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檢視 1950 年代到 1960 年代的中美軍事同盟關係

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摘 要

學者一般將一九五〇與六〇年代的國民政府（國府）視為美國的附庸國，然而，許多論述又強調國府不是美國順從的盟國，而是一個狡猾又不實際的朋友。本文並非試圖爭執國府對美國是否忠誠，而是要透過歷史紀錄強調國府的身份比較像一個美國雇用的保鑣。這個保鑣必須要努力的保衛美國利益才能勉強維持生存。因此，她的身份比較不像是陰謀家，而像是個低薪勞工。此外，也由於美國對台灣廉價兵源大規模投資，讓國府發展成一個軍事強國，使其對本身的認知與行為在大國與小國之間擺盪。

關鍵詞：冷戰、蔣介石、美中（台）同盟、美援

Making a Power: A Review of the US-Nationalist China Military Alliance, 1950s-1960s

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Abstract

Scholars have generally considered the Nationalist China during the 1950s and the 1960s as a client state of the US. Yet, academia most commonly describes the Nationalists not as an obedient ally but as an impractical, stubborn, and cunning friend of the US. Using historical records and theories of small states, this paper argues that the dual personality of the Nationalists originates from the American investment in the low-maintenance bank of human resources in Taiwan. American support resulted in the Nationalists developing a vision of itself as a powerful military state that was asymmetrical with its actual capabilities, and it was this perception gap that caused the Nationalists to behave so seemingly incongruently.

Keywords: Cold War, Chiang Kai-shek, US-Nationalist China Alliance, American Aid to Taiwan

Introduction

US-Nationalist China alliance started during the World War II. Studies of that period tend to focus on Nationalist incapability of fighting its enemy as well as dependence on Washington, and many of them indicate that Nationalist China became a world power due to American support. This may be due to the influence of famous early publications such as *Thunder Out of China* (1946), the US State Department's *The China White Paper* (1949), and *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* (1971), all of which describe the Nationalists as a very incompetent and cunning government.

These impressions against the Nationalists have affected subsequent studies of its alliance with America after 1949. Scholarly concern about the US-Republic of China (ROC) alliance has revolved around issues of whether the Nationalists resisted US calls for reform while requesting US aid or covertly tried to draw the United States into a war against the People's Republic of China (PRC).¹ Some works concentrate on Washington's dilemma of assisting or eliminating its support of the ROC,² and these studies make the Nationalists appear a helpless ally.

Sometimes the Nationalist government seemed nothing like a helpless ally. Tucker points out that the Nationalists was likely not a subordinate US ally.³ She finds that, although Washington was the protector of Taiwan, it was not able to

¹ Such as: Ronald W. Pruessen, "A Thorn in the Side of Peace" and Robert Accinelli, "Tension across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics", in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (eds), *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy 1954-1973* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 77-140; and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation; The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 311. To avoid confusing the reader and to accommodate the political reality before 1971, in addition to Taipei and ROC, the author will mostly use the term Nationalist government to express the ROC government. The term "Taiwan" is mostly a regional term that became more related to sovereignty after 1971.

² For example, see Ralph N. Clough, *Island China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); and David M. Finkelstein, *From Abandonment to Salvation: Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950* (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press, 1993).

³ See Nancy Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994).

control the Nationalists; on the contrary, during the Cold War it was usually the Nationalists that dominated Washington's China policy. In brief, most scholarly works of US-ROC relations are negative to the ROC; Garver thus fittingly states that scholars tend to emphasize unattractive aspects of the US-Nationalist alliance.⁴

This paper does not intend to describe the Nationalists as a loyal friend to the US, but would argue, through historical records, that the Nationalist government was not simply taking advantage of the US. In fact, the ROC on Taiwan was more like a US-hired muscleman. This muscleman must work hard to protect American interests in order to maintain his survival, and therefore acted less likely a manoeuvring politician, but more similar to a low-cost labour.

A Small State Acting Like a Power

During spring and summer of 1958, planes took off from Taiwan toward Indonesia. Their missions were to bomb Indonesian government force and airdrop military materials to anti-government guerrilla in order to shake the pro-communist Indonesian government. No matter how insignificant these missions were to international politics, there is one question: The Nationalist government just fled to Taiwan for less than a decade. On a poor island where military force should be reserved for the defence of the PRC invasion (or counterattacking Chinese mainland), how did the Nationalist government build up its ambition and capability of long-range attack?

For the realists, international relations are about the politics of powerful states. From scholars' theories, we understand that states with greater territory, stronger economies, advanced technology, superior military preparation, and larger populations enjoy positions as great powers in their dominance of the world.⁵ More recent realists add factors of global influence such as agenda setting, cultural attractiveness, and ideology into the analysis of power.⁶ In short, realists presume that

⁴ John Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 7.

⁵ See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1967); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

⁶ See Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books,

the lesser participants in the hierarchy of international politics are unimportant.

However, most of international society is composed of relatively smaller states, and scholars are having difficulty defining this majority group. Attempted definitions include attributes that realists too deem important: geographical size, population size, gross national product, and a country's degree of influence in international affairs. But, up to now, no satisfactory definition has been found because there is no clear classification of "smallness."⁷

To classify small states, Hey summarizes their most commonly cited behaviours:⁸ (1) low level of participation in world affairs, (2) narrow scope of foreign policy issues, (3) behaviour limited to immediate geographic area, (4) use of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, as opposed to military instruments, (5) emphasis on internationalist principles, international laws, and other "morally minded" ideals, (6) security of multinational agreements and membership to multinational institutions whenever possible, (7) positions of neutrality on issues, (8) reliance on superpowers for protection, partnerships, and resources, (9) aim of cooperation and avoidance of conflict with others, (10) a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources spent on ensuring physical and political security and survival.

Hey then provides the ultimate definition of small states: perception. If a state's people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states' people and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered. However, a state may perceive itself as a large state and be legally recognized by most of the world as such, though it may concurrently be considered by other important states as small because it has in some way failed a criteria. In this case, the usual definitions do not fit.

The situation of the Nationalists after 1950 was not dissimilar to its experience in

1990).

⁷ For example, see Laurent Goetschel (ed.), *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interests and Policies* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 15; David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); and Roderick Pace, "Small States and the Internal Balance of the European Union: The Perspective of Small States," in Jackie Gower and John Redmond (eds), *Enlarging the European Union: The Way Forward* (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000), 107-119.

⁸ Jeanne A.K. Hey, "Introducing Small State Foreign Policy," in Jeanne A.K. Hey (ed.), *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 10.

