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Paradigm Shifts : Is Strategic Studies Still Relevant to the World Today?

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Abstract

Historically, the origin of Strategic Studies begins very early days and its definitions and scopes evolve in correspondence with the change of time. During the Cold War era, the state-centric approach was considered a main drive for Strategic Studies, through which states have been seeking for their survival in the international community by force building. When bipolar system vanished, critics argued that the methodology of knowledge-building for Strategic Studies were apparently short of scientific proof and testability in the real world. Critics also challenged the feasibility of rational decision-making and predictability of Strategic Studies. This essay has collected some main critics and found that the course of Strategic Studies is evidently affected by strategic environment, which has rendered not only the danger of paradigm lost but a necessity of reflection for its stalemate. In so doing, the Strategic Studies may highlight its value and function so as to differentiate itself with Military Studies and Security Studies and establish specialty of its own discipline. In conclusion, the Strategic Studies has to abolish its outdated paradigm, as this essay indicates, and builds up its new research fields. In addition, whatever changes are made to the international environments, the Strategic Studies is still relevant to the world today because it is considered as indispensable means and instruments for national security and state survival.

Key words: strategic studies, paradigm, deterrence, security studies, military studies

A. Introduction

The rapid pace of political, economic, demographic, social, scientific, and technological changes imposes unprecedented challenges to the politico-military policy makers among states in the post cold War era. Needs for quick response to the diversified subjects such as crime prevention, ecology, energy, ethnic turmoil, international terrorism, public welfare, smuggling, and cross-borders conflicts are key considerations. Also, needs for competent strategy will multiply if trends toward complexity continue to accelerate. The question is whether strategy is designed to deal with challenges above in the face of new international environment today.

In his article published on a journal, namely World Politics in the year of 1997, Richard Betts titled the topic as "Should Strategic Studies Survive?", which had caused a lot of controversies over the issue of paradigm shift or change in the academic community of Strategic Studies (Betts, 1997: 5-33). Again, in the year of 2000 Betts put his another notable paper on International Security with the topic "Is Strategy an Illusion?", in which he responded critics by arguing that Strategic Studies are still valid and relevant to global politics today, even though there are some apparent flaws in world interpretation (Betts, 2000: 5-50). Following his argument, a lot of strategic analysts and scholars carried out some self-verified reflections on similar topics in exploring the difficulties that Strategic Studies have been bearing upon in the post Cold War international politics(Payne, 1996: 2001; Gray, 2002; Baylis et al., 2002). They have notably worked hard to map out future direction for the Strategic Studies. There is no denying the fact that the problems of ethnic conflict, global warming, and nuclear proliferation have become major global issues in the Post Cold War era. These questions stay centers of international attention. This seems to suggest that states, once had been seen as a center for the study of international affairs, have yielded the way to issues related to the global concerns, such as international terrorism, ethnic conflict, environmental protection, and piracy. Critics contended that some serious misunderstandings and unawareness by Strategic analysts over the realities of shifting focus in the world political structure did occur. Thus the aim of this study starts with a background study of strategy and examines the definitions of strategy so as to understand the core ideas of Strategic Studies; then follows by viewpoints and allegations from critics. Finally, the paper conducts necessary survey on paradigm shifts, to see if paradigms that Strategic Studies have centered upon can

keep up with the trend of international concerns in the Post Cold War period.

More importantly, will the strategic studies remain a need for caution and humility because there is a huge gulf between offering advice and taking responsibility for decisions with potentially severe consequences? Or, will the future of strategic studies still remain relevant in terms of academic organization due to its less coherence in explanation of the end of Cold War? Besides, will the Strategic Studies be replaced either by Security Studies because of its broad agendas or by Military Studies for its narrow technical thoughts? In short, is Strategic Studies still relevant to the world politics today?

B. Origins, Definitions and Scopes

B.1 Origins of Strategy

B.1.1 Military Background

In western world, the term "strategy" can be traced back to one thousand years in ancient Greece and had been used as a way to train "generalship"((Mclean, 1996: 480). Byzantine Empire's Emperor Maurice has been regarded as the first one using "strategy"(*Strategicon*) for guiding high-ranking generals in order to win battles (Palmer, 1978: 73). In ancient China strategy was generally referred to "Sun-Ze Doctrines" that has become a textbook to many military academies in the East and West.

