

國防大學政治作戰學院 107 學年度博碩士班



身分：全時進修軍、自費生

所別：政治學系博士班

科目：研究方法（國家安全與政治戰略課程組）

一、科學研究之所以優於其它知識獲取的方法，主要是它

建立在一系列的基本假定，而這些基本假定是甚麼？

試說明之。(25%)

二、何謂變相？試就依變相、自變相、控制變相、連續變

相等名詞加以說明之？(25%)

三、一個完整的研究程序包括那些主要階段？試簡述之。(25%)

四、就您所學的研究方法，擇一擅長之研究法，並以近期

中共對台 31 項政策為題撰寫一份研究計畫書？(25%)



身分：全時進修軍、自費生

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科目：研究方法（輿論戰與策略傳播課程組）

申論題每大題 25 分，合計 100 分。

一、台灣民意基金會日前舉行「台灣人對政府官員的感覺」全國性民調發表會；其中針對軍人的好感度方面，整體有 56% 台灣人有好感，高居 7 類人民公僕第三位，由此可見國防部政戰局這一年來在重振軍人形象帶來成效。對於軍人的好感度方面，民調資料顯示，7.9% 非常好，47.7% 還算好，25.8% 不怎麼好，11.2% 非常不好，2.5% 沒什麼特別感覺，5% 不知道；整體而言，有 56% 台灣人對軍人有好感，但仍有 37% 反感。請回答下列問題：

- (1) 本調查的母群體？
- (2) 如以電話調查方式實施，抽樣架構應該是什麼？
- (3) 本調查的信心水準是 95%；抽樣誤差是 $\pm 3\%$ 。請解釋其含意。
- (4) 本調查屬於對比式民調，請問其中有哪些系統性的謬誤？
- (5) 本項調查使採 Likert 表尺進行測量，請問其優缺點？

二、以下是一篇研究論文的摘要，請閱讀後回答問題。

臉書 (Facebook) 是國防部門廣泛運用的新媒體平台，是軍隊執行政策溝通、爭取民意支持的重要管道，本實驗採 3X2 組間設計，檢視台灣國防部發言人的臉書發文策略對閱聽人之議題設定及預示效果之影響。本研究亦探討媒體使用依賴程度與議題設定效果的關聯性，結果發現，使用社群媒體時間越多的閱聽人，受臉書的議題設定效果影響越顯著。

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(1) 何謂組間設計？

(2) 本實驗有幾個因子？

(3) 如果您是研究者，要得到「使用社群媒體時間越多的閱聽人，受臉書的議題設定效果影響越顯著」的結果，應該設定何者為自變項？

(4) 如果您是研究者，要得到「使用社群媒體時間越多的閱聽人，受臉書的議題設定效果影響越顯著」的結果，應該設定何者為應變項？

(5) 本研究在研究方法層面的限制為何？

三、以下是一篇研究論文的摘要，請閱讀後回答問題。

本研究目的為應用網路模因理論為架構，以 2013 年洪仲丘事件為背景，透過大數據文本分析法，以 R 語言及簡易貝氏機器學習為工具，爬蒐 12,197 網路公開頁面，分析 90,062 則文本，企圖檢視社群網站及網路傳統媒體的謠言傳播模式。研究發現相較全假謠言，半真假謠言在被複製的持續時間、傳統媒體複製次數、社群媒體複製次數均明顯高於全假謠言。半真假謠言變異程度與擴散程度皆高於全假謠言，且謠言在社群媒體上的傳播能力明顯高於網路傳統媒體。