Sichuan province in 1942: With American assistance, the Nationalist China was soon awarded power status in East Asia and enthusiastically participate in world affairs although effectively controlling a limited area—the region of Sichuan. Now, in the province of Taiwan, most of its territory was again lost to its enemy, but the Nationalists once more strengthened itself with American assistance, yearly recognized as a big power in the UN, and even militarily involved beyond immediate geographic area. In other words, similar to what happened several years ago, the Nationalist China since 1950 still could act like a big power by contributing to the American-led anti-Communist crusade in East Asia. Therefore, the ROC on Taiwan led by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government has been a peculiar case in international history because it is, in fact, geographically small, but its behaviour has not been like that of other small states.

Demonstration

During WWII and the later Chinese civil war, the Nationalists showed very poor military capability fighting against the Japanese and the Communists. US pendulous policy toward the establishment of the PRC clearly pointed out American disappointment in its alliance with the Nationalists. This therefore endangered the eligibility for American aid as well as the international reputation of the Nationalist government. After the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, it needed American assistance more than ever.

American friendship during the Cold War obviously depended on the Nationalist value in the crusade against Communism. To be assured of U.S. aid during 1950s, the Nationalist had to repeatedly demonstrate its military capability in order to prove its irreplaceably strategic value to the United States. The first test for American-led anti-Communist world campaign was the Korean War. The Nationalists would have liked to dispatch its 52nd Army, one of its best units, to help the allied force.

At this, Washington worried whether the participation of these troops would trigger a general war with Communist China, or even the Soviet Union; the Nationalists, on the other hand, was concerned with heightening national prestige, encouraging morale, and ensuring American aid. These concerns preceded the

possibility and desire of an outbreak of war with mainland China.⁹

Taipei looked anxious to get involved in the Korean War, but was more interested in demonstrating its value in front of American policy makers. In the early 1950s, the Nationalist government was extremely weak and so prioritized conserving its power, not losing the rest of its troops. Winning back Chinese mainland was a slogan to maintain morale in Taiwan rather than an urgent mission. The Nationalists did not really want to send a lot of troops to Korea. It realized that the troops should be dispatched only when absolutely necessary; the number of soldiers, if finally dispatched, should be a minimum, for this expeditionary army should be used as a leverage to request American aid.¹⁰

To relieve American forces in Korea, avoid a general war, and make the best use of the Nationalist force, Washington instead encouraged the Nationalists to harass bordering provinces of Chinese mainland, acting as a means of opening another front. Since 1951, the CIA had helped train and supply 1600 guerrillas based on the island of Jinmen,¹¹ and had air-dropped weapons and ammunitions to the last Nationalist troops on the China-Burma borders isolated since 1949.¹² Both of these two forces were ordered to sporadically invade Yunnan and other coastal provinces.

In addition to badgering the Chinese boundaries, the US also encouraged the Nationalist to harass Communist China on the sea. The Nationalist marine guerrilla force intercepted merchant ships of different nationalities sailing to Communist China, and CIA officials usually were commanding these marine force operations.¹³ The

⁹ Yingfo paiqian guojun fuhan canzhan zi yanjou (Research on whether to dispatch military forces to Korea), Memo from Zhou Zhirou to Chiang Kai-shek, 10/16/1952, in “Guojun fuhan canzhan zi yanjou yu jianyi” (Research and recommendations for joining the Korean War), December 1950 to December 1955, , Presidential File (hereafter PF) 3132009/9, Ministry of National Defense, ROC (hereafter MND).

¹⁰ Taiwan zhonglihua jaishuho duei junshi zi yijian (Military opinions after Taiwan Neutralization is relieved), Memo from MND to Chiang Kai-shek, 03/09/1953, in “Taiwan zhonglihua jaishuho duai junshi zi yijian “ (Military Opinions after Taiwan Neutralization was relieved), March 1953, PF 2131514/14, MND.

¹¹ Zhangyu jihua (Operation Octopus), Memo from Zhou Zhirou to Chiang Kai-shek, 7/9/1951, in “Mei yuanming yojiduei zuozhan jihua” (War Plan for American-aid guerrilla in Fujian province), July 1951, PF 2137511/11, MND.

¹² For more details about US-Nationalist cooperation in Burma, see in John Garver, 148-166.

¹³ Taisheng Weng, *CIA zaitai huodong mixun: xifang gongsi di gushi* (Secret Activities of CIA in Taiwan: The Story of the Western Enterprise) (Taipei: Lianhebao, 1991), 31.

Nationalist naval and air force themselves might not have been able to detect all these merchant ships, so sometimes intelligence as detailed as ship names, their tonnage, commodities, nationalities, and routes were sent from half an earth away—Washington DC.¹⁴

American military assistance was building Taiwan as an anti-Communist fortress during and after the Korean War, but for the Nationalist government, whose navy and air force had both become very active in blockading the Chinese coastline, these military activities were allowing it to “prove our capability to American people and the Eisenhower administration,”¹⁵ and hence “strengthen our requests of American naval and air assistance.”¹⁶ Since the Nationalist military force was seriously in need of assistance, it was desperate for any funds and supplies available. Goods from merchant ships that were intercepted, for example, were either confiscated or resold; the income from these goods was vital to those poorly-supplied guerrilla forces. Thus, besides assisting in ship-interception, another important job for the US was to help the Nationalists to fight UN accusations of piracy.¹⁷

The Nationalist poorly equipped navy was a threat to defenceless merchant ships, not to armed ones, which might only be intercepted by a scold. For example, irritated by the Nationalist blockade policy, the British navy began to escort its commercial ships. The Nationalist warship could not afford to fire on the British navy, so it decided to give them a course in anti-Communism. The following is a summary of light signal exchanges between the British and the Nationalist boats (misspelling included).¹⁸

Nationalist warship: *Name, please.*

¹⁴ Jiebu zifei chuanzhi baogao (Report of Merchant Ships Intercepting Committee), 2/9/1953, in “Zifei wailun chulian” (Cases of Merchant Ships that Help the Communist), April 1950-July 1954, in Army Records (hereafter AR) 0181.6/3780, MND.

¹⁵ Telegram, the ROC embassy at Washington to Taipei, 2/5/1953, in “Zifei wailun chulian” (Cases of Merchant Ships that Help the Communist), April 1950-July 1954, AR 0181.6/3780, MND.

¹⁶ Taiwan zhonglihua jaishuho duei junshi zi yijian (Military opinions after Taiwan Neutralization is relieved), op., cit.

¹⁷ Zhenhui Yeh, *Jiang Tingfu yu zhongguo waijiao* (Jiang Tingfu and Chinese Diplomacy) (National Taiwan University, Master thesis, 1977), 127.