In modern time, the study of strategy started from the late 18 century or early 19 century, mainly referring to the relations between war and military forces. During this period, there were two outstanding strategic analysts, Carl Von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri Jomini, who published two well-known books "On War" and "The Art of War" based on the study of Napoleon's war talent and strategy for winning the battle with several decisive campaigns. As the importance of these two books to the guide of both modern military strategists and civilian strategic analysts, Kalevi J. Holsti thus points out that the strategic thinking of Clausewitz and Jomini has been the concepts reiterated by many international political scientists when they study conflicts of states (Holsti, 1996: 6-7; Holsti, 1991: 13). In view of this, one hence knows the significance of military forces in the study of strategy in early days.

Many believe that the development of military technology deeply influences the effectiveness of strategic employment in many ways, starting from land warfare, sea warfare to air battle all included. One simple example is the invention of aircraft that has made war from one dimension to multi-dimension levels, so was the influence of creation of nuclear bomb to the modern war and strategic thinking. For many strategic analysts, the invention of nuclear weapon has made a demarcation of strategy and strategic studies in their pursuit of objectives as well as the definition and implementation.

B. 1.2 Strategic Studies

Ken Booth, once a strategic analyst then a scholar of security studies later, claims that the end of Cold War symbolizes an end of Strategic Studies because in the Post Cold War period, the Strategic Studies has yielded its way to the security Studies due to wide-spread of security concerns in the world society nowadays (Booth, 1994: 109-119). Booth has classified Strategic Studies into three stages, arising from the birth of nuclear weapons. The first stage of Strategic Studies, according to Booth, began in early 1950s, with few theoretical achievements worth noting since it was the time of infancy for the concept formation. Then the second stage came, between 1956 and 1985. It was a "Golden Age" of Strategic Studies, as he titled, During this period, Strategic Studies had been introduced into universities with academic and practical significances to policy making, and the theories related to nuclear deterrence became core values of Strategic Studies. With multi-dimensional ideas involved, such as politics, economics, psychology, history, diplomacy, and technology pouring into the discipline, most scholars took it for granted that Strategic Studies played a central role in the study of International Relations.

The third stage appeared in the late 1980s as the Cold War drew to an end. The final stage of Strategic Studies actually faced some severe criticisms from different schools of thoughts due to the change of global security concerns and possible signs of paradigm shifting occurred. For some, the sign might indicate a weak theory tendency that seemed unable to explain the world appropriately. During this period, not much progress in theoretical improvement to speak of in the Strategic Studies to justify its state-centric academic stand in the international society. That is to say, the core values that Strategic Studies once cherished and built for in the Cold War Era were called into serious questions. A call by many for paradigm shifts echoed in

strategic community in an attempt to map out new direction and defend for its legitimate validity (Betts, 2000: 5-50; Payne, 2001; Gray, 2002; Baylis et al., 2002).

In sum, strategy and strategic studies for many, in a sense, refer to two different issues with different focuses. Others probably might argue that they both share the similar origins with special attention on power and war. As a matter of fact, the evolvement of strategy demonstrates its varieties in explanation of different periods from very early years, especially when referring to the military related studies, while in universities strategy faced challenges of its scientific approach. Nevertheless, when making a comparison between strategy and Strategic Studies, one may notice an interesting fact that Strategic Studies seems to pay more attentions to academic value than strategy does in practicability. In other words, the significances of strategic studies lie more on knowledge-seeking approach than on implementation in the real world. There has been always an argument over the development of strategic studies in the Post Cold War era. Some stressed that Strategic Studies was largely undertaken outside the universities and because strategy was tested by practice and judged by results, most strategists have responded to the pressure of change and to the demand for policy analysis and prescription by narrowing the focus of their attention within the field.

B. 2 Definitions of Strategy

B. 2.1 Military Strategists

Despite the fact that definition on strategy varies from one to another, there are however, two major separate views on the meanings explanation. One is termed by military strategists who are mainly served as military professionals and seek for victory in the battlefield by using military strategy appropriately; and the other, civilian strategists who are educated at universities tend to utilize academic methods for the analysis and scaling strategy in order to offer plans for policy makers.

For military professionals, one of the most prominent definitions of strategy is from Clausewitz who claims that "Strategy is the use of engagement for the object of the war" (Clausewitz, 1976: 178). He also stresses that "Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy" (Clausewitz, 86) Another well-known strategist, Jomini, even though he did not make any direct definition on strategy, defines the war as a series of engagements, by which effective strategy takes

the lead and finally wins the war (Moran, 2002: 25). Later, Liddell Hart proposes strategy is an art to distribute and use military means to achieve policy goal. He particularly emphasizes the importance of taking "indirect approach" as a way to win victory in the battlefield (Hart, 1967: 336-370). Andre Beaufre, a French strategic analyst, strongly believes that strategy should be seen more an art than an engagement. Beaufre argues that strategy is a dialectic art in force or, to make it more specific, is a dialectic art of solving problems from two opposition parties (Beaufre, 1965: 22). The US Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie defines strategy as a "plan of action" designed for attaining certain goals. In Wylie's word, strategy refers to a system of measures to achieve one's intention (Wylie, 1989: 14).

