military, police and civilian personnel. In the past, the Garrison Command was perceived as an intelligence organization with its own coast guard forces and led by military generals. While Coast Guard Command were also led by military generals, the CGA directors are filled by civilians of different background—three out of four CGA directors since 2000 had been the director of the police forces before coming to assume the CGA leadership. What follows is an examination of the personnel, mission and reorganization of the CGA, as an effort to shed light on the change and continuity of

¹⁶ See the official CGA website at www.cga.gov.tw.

the CGA spheres of influences.

Civilian-Military Tensions

In fashion of the professional division of labor, elements of personnel take charge of varied dimensions of patrol missions. To quote the CGA official statement, "...Under the CGA, there are two Offices of the Directorate General – the Maritime and Coast Patrol Directorate General Offices. The Maritime Patrol Directorate General Office is organized with personnel from the original aquatic police department and Smuggling Surveillance Fleet of the Office of Directorate General of Customs.... The Coast Guard Directorate General Office is organized with personnel from the original Coast Guard Command Department of the Ministry of National Defense...."¹⁷ Quite predictably there emerges tensions over career promotion expectations between the military staffs in the Coast Guard Directorate General Office and the civilian staffs in the Maritime Patrol Directorate General Office. Although there have been a variety of steps taken to further integrate the two parts into a tight-knit functional unity, particularly referring to diverse channels for civilian and military promotions,¹⁸ the net effect is mixed at best. In general the military staffs' career expectations are more threatened than civilians due to the steady civilianization of the CGA, which is regulated by the CGA organization act. The civilianization of the CGA is sort of inevitable given that the transformation of coast guard establishments into the CGA is part of the larger process of the military retreat from the internal security sphere.¹⁹

Another short-term major challenge confronting these integration efforts lies in that civilian staffs are not yet fit for some quasi-military missions that used to be the turfs of military and police.²⁰ Yet the CGA has put in effort to professionalizing military expertise. The CGA has established two special operation forces, with the second one

¹⁷ See the official CGA website at www.cga.gov.tw.

¹⁸ Wang Shinwu, "New Challenges Facing Coast Guard Administration, Part II," the detailed analytic report released by the *Central Agency*, January 12, 2006; "Director of CGA: Morale Inspired by Three Military Staffs Promoted to Generalship," *Central Agency*, June 30, 2005.

¹⁹ See "Military Staffs (of the CGA) Fear being Purged," *Apple Daily*, (Taipei), January 26, 2006.

²⁰ For further discussions, please see Wang Shinwu, "New Challenges Facing Coast Guard Administration, Part II," *ibid.*

focusing on counter-terrorism.²¹ Although the counterterrorism special operation force was initially trained by ROC Marine, the CGA has managed to develop its own training force.²²

Internal security-External Defense Disputes

Major mission for the CGA is broadly categorized into four areas: maritime safety, marine resources protection, search and rescue, port security inspection, which maintains to dedicate to coast and maritime security. The nature of the CGA mission is twofold. On the one hand, the CGA personnel on duty are by definition legal enforcement police in charge of internal security. On the other hand, strategically the CGA armed forces are paramilitary forces for quasi-military external security in protection of sovereign territory. On external security, the major mission CGA undertakes in the external security dimension is maritime patrol for fishery resources protection, contributing to a way of demonstrating determination to protecting sovereign territory. In addition, since 1999 the coast guard forces have been deployed on the two tiny islands in South China Sea after the withdrawal of marine forces, as part of the unilateral demilitarization initiative in hopes of signaling Taiwan's good will in shaping confidence-building measures (CBMs). Today CGA remains that force deployment at the size of about 300 paramilitary troops despite that the Defense Ministry is reportedly considering to redeploy marines back there.²³ It remains to be seen whether the CGA forces are to withdraw from those islands.

Military-Intelligence Controversy

What is less clear yet of special interest for this paper is whether the successor of the Garrison Command retains the personnel, mission, and equipment of counter-intelligence and domestic eavesdropping. What often goes unnoticed is that, within the CGA organizational structure, there are Intelligence Department and Telecommunications and Information Department, which were suspected by some to have remained those

²¹ Dai Guangzi, "Coast Guard Administration's Special Operation Force as thrust of Counterterrorism," in *China Times Evening News* (Taipei), April 16, 2007.

²² Li Han, "Coast Guard Administration's Special Operation Force Trained by Marines," in *China Times* (Taipei), April 15, 2007.