¹⁸ Xunluo baogao (Patrol Report), Naval Commander to General Chief of Staff, 10/5/1953, in “Zifei wailun chulian” (Cases of Merchant Ships that Help the Communist), op., cit.

British warship: *British warship MODEST.*

Nationalist warship: *You should be ashamed of yourself.*

British warship: *Please realize I am on the High Sea and carrying out my order.*

Nationalist warship: *Identify between foe and friend of your nation. You must be blind if you don't realize of and your nation would be defeated by yourself not the communistYou should leave here at once. You were the enemy of Communist in Korea, and here you are their friend. Don't you feel to be ashamed of your honourable dead in Korea?*

British warship: *Thank you. Good Night.*

Cheap Labour

If the Nationalists saw the US as an aid supplier, what was the function of the Nationalists in American eyes? In the 1950s, the American embassy in Taipei told American visitors that the cost of paying and equipping a Nationalist soldier (US\$300) was low, only about one tenth of paying and equipping an American soldier.¹⁹ The expense of a Nationalist soldier remained low during the 1960s, so “if the US would not even pay,” U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara warned in 1964 when he asked for 2 percent of American defence budget for military aid, “. . .then we will have to use our own troops to defend communist invasions. . . Foreign aid is the best weapon to assure our armed force not to join the combat [in Asia]”²⁰ In fact, even people in Taiwan agreed with the Americans “The military force of the ROC. . .is an anti-communist capital American acquired with low price.”²¹

To secure American friendship, therefore, the Nationalists usually had to make unilateral sacrifices. For example, the American-supported long-range air

¹⁹ Mei dashiguan jianbao ziliao (Briefing of American Embassy), Memo from Peng Meng-ji to Chiang Kai-shek, 12/26/1955, in “Waiguo renshi fenxi guoji qinshi ji yowuo yenlun” (Foreigners’ analysis of international relations and friendly talks), December 1950 to July 1961, PF 3136025/25, MND.

²⁰ Mei guofang buzhang duei canyuan baogao (US Minister of Defense reports to the Senate), Memo from Peng Meng-ji to Chiang Kai-shek, 12/10/1964, in “Mei canyuan junshi waijiao weiyuanhui zhixuan jilu ji junshi shozhang xian guohuei baogaoshu” (American Military leaders report to the Congress), December 1957 to December 1964, PF 3136018/18, MND.

²¹ Annie H. Chou (ed.), *Documentary Collection on US Aid to ROC, 1948-1965 II: Military Construction Project* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1997), 534.

reconnaissance missions to Mainland China dating from the 1950s were not critical to the security of Taiwan, because the Nationalists, for the purpose of either defence or counter-attack, mainly needed Beijing's military deployment intelligence along the Chinese coastline. The Nationalists, however, had to use its best pilots to collect information of Beijing's military deployment and, later on, nuclear development in order to help America collect global intelligence.

An obvious "American job done by the Nationalists" was flying U-2. In the 1960s, the most advanced U-2 reconnaissance planes deployed in Taiwan belonged to and were controlled by the US, but it was the Nationalist pilots who flew them over Southeast Asia and Mainland China. The negatives collected by those Nationalist pilots were immediately sent to American bases in Japan, although it was technically available to develop those photos in Taiwan.²² In this cooperation, the Nationalists seemed to be more like a labour rather than an ally to Washington.

Flying a U-2 was a very dangerous mission. Taipei had more missions sacrifice, and pilots than American had in any other region. Compared with the hundreds of missions that the Nationalist pilots flew and the 10 deaths these incurred, American pilots only had 24 of its men fly over the Soviet Union, and one fatality in Cuba.²³ Some Nationalist high-ranking officers therefore criticized the government for failing to gain more military assistance from the US in return for the dangerous U-2 operations.²⁴ In other words, Washington might have underpaid Taipei for its contribution in the anti-Communist campaign.

However, with lower cost of equipping the Nationalist soldiers, Washington helped the Nationalists grow from an insignificant force to a major partner of the US in the containment of Communism in East Asia within a decade. Taipei's sacrifice and strong will to fight Communism assured its alliance with America but at the same time took more military responsibility. By the early 1960s, the Nationalist armed forces constituted 63% of the Free World's strategic reserve force for potential deployment in East Asia. In terms of military manpower, the ROC assumed a far greater burden than any allied country. The ROC's relative defence spending, built

²² Weng Taisheng and Chris Pocock, *Heimao zhongdui* (Black Cat Squadron) (Taipei: Lian jing, 1990), 41-42.

²³ See in Xijun Hua, *Zhanji de tiankong* (The Fighter's Sky) (Taipei: Tianxia, 1999), 95; and *Ibid*, 244.

²⁴ Weng Taisheng and Chris Pocock, 181, op., cit.

up by the Nationalist budget and a much larger share of American aid, was ten times as great as Japan's and was surpassed only by South Vietnam which was at war.²⁵ Huge military investment explains why in 1960, the South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem credited the Nationalists as a "major military power."²⁶

Extending Power

Southeast Asia

Washington surely made the best use of the growing Nationalist force in its anti-Communist campaign. As the first chief of American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Major General William C. Chase described that "American military investment in Taiwan is the most inexpensive exchange in defending Asia," as early as 1952 Chase suggested to the Congress that "Chinese (the Nationalist) army has potential capability to be deployed anywhere, such as protecting Southeast Asia."²⁷

In the mid-1950s, American assistance greatly improved the Nationalist military, and Taipei was able to successfully prove itself a reliable anti-Communist ally. The United States must have been happy with the Nationalist military improvement force, so it decided to make the Nationalists an example to aid-receiving nations in Southeast Asia. The Nationalist influence was therefore gradually extending out of the Taiwan Strait. In 1957, the MAAG suggested that the Nationalists accept officers from Thailand and Vietnam to study the Nationalist troops, and the MAAG would pay for their training. The Nationalists knew this would aggrandize its reputation in Southeast Asia, but the long-term shortcomings of its troops, such as ageing and poor organization, had not been resolved.²⁸ Although the Nationalist finally rejected the MAAG's offer, this did not mean that it would not show its military muscle to Southeast Asia.

²⁵ John Garver, 65.

²⁶ Ibid, 202.

²⁷ Annie H. Chou, 443~444, op., cit.

²⁸ Memo from General Chief of Staff Peng Meng-ji to Chiang Kai-shek, 3/8/1957, in "Meifang jiangyi pai taiyue liangguo junguan laihua guancha guojun shunlian zhi yanjiou jieguo" (Research result of the US suggestion on officers from Thailand and Vietnam visiting the ROC Army), from March 1957 to April 1957, PF 3131429/29, MND.