As defined above, one might obviously realize the meanings and the significances by military strategists for the purpose of achieving victory. They serve their career as military professionals and see winning a war as the sole goal of strategy. Military forces and military means for them are the center of strategy for winning the war, rather than a fulfillment of policy implementation. In so doing, military technology and weapon systems have been viewed as major driving forces behind the strategy implementation. However, the concept and strategy were changed, followed by an invention of nuclear weapon. Consequently a sea change occurred in its role of goal-seeking, which suggests that once the nuclear weapons were used, the line between winners and losers disappeared and everyone became the victim.

B. 2.2 Civilian Strategists

Apparently, seeking for winning the war by effective employment of military forces has been guidelines for military strategists. When nuclear weapon became reality, the concept of strategy for military strategists changed quickly in complies with the daunting effect of destruction. Liddell Hart once remarked, it could become meaningless for traditional (military) strategists with the purpose of pursuing for victory through military strategy after the appearance of nuclear weapons in the world (Hart, 1960: 66). This obviously draws a clear line between traditional military strategists.

For civilian strategists, Strategic Studies is referring to something policy relevant. Any strategy that is in some sense designed for goal achieving has to be in line with policy aim. In other words, for civilians, strategy is essentially a pragmatic and

policy-oriented activity. Bernard Brodie stresses the important essence of strategy by pointing out that "strategic theory is a theory of action....Strategic Studies is policy relevant." (Brodie, 1973: 1-3) Colin S. Gray indicates that strategy is a bridge, or a linkage, between military forces and political intention. In order to achieve the policy goal the study of strategy is aimed at choice, whether or not using forces (Gray, 1999a: 17). Gray also emphasizes the significant role of strategy by stating that "Strategy is neither the use of force itself, nor is it policy, rather it is the bridge that should unite the two," and he believes that the roles of strategic studies are multi-dimensional with the military force as a core connecting economy, technology, organizations, information, society, and pattern behavior of the rivalry (Gray, 2002: 4 & 126-129). Betts shares the same view with Gray, he argues that strategy is a link between military means and political aim (Betts, 2000: 5). Hedley Bull, however, considers strategy as an art and science for how to reach the policy goal by means of force in any conflict (Bull, 1968: 593-605).

Despite most civilian strategists agreed the important connection between strategy and policy. Nevertheless, some other civilian strategists still pay their attention to the tradional thought of strategy, referring to the use of force to win the war. Thomas G. Mahnkenand & Joseph A. Malolo, for examples, defines the meaning of strategy by pointing out that "strategy is about how to win a war. Thus, any study of strategy should start from an understanding of war" (Mahnkenand & Malolo, 2008: 2). Another example is from Brodie's definition of strategy, which is mainly based on strategic practicability. He, as previously mentioned, insists that the role of strategy should be seen as a theory of action. In this respect, Gerald Segal believes that the title of Brodie's *War and Politics* should be regarded as synonymous with strategic studies in general and war in specific (Segal, 1989: 18).

With a different perspective and interpretation of the role of strategy, Thomas Schelling, an economist, views strategy as a game played by two parties. He puts strategy into the game theory model for explaining the role players interact with each other in several different occasions, by which choice might figure out from each side according to the choice of other party. He asserts that strategy is not concerned with the efficient application of force, rather it is to exploit and develop one's potential power (Schelling, 1999: 5). The book written by Barry Buzan *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations* in 1987 marked a systematic study of strategy and began a major shift on the concept of strategy

extended to the relations between military technology and International Relations. Buzan sought to develop a broader concept, an analytical framework and a wider international context for the study of strategy than that offered in the "strategy" tradition, in which military power dominates. In his book, he contends that Strategic Studies is referred to as "the means to be shaped are military ones, the field of conflict is the international system, and the ends are the political objectives of actors large enough to register as significant in the international context" (Buzan, 1987:3). Because its distinctive identity stems from its focus on military strategy, Strategic Studies can thus also be defined as a study mostly about the use of force within and between states. In this regard, as International Relations "covers a broad spectrum which includes political, economic, social, legal and cultural interactions as well as military ones," so has the Strategic Studies been seen as a sub-field and a vital component of the larger whole of International Relations. Hence, it is impossible to "study the causes of and cure for war without ranging deeply into the broader subject matter of International Relations" (Buzan p.4-5).