(1) 試論述這種大數據分析法在信、效度的優缺點。

(2) 請簡述大數據、機器學習與人工智慧間的關聯性。

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


四、以下是一篇研究論文的摘要，請閱讀後回答問題。

本研究以修正式德菲法 (Modified Delphi)，援引議題管理與議題建構等觀點作為理論框架，輔以整理國軍危機傳播議題管理的態樣為主軸，並整合新媒體的特色後，形成一套國軍處理新媒體危機議題的「關鍵因素」檢核標準，再透過募集產、官、學界專家意見，以綜整後再回饋之反覆聚斂模式，試圖歸納出新媒體議題管理之關鍵檢核因素，以供國軍管理網路議題時之參據。本研究合計進行 3 回合問卷，聚斂包含「來源層面因素」、「訊息層面因素」、「媒體管道層面因素」、「閱聽人因素」等 4 大構面，合計 51 項當前國軍面對新媒體環境下議題管理的關鍵因素。

- (1) 試論述這種德菲分析法在信效度的優缺點。
- (2) 試論述德菲法在應用層面的限制。

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身分：全時進修軍、自費生

所別：政治學系博士班

科目：研究方法（心理戰與軍事社會工作課程組）

申論題：每題 25 分

一、大數據(big data)與資料探勘(data mining)是現代社會科學領域中亟待開發與運用的一項分析技術，請問你對上述兩種分析技術的理解為何?(10%)

你認為上述二種分析技術運用在心理作戰或軍隊社會工作領域中的可行性及運用範疇如何?(15%)

二、過去數十年來在社會科學研究領域中，量化(quantitative research)與質化(qualitative research)兩種研究典範彼此多有衝突。近年來有學者提倡融合方法研究(mixed methods research)，請說明此一研究方法的內涵。(10%)

舉一實際研究主題，說明融合方法研究的運用模式。(15%)

三、在實際進行研究的過程中，一但有了研究的主題或方向後，下一步要做的就是進行「文獻探討」，請說明文獻探討的目的為何?(15%)

現代科技進步，絕大多數學術文獻搜尋工作已可透過網際網路取得，如果你想搜尋與你研究主題相關的學術文獻，你會透過網路上的那些媒介來搜尋你所需要的學術文獻(10%)。(請列出特定的網站、平台、資料庫等，並簡要說明從其中可以得到哪些資訊)



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四、請就以下的論文摘要，簡要說明研究目標、研究方法、研究結果及結論。(25%)

Relation Between Traumatic Events and Suicide Attempts in Canadian Military Personnel (Belik, Stein, Asmundson, & Sareen, 2009)

Objective: To determine whether exposure to particular types of traumatic events was differentially associated with suicide attempts in a representative sample of active military personnel.

Method: Data came from the Canadian Community Health Survey: Mental Health and Well-Being Canadian Forces Supplement (CCHS-CFS), a cross-sectional survey that provided a comprehensive examination of mental disorders, health, and the well-being of currently active Canadian military personnel ($n = 8441$; aged 16 to 54 years; response rate 81.1%). Respondents were asked about exposure to 28 traumatic events that occurred during their lifetime. Suicide attempts were measured using a question about whether the person ever “attempted suicide or tried to take [his or her] own life.”

Results: The prevalence of lifetime suicide attempts for currently active Canadian military men and women was 2.2% and 5.6%, respectively. Sexual and other interpersonal traumas (for example, rape, sexual assault, spousal abuse, child abuse) were significantly associated with suicide attempts in both men (adjusted odds ratios [AORs] ranging from 2.31 to 4.43) and women (AORs ranging from 1.73 to 3.71), even after adjusting for sociodemographics and mental disorders. Additionally, the number of traumatic events experienced was positively associated with increased risk of suicide attempts, indicating a dose-response effect of exposure to trauma.


Conclusions: The current study is the first to demonstrate that sexual and other interpersonal traumatic events are associated with suicide attempts in a representative sample of active Canadian military men and women.