In 1958, the newly established Sukarno regime in Indonesia adopted a pro-Communist policy. In February, the Nationalist planned to assist an anti-Sukarno force by secretly sending over a thousand soldiers, 8 anti-aircraft guns, and a dozen tanks,²⁹ to “rebuild diplomatic relations with Indonesia, help 2 million Indonesian overseas Chinese, and establish Indonesia as an anti-communist base that could influence Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia.”³⁰ The Nationalists expected the United States and Britain to lend a hand. It also predicted that “Thailand and Vietnam would pay more respect to us [the Nationalists], and we would gain higher status in the international society.”³¹

Right after US Secretary of State John Dulles visited Taipei in March; the Nationalists launched its military operation. With the assistance of the CIA, the Nationalists began to support an anti-Sukarno force in Indonesia. Freight airplanes departed from Taiwan, refuelled in the Philippines or Singapore (still a British colony at the time), dropped weapons and ammunitions in Indonesia, and then flew home. By June, the Nationalists had provided weapons and ammunitions for 7 battalions, was sending weapons and ammunitions for another 3, and was preparing to provide additional radar, airplanes, gunboats, and technicians to help the anti-Sukarno force. If the United States would provide a covering force, the Nationalist air force was planning to use bases in Philippines and Vietnam to intercept possible military assistance from Communist China to Sukarno. In addition, the Nationalist marines were planning to land in Indonesia.³² When Indonesian rebels were losing, the Nationalists did not give up, and continued to use B-26 bombers to help the anti-Sukarno militia shoot the Indonesian governmental troops.³³

Although this was a covert mission, more and more evidence made it clear that this was a Nationalist military cooperation sponsored by America. The Indonesian government shot down some airplanes, and found both American and Chinese corpses.

²⁹ Memo, MND to Chiang Kai-shek, 2/26/1958, in “Yanjiou zhiyuan yinni gemingjun youguanshixiang” (About assisting revolutionary force in Indonesia), June 1958, PF3131443/13, MND.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Memo, General Chief of Staff Wang Shu-ming to Chiang Kai-shek, 6/7/1958, in “Yanjiou zhiyuan yinni gemingjun youguanshixiang” (About assisting revolutionary force in Indonesia), Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

It also captured an American pilot carrying a US\$10000 recruitment contract and permits of American bases.³⁴ Finally, the Indonesian campaign ended when the anti-Sukarno rebels lost beyond all repair.



Figure 1—A sketch map of the Nationalist B-26 dropping and bombing on Indonesia July 26, 1958. Courtesy of the ROC Defence Ministry

³⁴ Taisheng Weng, 163.



Figure 2—A sketch map of the Nationalist air force plan to intercept Communist China’s assistance to Indonesia from bases in Taiwan, Philippines, and Vietnam. Courtesy of the ROC Defence Ministry

The Nationalists made international military allies with anti-Communist countries as its military power strengthened. Since early 1950s, the MAAG has encouraged the Nationalists to increase light armament and ammunition production so that Taipei could provide other countries’ needs.³⁵ Beginning in the 1960s, the Nationalists gradually received more and more requests for assistance. Restricted by the US-ROC agreement, the Nationalists was not allowed to provide military materials from the United States. Therefore, the Nationalist assistance was mostly small in scale and included self-produced military materials and military advisors. These aid-receiving nations were mainly but not exclusively from Southeast Asia. One Southeast Asian country that received the Nationalist help was South Vietnam. The Nationalists began helping South Vietnam train its frogmen in 1960,³⁶ and

³⁵ Annie H.Chou, 141~142, op., cit.

³⁶ Memo from General Chief of Staff Peng Meng-ji to Chiang Kai-shek, 4/18/1960, in “Yuenan junren

dispatched military advisors to train Vietnamese officers.³⁷ Starting in the mid-1960s, the Nationalists also sent freight planes and landing crafts to help South Vietnamese military transportation.³⁸ Other available documents indicate that the Nationalists gave 1000 tommy guns and 100,000 different bullets ammunitions to Malaysia in 1965 to prepare for a possible conflict with Indonesia. Documents also show that Malaysia was preparing to develop further military cooperation with the Nationalists that included training pilots, manufacturing arsenals, and establishing an air-defence system.³⁹ The Nationalists also gave Thailand explosive facilities, millions of bullets and shells of rifles and guns, in addition to providing training to help its frontier defence.⁴⁰

The US played a significant role helping the Nationalists develop its reputation in Southeast Asia. For one, it paid the cost of sending the Nationalist landing crafts to Vietnam. Furthermore, as early as 1958, the US began giving the Nationalists money to recruit technicians to implement agricultural programs that had been very successful in Taiwan. These technicians were very active in 26 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, and trained more than 200,000 farmers.⁴¹ In the same period, America helped the Nationalists assist Vietnam in developing its military medical service, and building fertilizer, sugar, and paper plants.

The US-ROC cooperation in Vietnam is a good example for explaining how the Nationalists extended its power. The procedures of the Nationalist technical assistance to Vietnam were separated into two independent components: a contract with South Vietnamese government and a contract with the US government. Officially, the Nationalists provided this assistance to Vietnam independently, although financial support was in fact from the United States. The American government not only promised to pay for most of these programs, but also agreed to

laihua sho waren xunliang" (Vietnam soldiers undergo frogman training in the ROC), April 1960, PF 3131492/92, MND.

³⁷ Gong Chang, "A Secret History of Taiwan Military Aid to Vietnam", *Defense International*, Vol. 226 (June 2003), 88-89.

³⁸ See in "Junyuan yuenan" (Military Assistance to Vietnam), from April 14, 1965 to April 1968, AR 0175.23/3750.2, MND.

³⁹ Gong Chang, 93.

⁴⁰ See in "Zhiyuan taiguo wuqi" (Militarily Assisting Thailand), from December 1972 to March 1974, AR0175.23/4040, MND.

⁴¹ John Garver, 206.

stay in the “status of secret help”, so that the Nationalists would be able to assist “the third party.”⁴²

The US might not have directly contributed to but usually encouraged the Nationalist foreign assistance undertakings. The Nationalist most impressive example of foreign aid to Southeast Asia was probably the Cambodian mission of 1970. The Nationalists promised to update the Cambodians’ armoury and give equipment and ammunition, including rifles, machineguns, mortars, and 106mm recoilless guns, for building two army divisions for the Lon Nol regime. Officially, the US ambassador to the ROC Walter McConaughy opposed this proposal because of Congress’s concerns about violating Cambodia’s status as a neutral state, yet the Nationalists still decided to provide assistance. Military and medical materials were air-delivered from Taiwan to Cambodia, and the US government must have tacitly agreed to these activities because those transport aircrafts refuelled in Saigon.⁴³

Other Regions

The Nationalists gradually extended its aid outside of East Asia. Some documents indicate that the Nationalist military support after 1962 reached as far as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Both of these two countries asked the Nationalist air-force for help against their war in Yemen.⁴⁴ In the Middle East, however, the Nationalist closest military relationship might be with Libya.