Buzan's ideas and concepts on Strategic Studies, like what he mentioned in the book, are broadly defined as "The literature of strategic studies is too vast and so complicated that those wanting to understand it cannot easily find a place to start...During the last 30 years the expansion of strategic literature has been driven by fast-moving developments in technology, conflict and politics." (Buzan 1987: 1). Therefore, strategy still remains relevant and vital component for the students of strategic studies to understand the basic literature and its effects. And the truth, what we have found from the views above and real world, is just like Clausewitz argued that "everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy." John Garnett bears similar ideas and states that Strategic Studies "is concerned with the darker side of human nature, in that it examines the way in which military power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests" (Garnett 1975: 3). During the Cold War period, the end of strategy, mainly on policy, seemed somewhat fixed. The central problem of policy was in its implications but also relatively simple in its formulation. Therefore, in sum, like what Betts pointed out, the demarcation between military strategists and civilian strategists is that "if strategy is to integrate policy and operations, it must be devised not just by politically sensitive soldiers but by military sensitive civilians."(Betts, 1997: 33)

B. 3 Scopes of Strategic Studies

As indicated above on points from both military strategists as well as civilian strategists, strategy can be categorized into two types of definitions based on their researchers' backgrounds. For those who are military professionals, they prefer using military forces to serve national interest and achieve national goal. One typical example given by John Collins regarding to the national strategy can be mapped several levels as follows:

	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary
	Focus	Participants	Policies	Input	Output
National	National	Chief of State;	National	National	National
Strategy	Objectives	Governmental Adviser	Policy	Power	Policy Plan
National	National	Chief of State;	National	Suitable	National
Security	Security	Security Adviser	Security Policy	National Power	Security Plan
Strategy	Objectives				
National	National	Chief of State;	National	Military Power	National
Military	Military	Military Adviser	Military		Military Plan
Strategy	Objectives		Policy		
Regional	Regional	Foreign Minister;	Foreign Policy	Diplomacy:	International
Strategy	Objectives	Ambassadors		Economic	Norms
				Assistance	
Theatre	Area	Subordinate	Joint or	Joint or	Joint or
Strategy	Military	Military	Uni-service	Uni-service	Uni-service
	Missions	Commanders	Policies	Forces	Plans & Ops

Table 1 Strategic Hierarchy

Sources: Collins, 2002: 4.

Karl Marx once argued that people make their own history but not in the circumstances of their own choosing. The study of strategy should help with the understanding of how individuals go about history making and in so doing reshape the circumstances that they face. For strategists, these circumstances include facing many extreme situations. Two striking examples of this point were provided by the events of sudden Soviet Blocs collapsed in 1991 and then the attack of 11 September 2001. The former has caused the entire edifice of Strategic Studies built up during the Cold War disoriented and extremely vulnerable to pressure from the analysis of East-West military confrontation. The latter has posed another challenge to the study of strategy. The 911 attack raises apparent question of any technology-driven

revolution in military affairs to these kinds of threats to national security, for the attack was instigated using the most ancient of military technologies, the knife, in order to turn the modern civilian aviation technologies against the West. Obviously, these extreme situations provide an agenda for strategy analysts (or policymakers) and students of strategic studies that can address.

As pointed out previously in the definitions as well as types of strategists and their concepts, this paper has categorized five different strategic paradigms with the authors, major points, methodologies and publications so that one can easily identify the variation of each in terms of their definitions and methodologies that are foundations of the paradigm.

	Authors	Definitions & Points	Methodology	Publications
Type One: Traditional Strategic Studies	Carl Von Clausewitz, Antonni Jomini, Liddell Hart, Andred Beaufre		Military approach	 On War The Art of War On Strategy An Introduction to Strategy
Type Two: Policy relevance 1956-1989	Colin S. Gray, Ken Booth	Strategy as a link between military force and policy aim	Political approach	 Strategic Studies and Public Policy Modern Strategy Strategy and Ethnocentrism
Type Three: Strategic Interaction & Rational Decision Making	Thomas Schelling Frank C. Zagare D. Marc Kilgour	Rational Choice under strategic interaction	Rational choice models	 The Strategy of Conflict Perfect Deterrence
Type Four: Study of Nuclear Weapons	Lawrence Freedman John Baylis	Employment of Nuclear weapons	Effects of deterrence	 The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy Deterrence Makers of Nuclear Strategy
Type Five: Strategic Cultural Studies	Jack L. Snyder Alastair I. Johnston	Cultural significance to strategy	Cultural approach	 Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History