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- ✓ 一、科學方法論的定義及特徵為何？(20 分)
- ✓ 二、試述操作概念的測量標準與評估原則？(20 分)
- ✓ 三、試從內、外效度說明如何進行有效檢定？(20 分)
- ✓ 四、試說明何謂大數據？此類量化研究方法對社會科學研究之助益為何？(20%)
- ✓ 五、解釋名詞：(20%)
 - 1. 理性主義
 - 2. 實證主義
 - 3. 內容分析法
 - 4. 演繹法
 - 5. R 語言

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國防大學政治作戰學院 107 學年度博碩士班入學測驗命題紙

身分：全時進修軍、自費生

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科目：專業英文（國安全與政治戰略課程組）



共二題，每題 50 分，共 100 分。

REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM

Many people speak of "guerrilla warfare," but this is a misnomer and a redundancy, for *guerrilla* is simply Spanish for "little war," what Spaniards practiced against Napoleon. It is not really about ambushes and booby traps but the accompanying political action. The two combined equal revolutionary political warfare, which Bernard Fall described as the struggle "to establish a competitive system of control over the population." Fall, an expert on Vietnam who died when he stepped on a land mine there in 1967, emphasized *administration* as the crux of revolutionary warfare. "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being outadministered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front."

Fall discovered, both under the French in North Vietnam during the early 1950s and under the Americans in South Vietnam during the early 1960s, that the Communists were collecting taxes throughout most of the country under the very noses of the regimes they were overthrowing. The occupying power, whether French or American, deceived itself by being able to drive through villages in armored convoys; this does not indicate administrative control, which may be in the hands of the insurgents. The emphasis on military hardware is a big mistake, argued Fall, for it detracts from the administrative element.

The Vietnamese insurgents were able to outadminister the regime for several reasons. In the first place, they were able to identify closely with the population something the French and Americans could never do. Indeed, the fact that the anti-Communist side in both Vietnam wars was connected with white foreigners gave the kiss of death to the effort. There was no political package the French or Americans could sell to the locals. Even the Saigon rulers lacked legitimacy among their countrymen. The Diem and subsequent Saigon governments were run by Central and North Vietnamese urban Catholics who disliked the largely Buddhist rural South Vietnamese. The Saigon officials were city dwellers who disdained assignments in the provinces and working with the peasants, which was precisely the Communists' strong point.


Terror, to be sure, plays a role in revolutionary political warfare. The Vietcong murdered many Saigon officials and government-appointed village headmen. But the villagers were not uniformly horrified at such terror because it was selective and targeted at people who were outsiders anyway. To many peasants, the Vietcong executions seemed like extralegal punishment for collaborators. When the Americans made whole villages disappear, that was terror. There's nothing selective about napalm.

While the insurgent is patiently building a network to supplant the regime, the occupier or government is impatiently trying to substitute firepower for legitimacy. The killing of civilians produces more sympathizers and recruits for the guerrillas. The government's overreliance on firepower erodes its tenuous moral claims to leadership of the nation. Some critics wonder if the American people and leadership ever understood what we were up against in Vietnam. We fought a military war while our opponents fought a political war, and in the end the political mattered more. Said one American officer as he surveyed the smoking ruins of a village, "Unfortunately, we had to destroy the village in order to save it."

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WHY WAR?

Much has been written on why there is war. Most thinkers agree that war has many causes, not just one. Very broadly, though, theories on the cause of war are divided into two general camps, the micro and the macro—the little, close-up picture as opposed to the big, panoramic picture.

Micro Theories

Micro theories are rooted in biology and psychology. They might explain war as the result of genetic human aggressiveness. Millions of years of evolution have made people fighters—to obtain food, defend their families, and guard their territory. In this, humans are no different from most mammals. Most anthropologists reject such biological determinism, arguing that primitive peoples exhibit a wide variety of behavior—some are aggressive and some not—that can be explained only by culture, learned behavior. Writers with a psychological orientation explore the personalities of leaders, what made them that way, and how they obtained their hold over the masses and brought them to war.