In 1960, American ambassador to Libya John Wesley Jones explicitly explained to the Nationalist representative: Because “the living standards of American technicians were too high,” Taipei should send theirs as soon as possible.⁴⁵ But this American labour replacer was not able to afford the expenses of its technicians, so the Nationalists proposed that the US government give funding and the Nationalists

⁴² Telegram, ROC embassy in Vietnam to the ROC Foreign Ministry, 7/29/1965, in “Yuanyue yiliaoduei” (Medical assisting group to Vietnam), from May 4 1964 to June 1967, AR 0175.23/5204, MND.

⁴³ See in “Junyuan gaomian gongheguo” (Military Assistance to Cambodia), from July 22, 1970 to May 1972, AR 0175.23/3750.4, MND.

⁴⁴ Gong Chang, “The X File: The Secret File of ROC Military Aid”, *Defense International*, Vol. 214 (June 2002), 59.

⁴⁵ Qi Shen, *Wode yisheng* (My Life) (Taipei: Lian jing, 2000), Vol. 2, 139.

provide human resources only, believing that this would be a project of mutual benefit between the Nationalists and America.⁴⁶ The Libyan government, however, refused the involvement of American money. Finally, the Libyan government agreed to pay the cost of Nationalist technicians and the Nationalists began to select and recruit military technicians to send to Libya.

The Libya-Nationalist China bilateral military cooperation grew rapidly. Libya's defence minister and military chief of general staff both visited Taipei in May and June 1962, and, as of September 1962, the Nationalists agreed to dispatch technicians to help Libya build its own military. Hundreds of advisors from the Nationalist troops went to Libya, and their assisting fields included air-force engineering, navy training, communication, munitions, and military medical service. A Nationalist colonel reported from Libya in 1968 that "foreign technicians in Libya armed force are all Chinese (from Taiwan)," therefore, "the reputation of Chinese in Libya are admired by many other foreigners."⁴⁷

There were so many technicians from Taiwan that some medical doctors of the Nationalist force were dispatched with Libyan troops against Israel, which made Taipei worried that, if the PRC backed the Arabs, the Nationalists might have to fight together with the Chinese Communists.⁴⁸ Military advisors from Taiwan also helped the United States in Libya under the table. They spoke for America whenever they could, and successfully convinced Libyan government to import more military communication equipments and medicines from the United States. The American ambassador to Libya therefore was very happy with these technicians' secret

⁴⁶ Telegram, ROC Embassy in Libya to the ROC Foreign Ministry, 12/17/1960, and Conference Record of Economic Ministry about Technical Cooperation with Libya, 12/26/1960, in "Zhongli jishu hezuo"(Sino-Libya Technical Cooperation), October 1958~August 1973, African Department Files (hereafter AF) 231.3/0003, ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MOFA).

⁴⁷ Report, Colonel Liao Tinzhong to MND, 9/27/1968, in "Pai libya fuwu ren yuan" (Personnel Dispatched to Libya), July 1968 to February 1971, AR 0312.5/3213, MND.

⁴⁸ See in "Libya wangguo shidai zhi zhongli guanxi" (Sino-Libya Relations during Libyan Kingdom), from October 1959 to June 1969, AF 212/001, MOFA, and Personal letter from Chen Zhiping (former ambassador to Libya) to Chiang Kai-shek. The date is not clear, but according to the file, it should be sometime around December 1968. In "Zhengchu feizhou guojia zai ershisanjie lianda zhuwo daibiaoquan" (Asking African states to help ROC Representation in the 23rd UN General Assembly), from December 1968 to January 1969, AF AI/14, vol 21, MOFA.

assistance.⁴⁹

Aside from the Middle East, the US suggested that the Nationalists give military assistance of \$1 million, including light machine guns, explosives, tires, and rebuilding munitions, to Ethiopia in 1964, though this plan did not materialize due to the political situation in Ethiopia.⁵⁰ This was not, however, the end of the Nationalist military assistance to Africa. In 1967, the Nationalists provided military advisors, financial support, and training for establishing a small navy in Malawi.⁵¹ The Nationalist military advisors and military supplies might also have reached Zaire, Chad, Niger, and Rwanda.⁵² Compared with military assistance requests to allies of other areas, the military aid that Africa asked from Taipei was smaller and less sensitive. For example, documents indicate that the Kingdom of Lesotho received 100 parachutes, 200 tents, and 400 sleeping bags from Taiwan,⁵³ and Dahomey (Benin) only asked for 50 light machine guns from the Nationalists because “that amount would be enough to deter a coup.”⁵⁴

When conducting foreign assistance relations, Taipei must have taken pleasure in the political loyalty of its aid recipients and the recognition of the Nationalist legitimacy as a Chinese government it represented. For example, when the Bolivian air force commander visited Taiwan and asked the Nationalists to give assistance, he was reported to have said that he respected Chiang Kai-shek very much, and when he saw both the national flags of the ROC and Bolivia flying together, he was “so touched that almost cried.”⁵⁵ Also in Central America, when Haiti asked for military

⁴⁹ Telegram, ROC Embassy in Libya to MOFA, 5/8/1965, in “Zhongli jishu hezuo”(Sino-Libya Technical Cooperation), op., cit.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 60-61.

⁵¹ Memo, General Chief of Staff Gao Kueiyuan to Chiang Kai-shek, 10/11/1968, in “Yioubang zhengfu qinwuo zhiyuan” (Allies asking for assistance), since August 1950, PF3131444/44, MND.

⁵² Wenlong Wang, *Waijiao xiexiang nongye chuyang* (Diplomacy reaches the countryside; agriculture goes abroad) (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 2004),180.

⁵³ Memo, Executive Yuan to MND and MOFA, 1/9/1973, in “Zensong laisuotuo junyong wupin” (Giving Military Materials to Lesotho), January 1973 to June 1974, AR 0800.04/6886, MND.

⁵⁴ Telegram, ROC Embassy in Dahomey to MOFA, 4/4/1971, in “Yu dahemei anquanhezuo” (Security Cooperation between ROC and Dahomey), since May 1971, MOFA microfilm files 183/0895, ROC National Archive.