²³ Chiang Zunnan, "Peaceful Island Taipin," in *Apple Daily* (Taipei), January 5, 2006.

intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.²⁴ To the extent that the CGA formal functional definition and organizational structure are concerned, those suspicions are not entirely groundless. According to the CGA mission statement, current CGA retains certain intelligence capacity dedicated for coastal patrol, and in a broader sense in support for national security intelligence under the coordination and command of the National Security Bureau (NSB). The second part of the intelligence function oftentimes goes unnoticed as the CGA anti-smuggling campaign and fishery resource protection cover the headlines most of the times. However, the NSB has made it clear that the CGA is still in the intelligence community, comprising one of the seven systems of the intelligence apparatus.²⁵ Moreover, the shuffling of the positions between Deputy Director of the NSB and Director of the CGA only reinforced the connection to the intelligence community. Most pronounced is that current CGA director, Wang Jinwong, was the deputy director in NSB before turning to current position while Shi Hui-yu, the former CGA director, is now serving in the position as the first civilian director of the NSB. Relevant to the endogenous issues of the CGA is that the military high-ranking officials mostly grasp promotions in their intelligence performances – for example, most recently two of the three new generals in the CGA are located in Telecommunications and Information Department of the CGA.²⁶

Dynamics within the CGA

Based on the professional-political continuum demonstrated in Table 1, one witnesses the reduction of CGA's influences in intelligence gathering and internal security while expansion in its external defense functions. Regarding how the CGA has made this turn, this paper finds that the civil-military tensions, coupled with the emerging sense of marginalization in both military and intelligence community, are the key driving forces behind the CGA efforts in maintaining the engagement in the intelligence gathering, and further expanding influences in the spheres of external security.

Largely benefited from the changing environment in domestic politics, the CGA has

²⁴ Interview of a civilian intelligence official in NSC on December 23, 2004; Interview of a military political officer on May, 2005.

²⁵ "Leaders of Seven Major Intelligence Organs Are Confident of Protecting the Safety of Political Party Leaders," Central Agency, Taipei, May 12, 2005.

²⁶ See "Military Staffs (of the CGA) Fear being Purged," *Apple Daily*, (Taipei), January 26, 2006.

accorded to the redefinition of national security and got their cuts from not only the civilian side but also the military and intelligence fields. The national identity controversy that democratization give rise to is both part of the problems and part of the solution for the CGA to remain relevant. The national identity disputes have made the nationalization problematic in terms of to what nation the officer corps should allege their loyalty. Yet this paper finds that the CGA accorded with current ruling government's fine-tune in the content of the nationalization, thereby placing heavy weight on the political neutrality of the officer corps. The internal rivalries between the military, the police, and the civilians have rendered the loyalty issues non-significant in its daily routines. Oftentimes the accusations based on national identity bias were directed to the political appointees instead of the working staffs. The impression this author garnered from limited personal contacts with several CGA officers also confirmed this trend of political non-intervention and neutrality.²⁷

Moreover, in response to the national identity crisis, the shifting focus of the security ethos is to emphasize on the protection of the geographic territory, which closely matches the nature of the CGA functions. The CGA, in turn, takes on this resounding ethos to single out its own special standing in promoting this shift in security ethos. Naming the patrol ship after Taiwan locality and adding Taiwan on the title of the CGA assets are just a few political episodes played out to win greater support from the pan-green audience, the ruling party and, most important, the President Chen, who by constitution is in charge of the decision-making for the whole national security apparatus.²⁸

Nonetheless, playing politics is not enough for the CGA to compete against other services within the security establishments. This paper finds that, with nuanced, selective interpretations of the changing environment, the maritime function and intelligence assets create a good opportunity for the CGA to get more resources from their civilian supervisors – be they the President, the Legislative Yuan or the civil society – than expected by many observers. Here are several instances that are likely to unfold the pathways the CGA follows to carve their niches.

I. Fishery Protection and Territorial Disputes

²⁷ Interviews of military staffs often reveal dissatisfaction towards the national identity disputes but those same military officers reiterated that the obedience of orders and loyalty is not an issue.

²⁸ Chen Yixiong, "Renaming Patrol Ships as Taiwan R.O.C. Taiwan Coast Guard," *United Daily News*, (Taipei), March 12, 2006.

Disputes against Japan over fishery fields is one issue that the CGA went under attack by the oppositionist parties, yet the CGA turns this challenge into an opportunity to call for the rearmament of the patrol ships and the procurement of patrol planes.²⁹ The CGA turned the corner around by appealing to the public first, then inviting debates, and finally turning to lobbying the Legislative Yuan.³⁰ By this author's observation, the CGA succeeded in finding a way out of the identity disputes and partisan rivalries. With this orderly, strategic sequence the CGA appeals to the power base of the oppositionist camp to support for the strengthened CGA capacity so as to counter Japanese harassments while also reinforcing the impression of "marching towards normalcy" favorable by the ruling party and the pro-independence camp.