Biological and psychological theories offer some insights but fall far short of explaining wars. If humans are naturally aggressive, why aren't all nations constantly at war? How is it that countries can fight a long series of wars—the Russian-Turkish struggle around the Black Sea or the Arab-Israeli wars—under different leaders who surely must have been psychologically distinct? Biological and psychological approaches may offer insights into some of the underlying causes of war but not the immediate causes. There is a certain human aggressiveness, but under what circumstances does it come out? For this we turn to macro theories.

Macro Theories

Macro theories are rooted in history and political science. They concentrate on the power and ambitions of states. States, not individuals, are the key actors. Where they can, states expand, as in the Germans' medieval push to the east, the Americans' "manifest destiny," the growth of the British Empire, and the Soviets' takeover of Eastern Europe. Only countervailing power may stop the drive to expand. One country, fearing the growing power of a neighbor, will strengthen its defenses or form alliances to offset the neighbor's power. Much international behavior can be explained by the aphorisms *Si vis pacem para bellum* ("If you want peace, prepare for war") and "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Political leaders have an almost automatic feel for national interest and power and move to enhance them. Does the pursuit of power lead to war or peace? Again, there are two broad theories.

Balance of Power The oldest and most commonly held theory is that peace results when several states, improving their national power and forming alliances, balance one another. Would-be expansionists are blocked. According to balance-of-power theorists, the great periods of relative peace—between the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the wars that grew out of the French Revolution (1792–1814), and again from 1815 to the start of World War I in 1914—have been times

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when the European powers balanced each other. When the balances broke down, there was war. Fighting in Bosnia calmed in 1995 only after power there roughly balanced. When the Serbs were ahead, they had no motive to settle; when they were on the defensive, they decided to stop the fighting. Many thinkers consider the Cold War a big and durable balance-of-power system that explains why there was relative peace—at least no World War III—for more than four decades.

Hierarchy of Power Other analysts reject the balance-of-power theory. First, because calculations of power are so problematic, it is impossible to know when power balances. Second, often periods of peace occurred when power was out of balance, when states were ranked hierarchically in terms of power. Then every nation knew where it stood on sort of a ladder of relative power. It is in times of transition, when the power hierarchy is blurred, that countries are tempted to go to war. After a big war with a definitive outcome, there is peace because then relative power is clearly known. If this theory is correct, then trying to achieve an accurate balance of power is the wrong thing to do; it could lead to war because eventually one state may think it has a good chance to win.

Misperception

Weaving micro and macro approaches together, some thinkers focus on "image" or "perception" as the key to war. Both psychological and power approaches contribute something but are incomplete. It's not the real situation (which is hard to know) but what leaders perceive that makes them decide for war or peace. They often misperceive, seeing hostility and superior weaponry in another country, which sees itself as acting defensively and as just trying to catch up in weaponry.

John F. Kennedy portrayed the Soviets as enjoying a "missile gap" over us; he greatly increased the U.S. missile program. It turned out that the Soviets were actually behind us, and they perceived the American effort as a threat that they had to match. The misperceptions led to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the closest we came to World War III. Iraq built weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but they were dismantled under UN supervision in the 1990s. The Bush 43 administration was convinced Iraq had revived its WMD programs and went to war in 2003 to remove a nonexistent threat. In the emotional and patriotic climate after 9/11, America was angry and suspicious. Intelligence data were skewed to show what the administration wanted to show. Misperception can count for more than reality.

In misperception or image theory, the psychological and real worlds bounce against each other in the minds of political leaders. They think they are acting defensively, but their picture of the situation may be distorted. In our time, it is interesting to note, no country ever calls its actions anything but defensive. The Americans in Vietnam and Iraq saw themselves as defending freedom; the Russians in Chechnya see themselves as defending their country. In its own eyes, no nation is ever aggressive. A country—under the guidance of its leaders, its ideology, and its mass media—may work itself into a state of fear and rationalize aggressive moves as defensive. Under rabidly nationalistic leadership, most Germans and Japanese in World War II saw themselves as defending their countries against hostile powers. Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević played the Serbian nationalist card and got most Serbs to believe they were surrounded by enemies. Once convinced that they are being attacked, normally peaceful people will commit all manner of atrocities.