⁵⁵ Memo, MND to the Presidential Office, 2/23/1979, in “Boliweiya junshi shouzhang fanghua” (Visits of Bolivian Military Leaders), February 1979 to May 1981, PF 3133444/44, MND.

assistance, its foreign minister told the ROC ambassador that the people of Haiti were deeply attracted by Chinese culture and history, and the status of the ROC was so important that in the Haitian presidential office, the picture of Chiang Kai-shek was standing next to that of the Pope.⁵⁶

Chinese Mainland

In the context of the Cold War, the Nationalists seemed to gradually resume its strategic importance and leading status in East Asia with the use of American military aid. In 1950, the US described the Nationalist navy as “woefully inadequate”; the army as “poorly led, inexperienced, and lacking equipment”; and the air force as piloted by men “insufficiently trained as well as demoralized.”⁵⁷ In 1955, American comments of the Nationalist military force called it “second to Korea in Asia and as good as NATO members.”⁵⁸ In 1956, General Frank S. Bowen, the chief of MAAG, claimed that the Nationalist military strength has been strong enough to counterattack Chinese mainland.⁵⁹ In 1960, comments of the Nationalist military power became “the best of the free world in the Far East: young, modernized, high morale, and effective use of American aid.”⁶⁰ This explains why Chiang Kai-shek proudly told his staff in 1959 that “in the free world adjacent to the communist group, the strength of the Middle East and Turkey is insignificant. Only West Germany [in the west] and the ROC [in the east] can counter communist forces.”⁶¹

Enhanced military power also changed the Nationalist strategy to recover the Chinese mainland. Some scholars argue that Chiang Kai-shek never seriously wanted to return to China.⁶² Since at least the mid-1950s, however, Chiang had been very

⁵⁶ Memo, MOFA to Executive Yuan, 8/16/1971, in “Junyuan haidi gongheguo” (Military Assistance to Haiti), from August 1971 to June 1974, AR0175.23/3750.5, MND.

⁵⁷ Nancy Tucker, *Uncertain Friendships*, 68.

⁵⁸ Mei dashiguan jianbao ziliao (Briefing of American Embassy), op., cit.

⁵⁹ Annie H. Chou, 461.

⁶⁰ Major General L. L. Doan, USA interviewed by American media, Memo from Peng Meng-ji to Chiang Kai-shek, 12/29/1960, in “Meiguo baoken duei Taiwan wenti zhi pinlun” (American media’s comments of Taiwan, September 1949 to December 1960, PF3131401/1, MND.

⁶¹ Zongtongfu junshi hui tan (The President’s military conference), 28th of 1959, 10/30/1959, in “Army Records, July 1959 to December 1959,” AR 003.91/2693, MND.

⁶² See in Steve Tsang, “Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s policy to Reconquer the Chinese

seriously preparing to win back the mainland. His staff had planned different ways, with or without foreign assistance, to recover the Chinese mainland. Detailed research covered every shore of the Chinese mainland available for amphibious warfare. The Nationalists was deeply aware of its forces' limitations; therefore, it concluded that the most promising method to return to the Chinese mainland involved the naval and air assistance of allies – this obviously meant America.⁶³

During the 1960s, however, when the heat of the Cold War had lessened, Taipei was not optimistic about Washington's continued generosity in aid. It therefore planned to trigger domestic conflicts on the mainland and then fight independently. US assistance was not a requirement to launch the war, although the Nationalists expected that US assistance would arrive if the Nationalists fought well.⁶⁴ With the strength of the Nationalist armed forces built in the past decade, it was ready to fight alone for at least 6 months, perhaps even as long as 24.⁶⁵

Mainland, 1949-1958" in Steve Tsang (ed.), *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993) 48-72, and Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) 253-254, 261, 268, 273-274.

⁶³ Memo from General Chief of Staff Peng Meng-ji to Chiang Kai-shek, 2/23/1955, in "Fangong denglu jihua" (The Plan of Counter-attack and Landing), from October 1952 to February 1956, PF 2130507/7, MND.

⁶⁴ Guojun jinchen zhanlue nengli jihua (Short-term Strategic Plan of the Armed Force), 7/1/1964, in "Guojun jinchen zhanlue nengli jihua" (Short-term Strategic Plan of the Armed Force), from September 1964 to October 1964, AR 541/6015.2, MND.

⁶⁵ Ibid.




Figure 3—A sketch map of the Nationalist 24-month counter-attack war plan in 1963. Courtesy of the ROC Defence Ministry

An Unhappy Ally

On the island of Taiwan, with American assistance, the Nationalists successfully transformed from a collapsing regime to a “major military power” in the anti-Communism crusade. Under this solid ROC-US alliance, the Nationalists should have been satisfied with its relationship with the US. Alas, American assistance resulted in American arrogance, and restrained by its American security shield, the Nationalists could only express its unhappiness under the table.

Since American assistance first arrived in Taiwan, a Nationalist high-ranking officer recalls, “the best houses in the cities were for American advisors, imported goods from American GI’s Post Exchanges were found circulating in city markets, American sergeants who were in charge of military aid materials looked superior to our officers, and even our liaison officers communicating with American advisors enjoyed an extra stipend and were paid much better than regular officers.”⁶⁶ Many

⁶⁶ Xijun Hua, 29, op., cit.

people in Taiwan felt themselves despised by Americans, and military service might have stronger impression because even American soldiers stationed in Japan paid more respects to the Nationalist officers than those who lived in Taiwan.⁶⁷

American Ambassador to the ROC Karl Rankin (1953-1957) confirmed this colonial manner. He recollected that “as the American official colony on Taiwan approached 10000, it became evident that quality was being diluted...a Little America grew up on Taiwan,...contact with the Chinese was much rarer....a sharp increase in street traffic [cars driven by or transporting Americans represented a large part of the street traffic in Taipei and other cities on the island] and American competition for the limited supply of good housing, tainted friendly atmosphere....with more than 5000 Americans enjoying living standards that seemed fabulous to most Chinese, we became egregiously conspicuous, to say at least.”⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the Nationalists heavily depended on American assistance so was unable to publicly denounce the American colonialist attitude. In the 1950s, as mentioned previously, the Nationalists desperately sought money and material to survive. When the US resumed its alliance with the Nationalists in 1950, the Nationalist military in Taiwan was so deprived of supplies, clothes, food and items “as small as a screw” that its survival depended on the Americans’ generosity.⁶⁹ Therefore, the Nationalist military chief of general staff recognized that he remained powerless as long as the issues were money-related, and he begged for aid from any American advisors he saw (看見佛就下拜，看見廟就燒香)。⁷⁰

The Nationalist military leaders had no choice but repeatedly asked their troops to cooperate well with American advisors, because “we have been waiting for US aid for long; we cannot allow anything to endanger it.”⁷¹ Maintaining friendship with the Americans became a tacit national education. For example, even Taiwanese

⁶⁷ Ibid, 55.