Table 2: Types, main ideas, methodologies and publications

Source: by author

Paradigms are world views shared by members of same academic community for the sake of better communication and similar methodological employment. The terms members commonly used are undoubtedly paradigms. What has mentioned above refers to the paradigms of each strategic community cherished, although they have all considered themselves strategic analysts. As one can identify from the table two, mostly in the first type of strategic studies are military professionals and their major tasks stress on the effective employment of military force to achieve military targets. Clausewitz and his book are considered the typical paradigm for these military specialists. The second type, Colin S Gray and Ken Booth for examples, focuses their works on explaining links between force and policy goal. Although military force may not necessarily stand at the center of strategy implementation, it still plays a vital role for policy making. The third type of Strategic Studies tends to use Game Theory as a model in order to understand interactions between two parties, through which the rational choice can be made by a matrix modeling and strategic interaction between rivalries. The fourth type of Strategic Studies lays the foundation on the assumption of effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Lawrence Freedman and John Baylis both highlight the importance of nuclear weapons to decision making from a historical perspective. The final one, but not the least one, appeared in the mid-1970s, a type that uses a cultural approach to the understanding of motivation behind any strategy making. In a word, this study establishes a general principle of inclusion that distinguishs the major paradigms of Strategic Studies from the extensive context surrounded of discipline.

C. Critics on Strategic Studies

As the international strategic framework changed right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, challenges on Strategic Studies were furious with some major critics, including problems of false philosophical assumption, too practical to be academic, too narrow to be realistic, misunderstanding the real world that caused a question of academic testability, and insufficient predictability. Hedley Bull believes that the civilian strategic analysts have inherently called into question about their integrity purpose, even though it is less concerned with the efficient conduct of force than the manipulation of risk and crisis management (Bull, 593-594).

C. 1 Problem of Philosophical Assumptions

Both military strategists and civilian strategists focus on state-centric approach for the understanding the real world, by which force could be employed in case the conflict occurred. Critics argued that Strategic Studies are conflict-oriented, which is immoral assumption to the human society and international community. Apart from that, one major problem facing strategic studies is because of its paranoia bias on world view that force is the sole panacea for solving controversy in the international society (Keegan, 1993: 21-22). Stephen M. Walt criticized Strategic Studies too narrow to see the world. He insists that Security Studies would replace Strategic Studies as a new dimension in the global affairs (Walt, 1991: 111-112). Richard Ned Lebow also alleged that the false prediction of Strategic Studies on problems of international security has caused failure of its theoretical assumptions. Hence, a new approach based on interdisciplinary study, an integration of peace studies and security studies, should be introduced into international 'studies for the sake of conflict prevention (Lebow, 1994: 251-252). Richard H. Ullman attributes a cause of misunderstanding in the real world by placing national security solely on military options, which may render international relation more prone to the threat from military than from other security related issues. In this respect Ullman urges a comprehensive security studies in the Post-Cold War era in accordance with changing perception of international security (Ullman, 1983: 129; Nye, 1989: 20-34).

With regard to the critics on paradigm of Strategic Studies, Alexander George argues that the theoretical premises of nuclear deterrence is a bias because it is out of self-interest, assuming that nuclear weapons may produce effects of deterrence and thus rivalry's self-restraint ensues. The unreliable logic, for George, apparently underestimates enemy's responses from rational choice that may in turn prove a false assumption (George, 1991: 2; George, 1988: 1-12). In fact, in his book "*Deadly Logic*" published in 1966, Philip Green raised a question of just war, blaming nuclear deterrence violation of human consciousness (quoted in Baylis et al., 2002: 8).

C. 2 Practical or Academic

As argued, if the strategic studies is inherently inter-disciplinary, then its intellectual basis also has been challenged for being too simplistic, for making

exaggerated claims for its objectivity, and for disregarding its literature, due to its unique, mostly reflects an intense, short-term policy orientation that is closely tied with the agenda of government decision-making on defense and military issues. The relationship between the academic and policy worlds is fraught with ethical and practical difficulties. Philip Green criticizes Strategic is nothing but a pseudo science, covering itself by apparent scientific method to give an illusion of academy (Green, 1966: 2-3).

Apart from the challenge mentioned above, another important criticism also against strategic studies is that because strategists often advise governments on a paid basis they are operating in a manner incompatible with the integrity of scholarship. It seems to suggest that strategists are involved in policy advocacy, which is not part of scholarship. Critics claim that strategic analysts are affiliated to the government and spend their time providing suggestions on how to attain policy goal and justifying objectives with their own advice. Critics also argue that war and force are issues of importance that should be studied in an academic way, rather than decided in a close chamber with a few policy makers. Besides, there have been attempts at developing a scientific approach to strategic analysis, but the nature of science in social science context has been debating and the methodology for the employment of strategy simply restricts and stresses on war and art, which relied too much on practical utility than on scientific approach.