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答題說明：請以藍、黑色鋼筆或原子筆在答案紙上作答，禁止使用鉛筆，違者本科不予計分，字跡力求清晰，如字跡不清致閱卷委員無法辨別，概由考生自行負責。

第一部分：英文字彙能力測驗（30%）

字彙題共 10 題，每題 3 分。第 1 題至第 10 題，每題有 4 個選項，其中只有一個是正確或最適當的選項，各題答對者，得 3 分；答錯、未作答或畫記多於一個選項者，該題以零分計算。

下篇短文包含 5 個英文單字，請仔細閱讀文章內容，並依據文意選出與題目英文單字最適切的同義詞。

We (1) hypothesize that generic frames (2) influence what news people share on Facebook and Twitter through three different (3) routes: emotions, motivations, and psychological engagement. Using a mixed-methods design, a content analysis of a representative sample of articles published in six Chilean outlets was combined with in-depth interviews with digital journalists. After controlling for issue, newsworthiness, informational utility, valence, and other confounds, results show that—across platforms—a morality frame increases news sharing, whereas a conflict frame decreases it. (4) Emphasizing economic consequences also decreases sharing, but only on Facebook. Surprisingly, the human interest angle has no (5) noticeable effects. These results show that news frames can have behavioral consequences, and confirm the existence of a gap between preferred frames of journalists and users.

- | | | | | |
|----|--------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1. | (a)posit | (b)represent | (c)indicate | (d)examine |
| 2. | (a)develop | (b)increase | (c)shape | (d)produce |
| 3. | (a)practices | (b)analyses | (c)changes | (d)ways |
| 4. | (a)weakening | (b)stressing | (c)generating | (d)deciding |
| 5. | (a)abstract | (b)obvious | (c)possible | (d)minimal |



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The aim of this article is to (6) improve understanding of self-effects in social media, and to compare self-effects with reception effects. Self-effects are the effects of messages the cognitions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of the message creators/senders themselves. A total of 4 theories have tried to explain self-effects in offline environments: self-persuasion, self-concept change, expressive writing, and political deliberation. The article reviews research into online self-effects that evolved from each of these theories, and argues why self-effects may be stronger online than offline. Based on this review, a model is introduced that helps (7) explain how online self- and reception effects may (8) coalesce and (9) amplify each other. The article ends by presenting some (10) suggestions for future research.

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 6. | (a)determine | (b)prove | (c)enhance | (d)show |
| 7. | (a)explicate | (b)explore | (c)advance | (d)expand |
| 8. | (a)disappear | (b)reinforce | (c)separate | (d)integrate |
| 9. | (a)diminish | (b)intensify | (c)condense | (d)execute |
| 10. | (a)advice | (b)opinions | (c)solutions | (d)points |



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科目：專業英文（輿論戰與策略傳播課程組）

第二部分：學術期刊文意理解測驗（50%）


本部分共有兩組題型：進階詞彙題（共 4 題，每題 5 分，共 20 分）與語句翻譯題（共 5 題，每題 6 分，共 30 分）。「進階詞彙題」部分，請根據題目的英文單字，寫出最適切的中文翻譯。「語句翻譯題」部分，請根據題目的英文短句譯成正確、通順、達意的中文。

This large-scale intermedia agenda-setting analysis examines U.S. online media sources for 2015. The network agenda-setting model showed that media agendas were highly **(11) homogeneous** and **(12) reciprocal**. Online partisan media played a leading role in the entire media agenda. Two elite newspapers—The New York Times and The Washington Post—were found to no longer be in control of the news agenda and were more likely to follow online partisan media. **(13) This article provides evidence for a nuanced view of the network agenda-setting model; intermedia agenda-setting effects varied by media type, issue type, and time periods.**