⁶⁸ Karl Rankin, *China Assignment* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 298-299.

⁶⁹ Speech, Air Force Commander Wang Shu-min to Tainan Supply Unit, 9/3/1953, in “Wang shuming jiangjun yenlunji” (Speeches of General Wang Shu-ming), from February 1947 to January 1953, vol.5, AR144.3/1010, MND.

⁷⁰ Speech, Military Chief of General Staff Zhou Zhirou to his staff, 4/30/1953, in “Canmou zongzhang xunshi jihuei” (Speeches of Military Chief of General Staff), from May 1952 to February 1960, AR144.3/2320, MND.

⁷¹ Speech, Military Chief of General Staff Zhou Zhirou to his staff, 7/27/1951, *ibid*.

civilians understood the importance of amity with the US: an Iranian senator recalls being given a discount in a Taiwan grocery store because the clerk mistook him for an American.⁷²

The Americans may have had reasons to disrespect the Nationalist troops on Taiwan that inherited some of the corruptive heritage from the mainland. In 1951, for example, the Nationalist general chief of staff announced that “as long as there is no more stealing and selling of military property, it will be a great achievement of our military reform.”⁷³ Corruptions must still be pervasive in the Nationalist troops until 1954-55, when American military advisors were generally furious that many American supplies were not well preserved. They were mad because American equipment was misused or wasted by lazy, unmotivated, unintelligent, and dishonest Nationalist officers who had been promoted because of their personal connections. About 80-90% of young American military advisors felt the incompetent Nationalists were hopeless in Taiwan. Most American advisors were eager to leave Taiwan forever, and claimed that they would tell their people in America that helping Taiwan was a waste of time, money and effort. Some officers encouraged their colleagues to read *Thunder Out of China*, a book criticizing the Nationalist administration between 1941 and 1946 on the mainland, because it perfectly illustrated what the Nationalist troops were on Taiwan.⁷⁴

Conversely, the Nationalists also had many reasons to be discontented. Although the Truman administration practically restarted US-ROC alliance after the Korean War, it did not immediately provide the Nationalists with enough advanced weapons to defend itself. For example, before 1953, the US only gave Taipei P-47s, a retired WWII propeller fighter capable of 450miles/hr, to fight against Beijing’s jet fighters that could reach speeds of 700 miles/hr.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Nationalists complained that many Americans were very picky when giving military aid to Taiwan, but were irresponsible about the date of delivery. Some of the American equipment arrived

⁷² A. Massoudi, *Zhongguo fangwenji* (Visit of China) (Taipei: English Free China Review, 1957), 31.

⁷³ Speech, Military Chief of General Staff Zhou Zhirou to his staff, 9/28/1951, op., cit.

⁷⁴ An unnamed report with Chiang Kai-shek’s written order to launch investigation on the top, 5/24/1955, in “Meijun junshi renyuan duei guojun junguan zi pinyu” (Comments of American Military Personnel on the NG’s Military Officers), from November 1951 to March 1957, PF 3132404/4, MND.

⁷⁵ Xijun Hua, 5.

broken or were outdated, but the very impoverished Nationalist troops had no choice but to accept it, and was forced to repair it out of its own limited budget.⁷⁶

Besides, the US government stipulated that American military materials were not for use against Mainland China without its permission because it feared involvement in a Chinese civil war. Consequently, much of the Nationalist combat strategy was unreasonably prohibited. The Nationalist off-shore artillery force, for instance, was not allowed to launch a pre-emptive strike even though a Communist shooting was imminent,⁷⁷ which explains why the Nationalists complained that American “have a capacity not enough for success yet more than enough for disaster.” (成事不足敗事有餘)⁷⁸

Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the government, a strong nationalist, and was very famous in his contempt for American advices. Comments like “America’s plan was naïve and funny; pay no attention to it” usually came out in his dialogue with his staff.⁷⁹ He was very much concerned about his forces’ interactions with American advisors, and continually told his staff that “asking for American assistance...[makes us] look like beggars,”⁸⁰ and “[if] we rely on foreigners, we will become their slaves.”⁸¹ He also shared his experience with stingy Americans: “During WWII, the American looked down on us..., they had a lot of money, but they refused to pay for our work.”⁸²

⁷⁶ Presidential Military Conference Notes, 12/8/1951, in “Zongtongfu junshi hueiyi” (Presidential Military Conference), from January 1951 to January 1952, AR 003.91/2693, MND.

⁷⁷ Conference Notes, ROC General Chief of Staff and American Military Advisor, 12/2/1955, in “Meizhengfu xianzhi wuojun gongji dalu zhengce” (The US Government Restrains our Attack against Mainland), from April 1953 to December 1955, PF 2130522/22, MND.

⁷⁸ Memo, Executive Yuan to Presidential Office, 5/9/1951, in “Duei Meiguo junyuan chuli zi jianyi” (Suggestions on American Military Aid), May 1951, PF 3131915/15, MND.

⁷⁹ Presidential Military Conference Notes, 3/6/1954, in “Zongtongfu junshi hueiyi” (Presidential Military Conference) from January 1954 to December 1954, AR 003.91/2693, MND.

⁸⁰ Presidential Military Conference Notes, 3/30/1965, in “Wushisnian di shi, shiyi, shier, shisan, shisi ci junshi hueiyi jilu, disice” (The 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th 1965 Military Conference Notes, vol 4), March 1965, PF 3134904/4, MND.

⁸¹ Presidential Military Conference Notes, 2/16/1965, in “Wushisnian di si, wu, liou, qi ci junshi hueiyi jilu, dierce” (The 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th 1965 Military Conference Notes, vol 2), February 1965, PF 3134904/4, MND.

⁸² Presidential Military Conference Notes, 1/19/1965, in “Wushisnian di san ci junshi hueiyi jilu, diyice” (The 3rd 1965 Military Conference Notes, vol 1), January 1965, PF 3134904/4, MND.

Since Chiang definitely knew how much his troops were relying on US aid, he also knew the Nationalists for that reason became a slave/beggar in front of Washington. Thus, he concluded that the US failed to treat the Nationalists like an ally,⁸³ characterized American advisors as “swaggering” (大模大樣),⁸⁴ and felt that they repeatedly insulted his government by this attitude.