C. 3 Too Narrow to be Realistic

One of the major challenges to Strategic Studies since the Cold War has come from the view that attention should be shifted away from the study of strategy to the study of security, simply because the argument "security" defined in terms of "freedom from threats to core value" is a more appropriate concept for analysis in the world nowadays. As Buzan noted in his book, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Security Studies "should not, and probably cannot be incorporated within Strategic Studies.... Strategic Studies probably could not adequately absorb Security Studies without large-scale retraining in area such as political economy, system theory, sociology and philosophy." (Buzan 1991: 23) Apart from this, Strategic Studies is much narrower subject and is largely confined to military related affairs, and Security Studies has a much more broad agenda to be explored, so "Strategic Studies is certainly part of it," In a nutshell, the most frequent criticism of Buzan's conceptualization of strategy was that it was too narrow to be implemented in the real world. (Buzan, 7-9 & 25) Ironically, Buzan's view on security concept was also criticized by many for unimaginably broad.

The similar point is shared in Ken Booth's essay, in which he argues that the study of strategic policy was the basis for IR's most powerful sub-discipline in the Cold War, namely Strategic Studies. To argue for a shift from strategy to security is certainly not to suggest that war and other forms of inter-group violence are not important. They still remain primary consideration. But it is called into question the Cold War equation where security is synonymous with states, the military dimension and the preservation of the status quo.(Booth, 1996: 328)

As the major task of the strategic community evaporated after the end of East-West military confrontation, a period of disorientation occurred. Some argue that strategic studies during the Cold War would find that the interdisciplinary requirements were expanded to absurd lengths. Furthermore, problems, such as ethnic conflict, international terrorism, the spread of disease across borders, and the impact of new technology on the conduct of war in the Post-Cold War era, have nothing to do with elaborate theories of deterrence. (Freeman, pp. 330-32) Others believe that new strategic environment and new threats imply new requirements in deterrence theories and policies due to the problems of proliferation as well as rogue states. (Payne, 1996: 31-35) In this respect, attention should be shifted away from the study of strategy to the study of security.

Another strong criticism in the Post-cold War period focuses on the task of national strategy. Because Strategic Studies employs a state-centric approach to international politics, strategists are preoccupied by threats to the interests of states that they neglect security issues within the state. In other words, the growing erosion of the state, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya, and the rise problems of non-state actors offer no solution to the inter-state violence.

C. 4 Testability and Predictability

It is generally assumed that theories are experience-based study. By employing universal principles deducted and verified from practical experiences, theories are

testable in the real world. Critics challenged the testability and predictability of core theory and paradigm in Strategic Studies, deterrence theory in particular. One of the contending arguments focuses on the falsification of deterrence theory, the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) for instance, by criticizing MAD nothing but an imagination. Peter Vincent Pry decoded data and information from the archive of former Soviet Union. He found a general misunderstanding from the so-called Western world that leaders had an illusion of MAD effectiveness on Soviet policy making. From the resources Pry discovered a truth that the aim of former Soviet Union was not taking NATO and US MAD into consideration, instead they had a plan to wipe out all military forces of NATO once for all by using nuclear as well as biochemical weapons. In a word, the strategy of Soviet Union was to take advantage of military superiority and destroyed American allies in Europe (Gould-Davis, 1999: 90-109; Odom, 1998: 71) °

Another powerful criticism to Strategic Studies lies on the inquiry of predictability of the strategic analysts in their process of policy making. Universal principles based on general experiences of any discipline are granted as guidelines for directing policy making so that policy itself appears predictable and a clear result can be made. In other words, policy making without doubt reflects accumulated experiences based on genuine practicability, rather than an uncontrollable situation.

D. Responses from Strategic Studies

D. 1 A State-Centric Approach

Many critics contend that because strategists stress on the role of military power, they tend to be preoccupied with the priority of using violence and war as the way to solve differences. Furthermore, they, critics continue, reject the truth that they have a distorted view on the world in an unhealthy way. Gray rejects the criticism by questioning the view too naïve to be understood the history of strategy. He argues that the main purpose of Strategic Studies is to help state to survive in an anarchical international society by using necessary means, including employing the violence if necessary. Since the state still holds its major actor in world politics in correspondence with threat, strategist would continue to take challenges as their inherent tasks. Strategic Analysts offer no apology to their continuing interest in issues of state security. In fact, Strategic Studies, as demonstrates in its nature, focuses on the study of how to use force to achieve policy goal and this is self-evident (Gray, 2007: 5-9)