11. 請寫出 homogeneous 的中文翻譯。

12. 請寫出 reciprocal 的中文翻譯。

13. This article provides evidence for a nuanced view of the network agenda-setting model; intermedia agenda-setting effects varied by media type, issue type, and time periods. 請將此短句譯成中文。



身分：全時進修軍、自費生


所別：政治學系博士班

科目：專業英文 (輿論戰與策略傳播課程組)

(14) Citizens' levels of mistrust toward the media, as well as their perception of media bias, have increased in past years in most Western democracies. This study explores how these negative observations on journalism may influence their use of traditional, citizen, and social media for news. Drawing on two-wave U.S. panel data, results suggest that media trust and perceived bias relate to media consumption differently. (15) Trust in social and citizen media positively predicts use of news via social media, but has no effect on traditional or citizen news use. By contrast, perceived media bias is associated with decreased news use overall.

14. Citizens' levels of mistrust toward the media, as well as their perception of media bias, have increased in past years in most Western democracies. 請將此短句譯成中文。

15. Trust in social and citizen media positively predicts use of news via social media, but has no effect on traditional or citizen news use. 請將此短句譯成中文。



身分：全時進修軍、自費生

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科目：專業英文 (輿論戰與策略傳播課程組)

This study postulates that people's beliefs about their own susceptibility to persuasion efforts can influence advertising effects. It thus represents the first explication of the process by which self-beliefs determine advertising effects, through their influence on the subjective experience of the ease of being persuaded. (16)

Integrating three research streams (metacognition, persuasion knowledge, and cognitive correction), the current study proposes a model of three influence patterns, which are contingent on whether people perceive the advertising message to be high in manipulative intent and whether people are motivated to be accurate in their judgments.

If advertising messages are low in manipulative intent, such that the persuasion seems acceptable, susceptibility self-beliefs influence people's attitudes toward the advertised products or issues (i.e., expected effects). If advertising messages are high in (17) **manipulative intent**, such that persuasion seems unacceptable, people exhibit suppression (no effects) if they have weak accuracy motives, but they exhibit overcorrection (opposite effects) if they are strongly motivated to be accurate. (18)

Five studies test these predictions and reveal some demographic characteristics associated with self-beliefs about susceptibility to persuasion. The findings thus have important implications for advertising practitioners.

16. Integrating three research streams (metacognition, persuasion knowledge, and cognitive correction), the current study proposes a model of three influence patterns, which are contingent on whether people perceive the advertising message to be high in manipulative intent and whether people are motivated to be accurate in their judgments. 請將此短句譯成中文。

17. 請寫出 manipulative intent 的中文翻譯。

18. Five studies test these predictions and reveal some demographic characteristics associated with self-beliefs about susceptibility to persuasion. 請將此短句譯成中文。



身分：全時進修軍、自費生

所別：政治學系博士班

科目：專業英文（輿論戰與策略傳播課程組）

Social media allow users not only to read news, but also to evaluate, reconstruct, and share it. This study (19) conceptualizes curatorial news use via social media as an important news use behavior, which involves evaluating the existing news, adding new values by reconstructing it, and then sharing it with other social media users. An analysis of survey data from 650 South Korean adults shows that curatorial news use on social media has a significantly positive association with political knowledge, internal political efficacy, and offline and online political participation. The interaction of social media news use and curatorial news use is also significantly associated with high levels of political knowledge and political participation.

19. 請寫出 conceptualizes 的中文翻譯。

第三部分：學術期刊摘要翻譯（20%）

20. 請將下列短文翻譯成正確、通順、達意的中文。

Despite extensive research in product placement, little research has examined how different consumer groups respond to product placement. The present study aims to fill this gap, employing cluster analysis to segment U.S. consumers according to cognitive and attitudinal responses they have developed to advertising in general. Analyzing a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults ($N = 21,944$), this study identified five clusters. The clusters reflect varying responses to product placement on television and in movies, as well as distinct demographic and media usage profiles. These findings are discussed from the perspective of consumer socialization and marketplace social intelligence.