II. Deployment on islands in South China Sea

Same pattern, although in a slightly different version, applies to how the CGA competes with the Defense Ministry in handling the deployment of troops in those two tiny islands – Dongsa and Taiping Islands – in the South China Sea. The CGA grapples with the overriding theme in redefining the national security as comprehensive security, which leads to reinforce the demilitarization trends in the national security affairs. To entertain the comprehensive security theme predominant in Southeast Asian countries around the South China Sea, those two islands the CGA troops stay are painted by the DPP government as important sources of environmental security and environmental diplomacy. Therefore, any proposition to re-militarize those two islands is likely to confront mounting pressures from epistemic communities of environmentalists and area specialists. Moreover, the CGA, coordinated through the National Security Council, suggested the Defense Ministry build a new airport runway on one of the Islands in the name of humanitarian security, another domain under the concept of comprehensive security.³¹ The call has met short debates and been refuted—at least for the moment, yet the Defense Ministry took most of the fire against its consideration over the remilitarization of the faraway islands by sending in the Marines

²⁹ Sun Chunwu, "Strengthening Law Reinforcement Capacity for the Coast Guards," *Central News*, March 28, 2006; "Strengthening Reconnaissance Capacity through Air Patrol," *Central News*, (Taipei) June 26, 2005.

³⁰ Sun Chunwu, "Strengthening Law Reinforcement Capacity for the Coast Guards," *ibid.*

³¹ Wu Minjie and Ho Bowen, "Building the Runway Invokes Controversies," *China Times*, (Taipei) December 12, 2005.

again.³² At the end of the day, the CGA, willingly or willy-nilly, keeps the turf untouched with its paramilitary troops remaining there.

III. Penetrating the intelligence state

The demilitarization process is one that Taiwan's ruling party intends to gather momentum in the intelligence community, particularly within the current Big Brother—the NSB. As the directors of the NSB were filled by certain military general instead of civilian politician after decades of democratization and the completion of *Guajiahua*, the civilian politicians from both the ruling and oppositionist parties realize the critical importance of incremental procedure in installing civilians inside the security state. In this light, the CGA is a great place to start insofar as it retains certain intelligence capacities. As the intelligence capacity of the CGA is in decline, the CGA cannot afford to miss the opportunity for the revival of its intelligence engagement. Paradoxically, the CGA's efforts to reinvigorate intelligence capacity are likely to receive the greatest support from the CGA military staffs within the CGA intelligence branches. As noted earlier, the fact that the CGA military staffs' career expectations are under threat provides sufficient incentives for those military officers within the CGA intelligence branch to make the case for the necessity for the CGA to retain intelligence gathering functions. Confined by limited sources up to this writing, one can only do the guess work in hindsight after the CGA intelligence officers got promoted at about the same time when the director of the CGA switched track to the NSB. The likely implications should serve as a precaution. While the CGA's hard work might push the civilian control over intelligence forward, it is uncertain at this moment whether the CGA conduct its intelligence gathering entirely under the NSB directives. It is neither crystal whether the CGA's intelligence gathering has followed democratic norms without violating human rights, which is critical to advancing democratic governance. The right direction for the CGA is to go down the path towards opening to bipartisan parliamentary oversight. In so doing the CGA is to set a good precedent and thereby shaping the democratic professionalism within Taiwan's intelligence community.

³² Jian Huanchi, "We should not Build a Runway on the Taipin Island," *Liberty Times*, (Taipei) December 29, 2005; Song Yenwei, "There should be a runway on the Taipin Island," *Liberty Times*, (Taipei) January 12, 2006.

Conclusion

This paper examines Taiwan's civil-military relations in the context of democratic consolidation, focusing on how armed forces and security apparatus face dual challenges for their professional autonomy and political neutrality in a young democracy. In contrast to expectations that lingering fear of interventions and questions about political loyalty would provide the military motives and opportunities to consolidate their veto power position, defense and security sectors in Taiwan achieved political neutrality sooner than expected. Taking on the pilot case of the Coast Guard Administration, this paper finds that the military carves their own political niches within the new democratic order by turning to lobbying both political and civil society to influence the defense and security policy agenda, which represents more of progress than challenges for consolidating democratic governance over the military in Taiwan.

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