One of serious allegations of Strategic Studies focuses on the task of inventing effective national strategies or international initiatives. According to critics, strategists are so preoccupied by threats to the interests of states that they ignore security issues within the state. According to Edward N. Luttwak's point of view, It is just as true that a prepared ability to fight can ensure peace in quite another way (Luttwak, 1987: 3) In Luttwak's view, hypocrisy of peace has served as the vanguard of operative belief, and the de-legitimization of war preparation, even though he asserts that "the war to end war" did not end it. This, however, more or less leaves only immediate self-defense as an unacceptable motive to guard one's own security. The problem is why such an argument is accepted so uninterestingly. Obviously, there are many who disagree, and the new academic venture of Peace Studies and Security Studies are dedicated to the proposition that they should be studied. This statement does not merely entail paradoxical proposition but also distort the logic of strategy. Within the sphere of strategy, as Luttwak states, human relations are conditioned by armed conflict actual or possible. Under such circumstances, strategy tends to reward linear logic by assuming the opposition and critics are results ironical if not lethally self-damaging (Luttwak, 4-5).

D. 2 The Risk of Test

Testability has always been called into questions for Strategic Studies, particularly with the assumption of deterrence through nuclear weapons. Academically, cases are testable in most situations and circumstances. There are reasons to hesitate in applying the general principles highlighted in strategy. Cost calculations become an elaborate undertaking. Weapon's effectiveness, nuclear bomb for example, has to be evaluated not only at the technical level but also strategic level, to examine how it would be employed initially and anticipate enemy reactions. The theory of deterrence based on the calculation of nuclear effectiveness, MAD for instance, is important enough to be noticed beyond narrow academic or specialist circles because of its horrendous characteristics.

In the event, Betts points out that strategic calculation and assessment has its own logic way of thinking. Evaluation is based more on nuclear destructive power than on enemy's reactions. Not because anticipations of response from enemy are deemed less important, nor motivations behind decision makers are under-estimated, but because the key factor that convinces the rivalry comes from annihilated power from nuclear weapon (Betts, 2000: 28-29). According to Betts's investigation, the determination to use nuclear weapon from one side seems to play very influential role to decision makers on the other side in their policy choice. Besides, one of remarkable characteristics of nuclear weapon depends so much on its powerful consequence and threat of total destruction. Anyone challenging its testability on the real world would obviously risk danger of human society by self-evident disaster after horrible test. The idea is absolutely immoral and irresponsible.

D. 3 Division of Strategic Studies & Security Studies

Critics argue that strategists tend to ignore the peaceful opportunities that exist for peaceful change. It is to suggest that a conflict-oriented approach used by strategists creates a fatalistic impression that progress in human society will be doomed to fail owing to conflicting nature. In response to the challenge, Betts contends in his article "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" that those who believe in new definitions of security run two risks. First, policy making in security needs careful attention to war and strategy, despite the fact that it is appropriate to distinguish agendas between "Strategy Studies" and "Security That is to say, military power still remains a crucial part of security Studies". and those who concentrate solely on non-military threats to security and ignore war will be at their peril. Second, security Studies may create its own risks of being too broad to be any practical value by including potentially everything that quickly becomes synonymous with "interest". In other words, Strategic Studies may still remain its distinctive and valuable of academic study. In a broad sense of academic study, Strategic Studies is part of Security Studies, just as Security Studies is part of International Relations within a broader field of political science (see figure 1).




Figure 1 Framework of division of political science

Sources: Baylis, J., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction To Strategic Studies, 12.

It is true that when the policy issues of the day shifted from bipolar confrontation and nuclear arms control to domestic as well as intra-state wars and humanitarian intervention, then quite different skills dealing with such problems might be needed. This is to suggest that Strategic Studies needs to draw a broad range of security expertise with evidently different issues previously. However, Betts warns that those who demanded new definitions of Strategic Studies run two risks. First, even though it is appropriate to draw a line between "strategy" and "security" studies, security policy still requires careful attention to war and strategy. He also argued that variation of definitions on security would quickly become synonymous with the term "interest" and "well-being", which tend to be related to the policy and strategy (Betts, 1997: 7-33). Despite all of the changes that occurred in the late Cold War period, there are many respects an underlying continuity with the previous era. This is to suggest that a clear cut between security and strategy becomes highly unlikely even when the world focuses have shifted from force-oriented studies to the multidimensional security studies (Baylis, et al, 12).