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所別：政治學系博士班

科目：專業英文（心理戰與軍事社會工作課程組）

一、請將以下的論文研究題目翻譯成中文(20%)

(一) Young-Adult Military Veterans' Employment: An Analysis of Human Capital and Social Capital (5%)

(二) A Study on Military Career Transition and Life Course (5%)

(三) From the exploration of gender consciousness to the practice of subject consciousness: The Life Transforming Journey of Military Women (5%)

(四) The Boundary of Dual Loyalty-The Existence and Establishment of Military Social Work (5%)

二、請以中文摘述以下的研究內容

(一) The research aimed for exploring the influence on organizational communication efficiency and social support of the service members when using LINE as a grapevine in military. It was conducted via structured questionnaire collected by internet. 254 questionnaires were returned (53%) with 245 questionnaires are effective (96.46%). Significant results were as followed:

1. Most of the social supports exchanging on LINE are information, social network, and tangible supports, while esteem and emotional supports are less.
2. Service members with different scales of using motivation of LINE will have different impacts on the receptivity to organizational communication efficiency and social supports.



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3. Service members with stronger using motivation, more using days per week, longer time for every usage, broader coverage of interactive objects will have higher receptivity to organizational communication efficiency and social supports. Besides, there is a positive correlation between organizational communication efficiency and social support, too.
4. The scale of receptivity to organizational communication efficiency and using motivation of LINE can positively predict one' s social supports, which means higher organizational communication efficiency and using motivation of LINE bring more social supports. (25%)

(二)After Xi Jinping became the national leader, China' s psychological warfare against Taiwan has carried out strategic approaches that are sometimes softer than before, and sometimes harder than before. This paper expounds the development and tactics of China' s psychological warfare, and analyzes its meanings, backgrounds, and thoughts, with specific cases. Moreover, this paper studies the contents of China' s policies toward Taiwan, with the emphasis on the insistence of 1992-Consensus and One-China argument, opposition to Taiwan independence, and peaceful unification. Besides, this paper is focused on China' s psychological strategies in terms of political, economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural aspects, and the means, methods and channels that they use. Finally, going through all the data, this paper comes up with suggestions, recommended reactions, and improvements for Taiwan. (15%)

國防大學政治作戰學院 107 學年度博碩士班入學測驗命題紙 (續 2)


身分：全時進修軍、自費生

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(三) Since the Taiwan government implemented the National Pension System on October 1, 2008, its old-age pension has established a social insurance system as its main support type. However, farmers' old-age pensions were not included in this program, but rather were allocated as a non-contributory benefit. This 20-year scheme was disbursed universally for 16 years; however, for the last four years, the welfare allowance has been modified into a means-tested program. This study examined the type and sustainability of this non-contributory welfare benefit, using the time series analysis method to forecast future financial expenditures. The monthly spending data on the old-age farmers welfare allowance program from January 2007 to April 2015 were collected from the Bureau of Labor Insurance of the Ministry of Labor; it comprised a total of 100 observations. An 8-year trend of financial expenditure was estimated. In addition, the program's sustainable problems were analyzed, and possible system reforms recommended. (20%)



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(四) The purpose of the study is to examine the status quo of education and practice of military social workers in Taiwan and to investigate difficulties and challenges facing practitioners, in contrast with the trends of contemporary western social work. The result suggests that difficulties facing practitioners in military social work include:

1. Neglect of social policy analysis and advocacy of reform of techniques while over-emphasizing clinical case service.
2. Neglecting the social environment within the military while over-emphasizing the resolution of personal problems.
3. The lack of a lasting professional training program.
4. A lack of a specialty code for political warfare officers involved in the social work profession.
5. Social work in military society has suffered from the conflict between its intangible position and profession, and facing possible vaporization.
6. Focusing on short-term, passive preventive actions rather than a long-term, pro-active plan in overall social work development.