But for fear of irritating the aid-giver, even Chiang was not able to confront Americans. He could only indirectly suggest the US government “take greater care in its relations with its Asian allies to ensure that they not appear as puppets of the United States.” His remark was so calm that needed CIA’s reinterpretation: Chiang was implying that the U.S. should take greater care with respect to the Nationalists itself to let it appear that the Nationalist actions were those of an independent country, not responses to Washington's bidding.⁸⁵

Because Chiang was not able to be independent from the US, he had to maintain his temper between an obedient vassal and an independent ally. For example, to the American President, Chiang’s statement sound like chasing after his lover: “[I] would never do anything inimical to US interests and would continue to regard basic US interests as being in line with those of [my] government.” He also expressed a sincere hope that the US government “felt the same way.”⁸⁶

Allying itself with a dominating superpower, Chiang had few channels to effectively express dissent toward American arrogance. Besides using anti-American language privately, Chiang sought other methods to relieve the frustration of a nationalistic aid-recipient. Those in the government who clearly advocated pro-American policies could serve as proof of Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-American sentiment. Wu Guozheng, who held a PhD degree from Princeton University, was assigned by Chiang as the governor of Taiwan in December 1949 to assure American friendship. In politics, Wu enjoyed the reputation of western democracy fan, which was useful when he bargained with US representatives for an exchange between his

⁸³ Presidential Military Conference Notes, 3/2/1965, in “Wushisininian di si, wu, liou, qi ci junshi hueiyi jilu, dierce” (The 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th 1965 Military Conference Notes, vol 2), op., cit.

⁸⁴ Presidential Military Conference Notes, 6/23/1964, in “Zongtongfu junshi hueiyi” (Presidential Military Conference) from January 1964 to December 1964, AR 003.91/2693, MND.

⁸⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1964-1968, 286.

⁸⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, US President Johnson and ROC Vice President C.K. Yen, May 9, 1967, National Security File (China), Box 241, f: China memo, Vol. 4, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

reform and American assistance. As US-ROC relations improved, the importance of Wu in the function of luring American assistance gradually diminished. Chiang soon forced Wu to resign in 1953. Two years later, after the US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty was complete, Chiang removed General Sun Li-jen, a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and who had long been seen by America as the Nationalist most honest, competent, and liberal military leader. Another senior diplomat, George Yeh, who had served as the Nationalist foreign minister and ambassador to the US, grew too close to America's foreign policy views. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek considered him unreliable and purged him in 1961.

Many people in Taiwan finally manifested their unhappiness towards the US in 1957 when American Master Sergeant Robert Reynolds shot a Chinese man, Liu Tze-jan. During the ensuing trial, one of Taiwan's most popular newspapers called the court case "critical to proving whether a Chinese life is worth the same as an American's, even if China is an American aid-recipient."⁸⁷ Two days later, the American military court in Taipei found the sergeant innocent, and an American plane immediately flew him out of Taiwan.

The trial seemed to declare that Chinese life was worthless, so people gradually assembled to protest American imperialism. An anti-American nationalistic demonstration immediately grew in size. Angry protestors, about 25000, encircled the American Embassy in Taipei and the demonstration soon turned violent. Rioters ran into the embassy, replaced the American flag with the ROC's, shouted "Long Live the ROC", and "Get Out, America," then ransacked the embassy and hurled the ambassador's safe out of a second story window. Meanwhile, Taipei's police watched without reacting.⁸⁸

It was abnormal for an anti-American riot of this size to break out during the decade that the Nationalists needed the American's favour most. Given that Taiwan was under strict martial law at the time, the US government saw the mismanagement of such a large demonstration as a Nationalist conspiracy; it believed that some officials knew about the protest in advance and had taken advantage of the situation.⁸⁹ By launching such a demonstration, the Nationalists might intentionally relieve

⁸⁷ *Lianhebao* (United Daily), 5/21/1957.

⁸⁸ Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son*, 237. op., cit.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

long-term anti-American sentiment, but was also punished by secret cut of a large share of US financial assistance.⁹⁰

What the US government did not know or did not care to know, however, was how much the Nationalists contributed to restraining domestic anger against the Americans. According to a 1966 report from the Nationalist National Security Bureau, the stay of American soldiers in Taiwan resulted to an estimated 2000-2500 criminal cases annually, and for the reasons of maintaining a friendly relationship with America, the government intentionally downplayed these events, especially the numerous rapes committed by American soldiers.⁹¹ The Nationalists must be mad of American mistreatment, but was too weak to argue with the United States. This “legitimate and powerful” Chinese government on Taiwan still had to behave as a small state in front of America.

Conclusion

A decade after the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, it had been promoted to the status of a critical fortress in American-led Free World, and had become able to provide military assistance to other anti-Communist regimes. With American military rebuilding endeavours behind the scenes, the Nationalists was inflated, and looked strong in front of third parties. Taipei gained respect, honour, legitimacy and confidence by delivering assistance to other countries, though the Nationalists itself was heavily relying on and dedicated to ensuring American aid.

To guarantee American aid, the Nationalists had to strenuously demonstrate its anti-Communism to the US and to the world through its “inexpensive” military personnel. However, the Nationalists received America’s help along with its imperialist attitude, which was hard for this government’s undying Chinese nationalism to accept. Nevertheless, because the ROC’s legitimacy and survival on Taiwan depended on the kindness of the US government, the Nationalists had to restrain its discontent for fear of endangering its friendship with the US. Even Chiang

⁹⁰ I-Cheng Loh, *Weichen wuli kehueitian* (An Insignificant Courtier Cannot Change the Nation’s Destiny) (Taipei: Tian Xia, 2002), 116-120.

⁹¹ “Jielou meijun zaitai exin” (Exposing Misconducts of American Soldiers in Taiwan), *Yazhou Zhoukan* (Asia Weekly), no.18 (May 6, 2001), 56-58.

Kai-shek himself could only express his anti-imperialism sentiments indirectly and implicitly, through means like purging pro-US officials.

By analyzing the capabilities and limitations of the Nationalists, we see the side effects of American assistance toward the ROC on Taiwan. The US, in asking the ROC to play vanguard, enlarged the ROC to an importance that was not suitable for its appearance, and gave the Nationalists erroneous impressions of national power as well as inaccurate estimates of its own influence. Therefore, with its politics and culture inherited from the Mainland, the Nationalists faced the problem of maintaining its big-power image in the real world. The fact that it was a small state imitating the manners of a great power goes a long way toward explaining the Nationalist unrealistic behaviour in its foreign relations.

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