A British scholar, Alex Danchev, warns that paradigms are not politics. They are merely the pets and playthings of political scientists (Danchev, 1996: 746)

However, paradigms in a sense reflect the world views from different fields are inherently varied in light of academic disciplines they are embedded in. Furthermore, paradigms are viewed by many as fundamental epistemology of each school. In general, the paradigm shifts only when the center of academic study is proved insufficient. The study of strategy in the contemporary international relations can be divided into several parts, including paradigms from technology-based military studies, nuclear deterrence and rational choice of decision-making model. As discussed earlier, strategic studies has its limited field of study embedded in broad security studies,

D. 4 Non-linear Predictability

Lawrence Freedman views strategy as a sense of being tested by practice and judged by result that offers strategic reasoning its edge. The unaccountable academic judgment and reasoning thus should appropriately feel a degree of humility when advising on policy recommendations (Freedman, 2002: 234). This may explain why the difference between strategic analysts in academic and strategy makers in policy making. As a matter of fact, effective strategy may take academic recommendations into consideration and suggestions optional, but the truth is policy makers are the ones who are responsible for the consequences of success or failure of the strategy implementation. Academic concepts are confined to its own logic and ensure every step meets the criteria so that the progress can be measured. That is to say, academic boundaries are often artificial and manageable within their own territories through jargon, without facing severe consequences even in its failure. Even though there are some mistakes occurred from false assumptions, they may revise the design and try again. Strategic planners, or policy makers, on the contrary, directly bear the front of success or failure in the execution of strategy, they don't even have a chance to repair the damage caused by mistakes. It is most often than not just a one way ticket. Therefore, the role decision makers, as Lawrence called, are risk taking rather than an academic-oriented policy (Freedman, 334)

Colin S. Gray attributes strategy making for policy makers to the factor of complex and sometimes "nonlinear". He argues that the reason for nonlinearity of strategy refers to "a condition structurally characteristic of, though not always dominant in, strategy and war that denies authority to the rules of proportionality and

additivity." (Gray 2002: 3-8 & 5). Academic discipline usually asserts logical coherence, reasonable inference and testable assumptions, which have been seen as linear development and predictable output.

D. 5 New Agendas for Strategic Studies

The criticism and responses from both against and for do shape the subject's focus, boundaries, philosophy and agenda for a better picture of Strategic Studies in the future. Some attempts have been made to re-conceptualize the field of Strategic Studies with a greater philosophical as well as methodological self-consciousness. Security Studies will certainly not replace the Strategic Studies as the new agenda in international relations as long as a state-centric approach still plays the key role in modern world politics. Apart from above-mentioned evolvement of the discipline, the conviction that civilian strategists have critical contributions to make the strategic policy beyond military patterns will create a market for professionally trained civilian strategists to fill in. From the very beginning it was clear that the policy issues rather than intellectual curiosity led the growth of the Strategic Studies community. Universities are certainly not hostile to policy-oriented research.

Furthermore, issues like international anti-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and the study of armed force are all policy relevant. In fact, much Strategic Studies activities nowadays have been about the peaceful settlement of disputes and generally supportive of the work of the United Nations. In this regard, the future of Strategic Studies in terms of academic institutions will be tested, according to Freedman, in a number of respects. First, as long as strategists work for offering advice to official decision making. Second, strategy should be view as an art and not a science. Third, strategists still remain relevant only if they have kept in touch with the range of possible situation that might tend to extremes (Freedman, 2002: 341)

E. Conclusion: Strategic Studies is still relevant to the world today

There always exists a contending question about the role of strategic studies in the post-Cold War era. Some argue that Strategic Studies has inherently problem of immorality from its very evil assumptions and violence-oriented state centric

approach. Besides, Strategic Studies is too practical to be academic in terms of its policy relevant study. Even the methodology for the Strategic Studies is called into question of unrealistic. In response to the critics of utility and academic value of Strategic Studies, Freedman and Betts proposed a ruminated suggestion by saying that the knowledge-based Strategic Studies is designed for solving the problem of conflict existing in the human society, within or without a state in particular and the purpose of it is seriously facing state's survival. Nevertheless, if Strategic Studies needs to be existent, it has to be embedded into universities system, through which can the field of Strategic Studies be cultivated and valued (Freedman, 328-342; Betts, 1997: 24). In other words, even though the Strategic Studies is policy relevant and a theory of action, it still can be intellectual aid to official performance.

Apart from above mentioned, as possible military confrontation in Korean Peninsula and disintegration of Chechnya have become more prevalent, more attention has been focused in the problem of cross-national conflict. As the conflicts have occurred since the end of the Cold War, which testify, however, the role of force remains a significant feature of international politics. Strategy thus continues to be the major role in the study of international relations and in spite of the prevalence and the rise of intra-state violence enhanced the role of non-state actors in the world politics, strategic analysts continue to argue that even with all current critics and challenges to the modern state, it still remains a major player in world arena and Strategic Studies, with no doubt, is still relevant to the world today.

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