In conclusion, this study proposes concrete suggestions regarding the missions of decision-making departments within the military forces of Taiwan and non-military educational units and practice institutes in the hope that military social work will move forward and go beyond tradition.

(20%)

國防大學政治作戰學院 107 學年度博碩士班入學測驗命題紙



身分：全時進修軍、自費生

所別：政治學系博士班

科目：專業英文（中共軍事事務課程組）

1. 英譯中(30 分)

During Hu Jintao's second term as general party secretary (2007 to 2012), total national expenditures increased 51 percent faster than domestic security spending. During Xi Jinping's current term (2013 to 2017), China's domestic security spending grew 34 percent faster than total spending. In particular, security-related expenditures in sensitive regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet have risen so rapidly that they now exceed the United States average on a per capita PPP basis. As China continues to invest heavily in developing ever more advanced security technologies, every dollar spent on domestic security will experience further leverage.

These figures begin to reveal the cost of maintaining stability especially in restive minority regions. However, the full amount of such expenditures is likely higher than official domestic security budget figures, in some regions perhaps significantly higher. Between 2007-2008, China spent a higher percentage of its total budget on domestic security than in 2016-2017. But overall budget increases might perhaps be concealing other investments that are security-related in one way or another.

2. 英譯中(30 分)

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is unlikely to dramatically alter the trajectory of China's ongoing nuclear force modernization or result in major changes to its nuclear policy. Beijing will likely view it as confirmation of an approach that is already well underway, one that is aimed at realizing improvements both in terms of the quality and quantity of its nuclear forces. Indeed, China seems likely to follow a course consistent with a recent recommendation by Li Bin, who suggests that in response to the NPR, China should not only "continue to focus on raising the survivability of its nuclear weapons...and their penetration capability against missile defense systems," but also "reaffirm that its nuclear weapons are only for deterring a nuclear attack" (Global Times,

國防大學政治作戰學院 107 學年度博碩士班入學測驗命題紙(續 1)

國防大學
博·碩士班
招生委員會

身分：全時進修軍、自費生

所別：政治學系博士班

科目：專業英文（中共軍事事務課程組）

January 25). The NPR, however, is not China's only concern. Indeed, Chinese analysts are undoubtedly awaiting the new US missile defense review that is scheduled to be released following the NPR. If the review includes an increase in US missile defense capabilities in response to North Korea, as is widely expected, Chinese strategists may conclude that further increases in force size or additional missile defense countermeasures are needed to ensure that China's nuclear deterrent will continue to meet its national security requirements.

3. 英譯中(40 分)

A terse February 25 article by Xinhua News Agency sent shockwaves around the world with its announcement that the Communist Party of China's (CPC) Central Committee had proposed amending the PRC Constitution to remove term limits for the country's president and vice-president (Xinhua, February 25). The proposed amendment would remove the only remaining legal impediment to PRC President and CPC Chairman Xi Jinping remaining in office beyond the end of his term in 2022, and seems to presage a return to one-man rule of the kind not seen in China since the heyday of Mao Zedong.

But mostly lost in the uproar over the end of collective rule was the fact that the proposed amendment is but one of a larger package of amendments proposed by the Central Committee—21 in total—that, as a whole, comprise the largest rewriting of the PRC Constitution since its wholesale revision in 1982. Although the PRC Constitution nominally functions as the country's foundational legal text, the relative ease with which it is revised to reflect changing political priorities—and the inability of China's Supreme People's Court to exercise proper judicial review—means that, in practice, revisions can be also understood as declarative statements of political authority and intent. Thus, together with the end of term limits, the proposed revisions both signal the extent to which Xi Jinping has consolidated power, and trace the outlines of the policy program he intends to pursue, at home and abroad.